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The history of the People’s Republic of China since its founding in 1949 can be 
roughly divided into two halves. The first three decades witnessed the coun-
try’s transition to, and experiment of, socialism under Mao through collectiv-
ization in agriculture, nationalization of industry and commerce, and the 
creation of a planned economy, and through successive political movements 
that surged in the Anti-Rightist campaign in 1957, the Socialist Education in 
the early 1960s, and the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s. Since Deng 
Xiaoping established himself as the paramount leader of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) around 1980, China has undergone waves of economic 
reforms, ranging from implementing the Household Responsibility System in 
agriculture to establishing Special Economic Zones, encouraging direct foreign 
investments and joint ventures, devolving economic planning power to local 
authorities and enterprises, experimenting various reforms to incentivize the 
management of state-owned enterprises (SOE), and finally corporatizing and 
privatizing the SOEs in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Politically, the reform era 
also saw significant changes in the inner workings of the party-state, most sig-
nificantly the introduction of collective leadership and fixed tenure of top 
leaders, and the establishment of a legal system to accommodate the increas-
ingly sophisticated economy and society, while the CCP strived to retain 
 control of the entire political system.
Chinese intellectuals’ reflections on the history and legacies of the Maoist 
era and their reactions to post-Mao reforms varied over time. In the 1980s, a 
“reform consensus” (gaige gongshi 改革共识) prevailed among them as well as 
the general public, who, having witnessed years of chaos and stagnation in the 
standard of living under Maoism, generally embraced the new economic poli-
cies that promised to deliver prosperity; they also welcomed the innovative 
measures in social, cultural, and political lives that allowed room for personal 
choice, despite the party-state’s firm rejection to any attempt at further liberal-
ization that would undermine its legitimacy and viability. This consensus, 
however, soon gave way to a profound divide among the intellectuals in the 
1990s and thereafter, as the reforms caused a myriad of problems, most strik-
ingly the massive unemployment of SOE workers, polarization in wealth distri-
bution, widening of regional gaps in development, and rampant corruption of 
government officials at all levels. Instead of a “complete refutation” (quanmian 
fouding 全面否定) of the Cultural Revolution or any of the Maoist legacies 
associated with it, once the precondition for legitimating the reform initiatives 
in the 1980s, the so-called “New Lefts” (xin zuopai 新左派) among the 
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 intellectuals, committed to social justice and equity, often turned to the Mao 
era for inspiration in seeking solutions to the challenges that confronted the 
nation. In sharp contrast, liberal intellectuals called for further steps in priva-
tizing the SOEs, integrating Chinese economy with the global market, estab-
lishing the rule of law, and making the decision-making process transparent 
and democratic as the true solutions to building a sustainable economy and 
sound political system. The result was a juxtaposition of Maoist socialism 
and post-Mao reform in the writings of the politically divided intellectuals, 
who either called for further steps of liberalization by rewriting the history of 
Maoist China in a completely dismissive tone or highlighted the downside and 
failures of the reforms by eulogizing the institutions and experiments of the 
Mao era.
Not all scholars in contemporary China, however, were convinced by the 
New Lefts’ or liberals’ thinking and readily took sides with either of them. 
Having lost interest in the ideologically driven writings on post-1949 China, the 
most innovative researchers in humanities and social sciences made efforts to 
rediscover the history of socialism and reform in China by shifting attention 
from macro political or economic systems to the operational realities of such 
systems at the micro level and investigating the everyday experiences of ordi-
nary Chinese people who lived through the decades of political movements 
and economic reforms. Their findings shed light on not only how the reforms 
have made China depart from the Maoist past but also profound continuity 
between the two eras that accounted for both the successes and setbacks in 
the nation’s quest for wealth and power.
Open Times (Kaifang Shidai 开放时代), an academic journal based in 
Guangzhou of southern China, plays a prominent role in this collective 
endeavor, by organizing thematic discussions on a wide array of topics span-
ning from the communist revolution before 1949 to the twenty-first century. 
The journal’s commitment to “bridging the divide” ( fenlie de mihe 分裂的弥合) 
among the intellectuals, its openness to different and contrasting opinions, its 
boldness in exploring sensitive and controversial issues in the history of social-
ism and reform, and its adherence to empirical strength and academic rigor in 
making arguments, have made Open Times the most popular venue for schol-
ars in different fields to share their findings with the public. This series, a col-
laboration between Open Times and Brill, puts together the best articles, in 
English translation, that have been published by the journal since 2003. 
Beginning in 2016, the series plans to publish two thematic volumes per year. 
The first two volumes are entitled “Mapping China: Peasants, Migrant Workers 
and Informal Labor” and “Media China.” The ensuing volumes will cover the 
Communist revolution and land reform, state control and mobilization in 
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the 1950s, power relations in industrial enterprises and agricultural collectives 
in the Mao era, economic reform and social change, everyday governance and 
resistance, geopolitics and diplomacy, ethnicity and identity, women and gen-








China’s economy has been growing at an unprecedented speed, and its popula-
tion urbanizing and relocating on a scale unseen in world history. How do we 
make sense of such rapid changes? 
Today’s China can still be defined as an agrarian country, given the propor-
tion of its land devoted to farming and the size of its earthbound population. 
The root of the Chinese Communist Revolution lay precisely in the rural area, 
as manifested in its strategy of “using the countryside to encircle the cities.” 
The socialist industrial system was also established on the basis of the con-
tribution by many millions of peasants in Maoist China. And the economic 
successes of China’s Reform and Opening (改革开放) have continued to rely 
on the rural population, including the 273 million nongmingong (农民工, 
conventionally translated as migrant workers) who are treated as cheap labor 
force in service to capitalist accumulation. Therefore, peasants, nongmingong 
and their informal labor have played a key role in China’s rapid transformations.
China can only be best understood by doing away with any generalizing 
concepts and instead by looking into its regional differences and its history 
across the ages. In this way, we will be able to see how peasants in various 
regions encounter the crisis and decline of rural society under the influence of 
neo-liberal policies, and how they make use of the social resources at hand to 
maintain their livelihoods. 
In terms of its geographic location and different levels of economic devel-
opment, China can be divided into eastern, central, and western regions. 
Nongmingong mainly work in the highly industrialized and urbanized eastern 
coastal regions, where rural communities still maintain their basic social func-
tions. However, most of these nongmingong come from the predominantly 
agrarian provinces in central China, where the rural areas are seriously “hol-
lowing out” (空心化). Western China, where ethnic minorities are concen-
trated and where large amounts of state investment in poverty relief were 
spent, is not a major source of nongmingong out-migration.
The seven articles in this collection all deal with the topic of “peasants, 
nongmingong, and informal labor,” but each has a different emphasis on one 
of these elements. 
Gao Yuan (高原)’s article, “Small Farming in the Market Economy: a Study 
of a Village in Shandong, and its Theoretical Significance,” examines the past 
15 years of socioeconomic change in Gengdian (耿店) in eastern China’s 
Shandong Province (山东省), focusing on its transition from household 
cotton farming to cooperative greenhouse vegetable production. Gao 
© Wu Chongqing, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004326385_002 
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addresses a shared assumption by Weber and Marx that peasant house-
hold production would be replaced by agricultural enterprises employ-
ing wage labor, and that traditional village society would dissolve and 
disappear. On the contrary, Gao argues that Gengdian’s successful transition 
illustrates that peasant household production has grown stronger. Alongside 
this agricultural transition are profound social changes, including an increase 
in cooperative spirit and social cohesion. Among the reasons that the farmers of 
Gengdian have not left the village to work like those in central China, and that 
the village has not become hollowed out, in addition to its location in an eco-
nomically developed region, a major reason is that its social foundation has not 
dissolved, so it can make effective use of the legacies of the Mao-era (毛泽东时
代) collectivization to promote cooperative economic organization. At a time 
when Chinese  academics have revived the discussion of the value of peasant 
economy, this case study reveals that the rural household economy is still viable, 
so villagers do not necessarily have to “abandon both agriculture and village” 
(离土离乡) and become nongmingong selling their labor-power.
Wu Chongqing (吴重庆)’s article, “ ‘Beyond the Boundary’: A Counter-
movement to the Hollowing-Out of Rural China,” deals with Sun Village (孙村) 
in eastern China’s Fujian Province (福建省). At a time when most villages in 
central China are becoming hollowed out, Sun Village reveals a countermove-
ment to this trend. Many young and middle aged residents of the village have 
likewise “abandoned both agriculture and village” but not as nongmingong. 
Instead, they have utilized relationships based on kinship and locality, known 
as “same hometown, same trade” (同乡同业), to carry out jewelry refashion-
ing in cities throughout China. They are also performing informal labor, but in 
contrast with capitalist economic activities, this is expressed as self-employed 
labor with “social economy” characteristics, in which economy is embedded 
in society. Under the influence of rural social relations, all kinds of produc-
tion factors related to this jewelry refashioning industry have become con-
centrated in Sun Village, turning the cities into peripheral areas radiating out 
from there. The main reason this countermovement has managed to emerge in 
Sun Village is that lineage consciousness and networks are more developed in 
eastern coastal areas. Through “same hometown, same trade” economic activi-
ties that support rural social development, they can resist capitalist economy’s 
encroachment.
Tan Tongxue (谭同学)’s article, “Social Ties and the Market: A Study of 
Digital Printing Industry from an Informal Economy Perspective,” deals with 
villagers from Xinhua County (新化县) in central China’s Hunan Province 
(湖南省), who “abandon both agriculture and village” to run print shops at uni-
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versities throughout China. This industry is another typical example of “same 
hometown, same trade.” Villagers from Xinhua carry out informal labor, but 
most of them are hired by bosses related by kinship or locality. These relations 
of kinship or locality do not conceal or transform the exploitative nature of 
wage relations and the cold-blooded competition among shops in the same 
industry, but rather become accomplices to capitalist economy. The difference 
from Sun Village lies in the lack of social capital and the lower level of lin-
eage consciousness and networks in Xinghua’s rural society, typical of central 
China. It is therefore hard for rural social networks to form mutually embed-
ded relations with economic activities, since rural social forces are not strong 
enough to reign in the capitalist economy’s negative effects on society, turning 
peasants into nongmingong. 
These first three case studies illustrate various ways that people from a 
countryside riven by regional disparities make use of local social resources 
to seek out ways to making a living. In these models, we can still see tradi-
tional social networks, various degrees of ties based on kinship and locality, 
and the existence of humans as social groups. Among the 273 million nong-
mingong in China today, however, few of them make a living in one of these 
ways. Most of them are still deeply involved in the global capitalist system, 
becoming isolated, atomized and cheap labor-power on the “workshop of the 
world” production line. From what perspective should we take stock of these 
nongmingong, floating from city to city, but being riveted like so many screws 
to capital’s rapidly-turning assembly line? 
In the Mao era, when class was eliminated as an integrated whole, class 
became a political keyword, with “class struggle” as the main means for social 
mobilization and consolidation. In the post-Mao era, however, the gap between 
rich and poor has grown; society has become polarized; capital and the state 
have formed alliances; industrial conflicts have become increasingly common 
and fierce; elite classes have emerged alongside the formation of the biggest 
industrial working class in the “workshop of the world.” In this context, class 
discourse has become a political taboo, and mainstream ideology advocates 
“getting rid of class.” In contemporary Chinese “political correctness,” one may 
only speak of “social strata” rather than “class.” 
Pun Ngai (潘毅)’s article, “Discursive Dyslexia and the Articulation of 
Class: A Theoretical Perspective on China’s Young Female Migrant Workers 
(Dagongmei),” is among the first attempts by Chinese scholars researching 
nongmingong to reviving a class perspective. Pun argues that in China’s violent 
society during the era of globalization, class is no longer an empty sign, but it 
is continually restructuring itself, and nongmingong are quickly forming into a 
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new type of laboring subject that she calls the dagong (打工) class.1 Dagongmei 
(打工妹, female nongmingong) have fought against the capital and patriarchy 
through a series of collective actions, including resistance in labor and every-
day life, and not simply through class struggle in the conventional sense.
The other article by Pun Ngai, co-written with Lu Huilin (卢晖临) and 
Zhang Huipeng (张慧鹏), is titled “The Class Formation: Control of Capital 
and Collective Resistance of Chinese Construction Workers.” China is not 
only a “workshop of the world,” but also a vast construction site of the world. 
In China’s large cities, 20% of nongmingong (between forty and fifty mil-
lion) are construction workers, who labor in the mushrooming construction 
sites. Construction sites are unique workplaces: the construction industry in 
today’s China has developed multiple layers of sub-contracting in its employ-
ment system, creating an informality and lack of transparency in labor rela-
tions. Construction workers are also unique among nongmingong in that 
they are almost all middle-aged men, brought into the city by baogongtou 
(包工头, informal labor sub-contractors) who are relatives or acquaintances 
from their own or neighboring villages. On the construction site they are 
directly managed by the baogongtou, who are also responsible for paying the 
workers. This intertwining of labor and personal relations often leads work-
ers to perceive their labor relations in a personalistic manner, and the sub- 
contracting system means that when workers fail to receive their wages, they 
do not know who to blame. They thus turn to “the state,” but the alliance 
between capital and the state gradually deepens the workers’ awareness of the 
system. Through repeated efforts at rights-defense, a new type of working class 
achieves its difficult birth. 
Wang Jianhua (汪建华)’s article, “Internet Mobilizing and Workers’ 
Collective Resistance at OEM Factories,” vividly describes a strike at a Honda 
automobile parts plant in the Pearl River Delta (珠三角), an important base 
of China’s “workshop of the world.” China’s second and third generations of 
nongmingong are younger and better educated, and when they are not work-
ing, they have grown accustomed to  living in cyberspace rather than merely 
using it. For the new generation nongmingong, the development of social 
networks is not limited to their roommates, classmates and laoxiang (老乡, 
people from the same native place), but is defined by the cellphone internet. 
Under conditions lacking effective labor organizations and class discourse, 
1   Translator’s note: In the 1990s, dagong referred specifically to informal wage labor in the pri-
vate sector, performed by nongmingong, in contrast to gongren (工人, “workers”) and “work-
ing class,” associated with urbanites working in state-owned or collective enterprises. Since 
the 2000s, these two terms have tended to be used interchangeably.
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the Internet has become an important resource for developing workers’ aware-
ness and feelings, and for organizing mobilization (including the mobilization 
of external forces). The emergence of online mobilization has transformed the 
scale, scope, forms, strength, effects and demands of strikes, but so far this per-
spective has been missing from labor protest studies. 
Finally, let us return to the source of China’s nongmingong, their villages, 
and observe the effects of the vast outflow of young people on rural society. 
My own conclusion is that this has already transformed rural China, especially 
the central regions, from a “society of acquaintances” to a “subjectless soci-
ety of acquaintances.” In a situation where young and middle-aged people 
are absent from the village for most of the year, in contrast with a traditional 
“society of acquaintances” characterized by social control through gossip, the 
value of “face,” and the accumulation of social capital, this new “subjectless 
society of acquaintances” is characterized by gossip’s loss of effectiveness, the 
devaluation of “face,” and the dissipation of social capital.
The last piece in this collection, Tan Shen (谭深)’s “The Impacts of Labor 
Migration on Rural Poverty and Inequality,” studies the outflow of nong-
mingong. Researching on women, children and the elderly at the levels of 
household and society, Tan analyzes how population movement affects these 
different groups and levels of society in the countryside, and influences pov-
erty and inequality. Over the past thirty-some years of large-scale population 
movement from rural China, inequality has not only failed to disappear, but 
has increased. Poor households and the elderly have become increasingly mar-
ginalized. Today, two common characteristics of rural China are, therefore, 
hollowing-out and stratification. The combination of these two characteristics 
often make disadvantaged groups feel helpless, even leading to a crisis of the 
meaning of life for them.
All seven of these articles come from the journal Open Times (开放时代), 
which could be considered a window into contemporary Chinese academic 
trends. It is thus also necessary to introduce this journal. 
Open Times was founded in January 1989 in Guangzhou (广州), the largest 
city in southern China. It is published by the Guangzhou Academy of Social 
Sciences (广州社科院). Its mission is “to connect academia with society” 
(以学术关怀社会). It actively promotes interdisciplinary research on contem-
porary China by local and overseas scholars from the humanities and social 
sciences with a historical perspective. Philip Huang (黄宗智) regards Open 
Times as China’s best comprehensive social science journal at present. On June 
15, 2013, a conference called “China’s ‘Present’ and the Humanities: A Discussion 
of Open Times” was held at the University of Tokyo by the university’s Center for 
Philosophy in combination with a group of Japanese China scholars. Professor 
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Murata Yujiro of University of Tokyo said: “This is the first time in history that 
a conference has been organized at the University of Tokyo specifically to dis-
cuss a Chinese academic journal.” According to Ishii Tsuyoshi, the organizer of 
the conference, “With its high academic standards, Open Times has consistently 
provided readers with effective perspectives for profound reflection on contem-
porary cultural life.”
Wu Chongqing 
Institute of Marxist Philosophy and China’s Modernization
Sun Yat-sen University 
December 24, 2015
Chapter 1
Small Farming in the Market Economy:  
A Study of a Village in Shandong, and  
Its Theoretical Significance*
Gao Yuan 
1 Classic Theory and a Different Reality
Max Weber, as one of the great pioneers of the social sciences, pondered long 
and hard over the future prospects of the countryside within the context of 
capitalist economic expansion. Firstly, Weber came to realize that the tradi-
tional countryside and modern capitalism form two entirely different develop-
ment trends. This is because each adheres to its own very different economic 
logic: the economic order of the traditional countryside is concerned with 
how, on a given piece of land, to support the greatest possible number of 
people, whilst the capitalist economic order is concerned with how, with this 
given piece of land, to use the smallest amount of labor power to provide the 
greatest volume of agricultural produce for the market (Weber, 1997 [1906]). In 
this respect, Weber’s thinking is similar to that of contemporary economists. 
Weber goes further to locate the future prospects of the traditional country-
side within his overall understanding of “modern Western civilization.” The 
basis of this type of modernity is in rational ethics, rational economic opera-
tion, rational bureaucratic administration, and rational legal authority (Weber, 
2004a; 2004b: 448–460; 2007: 212–217). Weber argued that the village collective 
is built upon and held together by “traditional factors” like kinship ties, clans, 
* (This article was first published in Chinese in Open Times, 2011, No. 12)
 This article has benefited greatly from a series of discussions between the author and 
Professor Philip C. C. Huang. Professor Huang also painstakingly read, critiqued, and gave 
his suggestions on the article. For this, I would like to take the opportunity here to express 
the sincerest of thanks to him. I also wish to extend thanks to teachers and friends, including 
Chen Chuanbo, Tong Zhihui, Yu Shengfeng, Liu Xueting, Chen Wenling, and Huang Jialiang, 
for their suggestions. Thanks to the local people of Gengdian, and comrades from the man-
agement office of the Liaocheng Municipal Department for Agriculture, the Chiping County, 
Jiazhai Township Party Committee, and government, including Geng Zunzhu, Geng Fuzhong, 
Geng Chuanxi, Geng Qingxiang, Geng Zunhong, Zhao Baodong, Geng Yiqing, and Shang 
Siquan, for their assistance and support during the fieldwork upon which this study is based.
© Gao Yuan, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004326385_003 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
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or historically formed neighbourhood ties. In terms of ethics, economic ori-
entation, the style of rule (herrschaft) and the order of social groupings, the 
“traditional” nature of the countryside is completely at odds with the rational-
ity of the “modern” (Weber, 2004b: 131–136, 151–153; 2004c: 262–265; 2007). As 
we see the full emergence of rationalized society’s intense need for expansion 
and competitive advantage, the basis of rural society—the main objective of 
which is to satisfy the needs of the collective with household agricultural busi-
ness, run by its own members as the labor subjects—will be supplanted. In its 
place, the agricultural enterprise emerges, the aim of which is to seek constant 
profit, hire free labor power, and firmly orient itself towards the market. With 
the decline of the household agricultural business, the village, as a collective in 
the traditional sense, also gradually crumbles and withers away (Weber, 1997 
[1906]; 1997 [1895]). 
On the fate of the countryside, Marx’s thinking was similar to that of Weber. 
However, the thought process by which Marx arrived at his verdict was some-
what different. Whilst Weber saw capitalism as a concentrated manifestation 
of rationalization, Marx saw capitalism as a manifestation of the alienation 
of humanity (Löwith, 1993). This alienation was reflected in humanity’s sepa-
ration from the tools of its own labor, and man (or woman) himself/herself 
becomes the tool (Marx, 2000, [1844]: 50–64). As such, Marx views capital-
ism as the following kind of utterly alienated social state: society is split into 
two antithetical classes, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat; the former owns 
the means of production, whilst the latter does not. Instead, the proletariat 
becomes instrumental hired laborer, serving capitalist production. During 
the process of the changes in society predicted in Marx’s history of philoso-
phy, as small-scale proprietors, the peasantry were destined to become sepa-
rated, either by rising up to become part of the bourgeoisie or sinking down 
to become part of the proletariat stripped of the means of production. Marx 
left no place for any form of small-scale proprietor at the destination of these 
historical social transformations. Be it the peasant, the urban small-scale 
 merchant, or the craftsman working with his hands, Marx saw the decline of 
all of these classes as a historical inevitability (Marx, 1983: 771–791). 
The historical, sociological observations of Marx and Weber on the trans-
formation of the countryside have provided us with rich food for thought in 
developing our own understanding of the changes taking place in rural China. 
However, it cannot remain unsaid that their verdicts on the fate of the coun-
tryside are deeply reliant upon the history of Western social transformation. 
Thus the significance of the theories of Marx and Weber is not in whatever 
standard beliefs they conjured up about the prospects for modernity or social 
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 progress—these are often a theoretical refinement of Western history; the 
value of their theories is in the very fact that they provide us with perspec-
tives for our observations that help develop a deep understanding of the social 
states of mankind. For example, Weber highlighted the organizational form, 
method of control and economic ethics of social groups, whilst Marx empha-
sized class divisions. With these perspectives, not only are we able to come 
to form an understanding of the characteristics of the evolution of Western 
societies—this was the empirical basis upon which the theories of Marx and 
Weber were formed—but we can also observe the transformation of Chinese 
society. It is quite probable that the latter is something of a departure from the 
experience of the West. 
The external environment faced by the Chinese countryside at present is 
very similar to that of Western Europe during the time of Marx and Weber. 
The market economy and industrial civilization continue to expand; business 
practices characterized with a strong market orientation and profit-seeking 
motivation have shaped the mainstream economic logic. Within this historical 
context, what changes have occurred in the Chinese countryside? Is the coun-
tryside developing along the same lines set out by Marx and Weber? These are 
questions that should not be ignored. 
China has a vast countryside, and an enormous number of people living 
in rural areas. There is huge disparity between the different regions. It would 
be difficult to cover all of the various types of change occurring in the coun-
tryside within one study. One feasible method is to select certain villages and 
undertake social research from a micro-level perspective in the pursuit of 
those phenomena that are at odds with the classic theories. In this way, the 
tensions between theory and practice will become evident, and we will move a 
little closer towards understanding the reality of rural society.1 This is the line 
of thinking adopted in the research upon which this article is based, and the 
research focuses its investigation on one specific village. The village in question 
lies in the northwest of Shandong Province (山东省), and it is named Gengdian 
(耿店).2 Beginning in March 2010, in cooperation with the local agricultural 
administrative authorities, I began to undertake a series of fieldwork in 
1   The empirically based content and data covered in both this and the following sections 
come from the fieldwork carried out by me in cooperation with the management office of 
Liaocheng Municipal Department for Agriculture, and also from interviews with villagers 
from Gengdian, conducted over the telephone.
2  Gengdian belongs to Jiazhai Township, in Chiping County, Liaocheng City, Shandong 
Province. As of recently, there are 178 households within this village, and the population is 
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Gengdian. The research finds that firstly the rapid expansion of the market 
economy has had a profound effect on Gengdian since the start of China’s 
Reform and Opening (改革开放). Transformation of the structure of agricul-
tural production began in Gengdian during the mid 1990s. Today, the major-
ity of villagers have already shifted from growing traditional crops like grains 
and cotton to instead cultivating vegetables in greenhouse conditions under 
huge canopies. Vegetables grown under these large canopies are a highly com-
mercialized form of agricultural produce. The villagers’ aim in producing 
vegetables is to sell for profit at market. Meanwhile, in order to produce their 
vegetables and maintain their greenhouses, the villagers need large amounts 
of different types of materials. The villagers are heavily reliant on the market in 
order to obtain these materials. Today, the villagers of Gengdian have already, 
to an unprecedented degree, become tied up in the market economy. 
At the same time, there is a paradoxical phenomenon in Gengdian, which 
is worth giving thought to. In a departure from Marx’s verdict, with the expan-
sion of the market economy, the identity of the villagers as small-scale propri-
etors was strengthened, not weakened. The agricultural transformation from 
producing grains and cotton to producing vegetables in greenhouses brought 
a sharp increase in the income earned by villagers through labor and in the 
returns from each plot of land. The annual income they achieved by relying 
on their own allocated plot of land saw more substantive increases than at 
any time in the past. This bolstered the identity of these rural households as 
small-scale proprietors/petty bourgeoisie. Moreover, the transformation of 
agriculture in Gengdian was a common phenomenon amongst the villagers. 
By 2010, throughout the whole village, those rural households in possession of 
these large canopies stood at 95% of all households. Within the village itself, 
the agricultural transformation had not caused the broadening of disparities 
in wealth between the villagers or class divisions amongst them. Instead, it had 
brought about common increases in their incomes. 
At the same time, at variance with Weber’s thinking, small-scale agricultural 
production in Gengdian had not been replaced by agricultural enterprises 
using the free hiring of labor. The marketized production under canopies was 
still operated by households. Not only had the village as a whole failed to disin-
tegrate, with loosened ties between households and villagers, but it was experi-
encing greater cohesion. The rural households in Gengdian were certainly not 
isolated individual operators with nothing to do with one another. Production 
using the large canopies was far more complicated than the traditional growing 
741 people. Those of working age and capacity total 420 people. The village covers 1,800 mu of 
land (1 mu = 0.0667 hectares), amongst which 1,301 is arable land. 
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of crops like grains and cotton. The maintenance of the canopies and the man-
agement of vegetable crops required the use of various refined techniques. 
The vegetables could not be stockpiled, so the villagers needed a channel to 
quickly sell them on and required cold storage facilities to store up those veg-
etables that were difficult to sell. Then, the villagers needed a convenient way 
to get hold of seedlings. Thus the marketization of their agricultural activities 
prompted a greater need amongst the villagers for a force that could provide 
them with the services indispensable to undertake these kinds of operations. 
In Gengdian, the local cadre, as the political heart of the village, bore the task 
of providing this force. The structure of village politics formed since the start 
of the Rural Reforms (农村改革) had begun to revolve around economic objec-
tives and thus exceeded the traditional functions of administration. With an 
administrative system of village governance mainly based on the levying of 
taxes, the villagers felt only the control and demands of the village collective, 
whereas with village politics that centered on economic objectives, the villag-
ers were gaining the services of the village collective. An increasing reliance 
on the services of the village collective actually transformed Gengdian into a 
more tightly knit community. 
The existence of these paradoxical phenomena indicates a fundamental 
reality: the small-farming economy and the village society of Gengdian have 
their own logic. This logic cannot be bound into some a priori theoretical rea-
soning. In the following pages of this article, I will combine empirical evidence 
with a theoretical exploration, in an attempt to portray the internal develop-
ment logic of small-scale farming and village society in Gengdian in the past 
fifteen years. On this basis, I will investigate the following question: if the 
development that has occurred in Gengdian was to become a kind of com-
mon prospect for China’s small-scale farming, what kind of impact would this 
have on the national economy as a whole? Although a micro-level study of one 
village is certainly not adequate to cover the complete picture of China’s coun-
tryside, through this research we are able to gain a glimpse of some issues and 
phenomena that are worth our consideration. 
2  Agricultural Transformation in the Village 
Agricultural transformation in Gengdian began in the mid-1990s. Prior to this, 
the whole village had always grown mostly wheat, corn and cotton. Between 
1978 and 1984, the increased production and prices of these traditional crops of 
grains and cotton had brought a rapid rise in the villagers’ incomes. However, 
after 1984, both the output and price of grains and cotton continually slumped, 
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and it was no longer possible for the villagers to rely upon these traditional 
crops to increase their incomes. This situation, in which all energy had been 
drained, leaving an inability to further increase income, was a common phe-
nomenon throughout the whole of Liaocheng City (聊城市), including in 
Gengdian. 
In 1996, the Jiazhai Township (贾寨乡) government to which Gengdian 
belongs demanded that the villages under its jurisdiction all made a strong 
push towards developing agriculture using these large canopies, adjusting the 
composition of an agricultural economy previously based on the cultivation of 
grains and cotton. In this way, they achieved increases in the income of farm-
ers. In the year prior to this, one household belonging to Wangyaobao Village 
(王药包村) in Jiazhai, made a significant amount of money growing kidney 
beans in the greenhouse conditions of large canopies. At that time, the veg-
etable industry had witnessed growth, and demand had shot up. Half a kilo of 
these beans could be sold for as much as four yuan (元). The farmer from this 
household could make a gross income of over 7,000 yuan for one large canopy’s 
worth of the beans. Jiazhai promoted the experience of this villager around the 
whole township. 
With this as inspiration, the transformation of agriculture in Gengdian 
got fully underway. The township government called on the Gengdian village 
cadre to first take two of the threshing floors belonging to the collective to 
test things out by building canopies. These cadres led the way and mobilized 
ordinary villagers, so that together they managed to set up 26 large canopies. 
The 26 mu (亩) of land needed for these canopies were provided free of charge 
by the village collective. A cash stipend of 600 yuan was given for each of the 
canopies. This money came from the funds accumulated by the village col-
lective. The first 26 canopies achieved great success, with one canopy, which 
took up one mu of land, making a gross income of 7,000–8,000 yuan, which 
was much higher than the income that could be made by cultivating one mu 
of grain and cotton. 
In 1997, Jiazhai required that each of its villagers made further pushes to 
promote the use of these canopies. This time, Gengdian already had no col-
lective land going spare that could be used. Demanding that the villagers built 
canopies on their own allocated plots of land would have been equivalent 
to making the villagers themselves bear all of the risk involved in the trans-
formation of agriculture, thus reducing the willingness of villagers to build 
canopies. As such, the village adopted the following method: the village cad-
res would take the lead in organizing for 20% of the allocated land of each 
of the villagers, which altogether would add up to 160 mu for building cano-
pies. Geng Zunzhu (耿遵珠), the current Secretary of the Village Party Branch 
 13Small Farming in the Market Economy
(村支书), was at that time just an ordinary villager himself. Looking back, 
he explained that although there had been some expressions of opposition 
from those villagers who did not want to construct the canopies, in the end, 
through the mobilization and hard work of the village cadres, this adjustment 
in land was completed. Since the beginning of the Household Contract System 
(家庭联产承包责任制), this was Gengdian’s only ever large-scale land adjust-
ment. After the land had been taken, the village cadres began a survey of this 
land, separating it off into smaller plots of land suitable for building the cano-
pies. According to the order in which the villagers had signed up to build the 
canopies, each had their turn to be allocated a piece of land. Not only was the 
land for building the canopies not subject to agricultural tax, the Santiwutong 
(三提五统) system (a further form of tax for undertaking local development), 
and so on, but a subsidy of 600 yuan was given for each canopy built. These 
measures stimulated the enthusiasm of the villagers for building the canopies. 
Following this readjustment of the land, by 1999 the number of households 
in possession of canopies had reached 126, accounting for 71% of the whole 
households. From 1999 to the present, the number of canopies in Gengdian 
has continued to increase. The skills required for operating and using the 
canopies and the different variety of vegetables have achieved regeneration 
and change, and the income from cultivating vegetables in the canopies has 
constantly risen. 
The greater context upon which the transformation of agriculture in 
Gengdian was reliant was the constant expansion of the market economy 
following the start of the Reform and Opening, and advances in China’s 
economy overall.3 During the reform years, common rises in the incomes of 
Chinese people prompted a transformation in the consumption of foodstuffs, 
which changes from a demand mainly for staple foods to that also for vege-
tables, meat products and other non-staple foods (Huang, 2007). Vegetables, 
the most important non-staple food in Chinese culinary tradition, were the 
most affected by the increased demand. The market orientation of agricul-
tural produce prompted by the reforms meant that the increased demand for 
vegetables was reflected in the market price, producing a knock-on effect and 
encouraging the transformation of the composition of agricultural cultivation. 
To ordinary villagers and village cadres alike, the incentives were palpable. 
Also notably, right from the beginning of the agricultural transformation, the 
changes were not being carried out by isolated households, but instead they 
3 The World Bank has released a special report discussing the development of the vegetable 
industry and the impact on the rural economy accompanying the trend for marketization of 
agricultural produce since the beginning of the reforms. See World Bank 2006.
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were being given impetus by the village as a whole. In Gengdian, developing 
the canopies and adjusting the structure of agricultural cultivation was not 
simply a private matter. It was an expression of the public affairs of the vil-
lage. As mentioned above, at the beginning of the development of canopies in 
Gengdian, the notable characteristics were collective mobilization, the plan-
ning for bringing village collective land together, and the measures taken to 
offer incentives. 
This path to agricultural transformation, which had a strong collective fla-
vor, is first and foremost related to the political tradition of Gengdian. Before 
the Rural Reforms, Gengdian was considered to be a relatively well-managed 
production brigade of a local Commune (公社). After the beginning of the 
implementation of the Household Contract System, Gengdian was still doing 
well—it always ranked in the top three in the annual evaluations of Guzhai 
Township. From 1999, it won a special award year in year out for ten consecu-
tive years in Guzhai Township, and in 2009, it was commended by the munici-
pal Party Committee Organization Department (组织部) as an advanced Party 
Branch (党支部) in Liaocheng. Within the context of this kind of political tra-
dition, the group of village cadres, who enjoyed the trust of the villagers, had 
always effectively carried out governance in the village. At the same time, they 
had the capacity to use their own powers to intervene in economic matters and 
were not limited only to the administrative tasks set for them by the higher-
level authorities, for instance, collecting taxes. In those villages that did not 
have a tradition of good governance, collecting tax was the routine work. And 
in those villages with weak basic-level organization, there is no way of carrying 
out even the most basic administrative tasks, let alone getting involved in col-
lective economic matters. 
Secondly, the path taken for the transformation of agriculture in Gengdian 
is also linked to the social structure and the character of the village itself. 
Gengdian is a village typical of northern China, with multiple family lineages, 
distinguishable by surname. Altogether there were nine different surnames in 
the village, of which Geng is one. Gengdian is not strongly influenced by over-
bearing clans. Moreover, in the eyes of the villagers, the township and village 
cadres, Gengdian is a really decent village. The villagers have good agricultural 
production habits, they like to work hard rather than fight, and they don’t have 
factional or clan disputes. In this kind of village, collective action will not break 
out as a result of internal conflicts. The decent nature of Gengdian, which has 
often drawn praise, and the tradition of good governance that has always pre-
vailed there, go hand in hand and compliment one another. 
At the same time as these two factors were taking effect, there was an insti-
tutional basis for Gengdian to spread the use of canopies throughout the whole 
 15Small Farming in the Market Economy
village. This basis was the collective land system of ownership.4 The Collective 
Land Ownership (集体土地所有制), from which the power to transfer land 
derived, made it possible for the village cadres to spread canopy production 
across the whole span of the village. At the same time, by transferring collec-
tive land, it was made possible for those households that built the large cano-
pies to retain a plot of land to cultivate crops grown in open field whilst also 
producing greenhouse vegetables. In this way, the risk borne by the villagers in 
building the canopies was reduced. 
The tradition of village governance, the social structure and character of 
the village, and the collective ownership system as the institutional basis—
all these factors combined to shape the collective agricultural transformation 
of Gengdian. If it had not been for the collective transferring of land and the 
drawing up of preferential measures for all to lower the threshold to green-
house production, then only a small number of villagers—the wealthiest, and 
therefore the most able to bear risk—would have dared to build the canopies. 
If this had been the case, then the benefits derived through the transformation 
of agriculture would only have been open to a small proportion of the people. 
The collective transformation of agriculture achieved in Gengdian, however, 
ensured that the vast majority of villagers were able to benefit.5 
3 The Consolidation of Household-Farming 
Following the transformation of agriculture, with the greenhouse model of 
vegetable cultivation, the total output and net returns achieved on each mu 
(亩) of land rose sharply. As such, the development of agriculture in Gengdian 
was mainly visible in rising output value as crops were changed, rather than 
through increases in the yield of any given crop. At the micro-level, this fea-
ture of the model helps to confirm the view, proposed by Professor Philip C. C. 
Huang (黄宗智) in his recent work China’s Hidden Agricultural Revolution 
(中国的隐性农业革命), that the development of China’s agriculture over 
the last 30 years has been “an agricultural revolution caused by changes in 
4 Scholars have already published papers on the important effect of the collective ownership 
system on rural economic development. See Pei Xiaolin, 1999.
5  How to make the advantages of technological progress benefit the citizens of rural China, 
covering the greatest possible ground, is an important issue that began to draw the atten-
tion of Chinese sociologists as early as the 1930s and 1940s. See Fei Xiaotong, 2007a: 159–161, 
166–172; 2007b: 237, 322–329. 
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consumption, reflected more in changes in the output value, and not in the 
changes in yield seen in traditional models” (Huang, 2010b; 2010c). 
Through a study of the investments and production of farmers who were, 
at the same time, cultivating vegetables in the canopies and grain crops, we 
can clearly demonstrate the difference in the output value of the two differ-
ent models for cultivation. Table 1.1 shows the the investment and production 
of three farmers in 2009 alternating crops of wheat and corn per mu of land. 
Table 1.2 gives the investment and production per mu of greenhouse vegeta-
bles. If we compare the second column of both Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, the out-
put value of greenhouse vegetables per mu is far higher than that of the grain 
crops, the former reaching 6–8 times that of the latter. After deducting the 
investment for production to arrive at the net profit for each mu of land, the 
greenhouse vegetables still commanded 6–7 times that of grain crops. 
The cultivation of grains and the production of vegetables are characteristi-
cally two very different agricultural business models. The former is a form of 
“involution” agriculture.6 When it comes to contemporary China specifically, 
the implications of this are that in circumstances where there are many people 
to a small amount of land, there is a serious case of “concealed unemployment” 
on the farms of small-scale farmers cultivating grain crops. For labor work-
ing in the production of grains, the period of their employment throughout 
a whole year clearly does not allow them to reach a state of full employment 
(Huang, 2010b: 87–89). Taking as an example the alternation between wheat 
and corn in Gengdian, each year only fifteen workdays are required for each 
mu of land.7 The laborers in Gengdian, on average, will each cultivate 3.1 mu 
of land.8 If this was all used to grow wheat and corn, then in one year only 
forty-six and a half days of work would need to be invested. If we understand 
6  Professor Philip C. C. Huang first put forward the notion of “involution” agriculture to ana-
lyze small farming in northern China in his book Northern China’s Small Farming Economy 
and Social Transformation. This concept was further developed in his book Chanjiang sanji-
aozhou xiaonong jiating yu xiangcun fazhan (Yangtze River Delta Small Farming Households 
and Rural Development). See Philip C. C. Huang 2000a and 2000b. 
7  If the model of alternating between cereals and grains and cotton is adopted, the labor 
invested annually per mu of land would experience an increase, but would still be far from 
that of the labor investment for growing vegetables in the polytunnels. I carried out a study 
of Lihai Village (李海村) in northwest Shandong where the investment of labor per mu alter-
nating wheat and cotton was an average of twenty-one workdays/year. See Gao Yuan, 2010.
8  This calculation is based on the total arable land of Gengdian Village, 1,301 mu, and the total 
number of laborers is four hundred and twenty.
 17Small Farming in the Market Economy
full employment to be two hundred and sixty days per year,9 then each laborer 
would be in a state of “hidden unemployment” for over two hundred days. This 
“hidden unemployment” is also an important reason for the vast number of 
rural laborers to flood to the cities to find work. 
In contrast with involution farming, the greenhouse vegetables are a kind of 
“labor-capital, concentrated” farming (Huang, 2010b: 134, 143–145; Huang and 
Peng 2007). Firstly, after farmers become involved in greenhouse vegetable 
production, the investment of labor on their land is 5–7 times as much as what 
is needed to cultivate grains (the fifth columns of Table 1.1 and Table 1.2 show 
a detailed account of the volume of labor required per mu each year for each 
of the two different models). This greatly alleviates the phenomenon of hid-
den unemployment in grain and cereal production. By comparing column 6 
in Table 1.1 and Table 1.2, we can see that at the same time as the investment of 
labor increases, the income from one workday per greenhouse vegetable pro-
ducing is no lower than that of the wheat-corn crop rotation. Here, we can see 
that this kind of increase in labor investment is not an ineffective use of labor. 
The sharp increase in the period of employment throughout a whole year 
brings about a clear increase in the annual per capita income of rural labor. 
In addition to this, at the same time as the investment of labor is increased, 
the capital investment in greenhouse vegetable production is also more con-
centrated than that of the cultivation of grains. If a wheat-corn rotation is 
adopted, the annual investment per mu of land would be around 595 yuan (see 
Table 1.1,  column 3); this can be compared with the investment for greenhouse 
vegetables, which reaches 4,600–6,000 yuan (see Table 1.2, column 3). 
Table 1.1  Gengdian Wheat-Corn Cultivation Model, Investment and Production  
(yuan; persons) 






Net Profit Use of Labor  
per mu of land
Net Profit per 
Working Day 
Geng Yiqing 1859 595 1264 15 84.27
Shang Siquan 1859 598 1261 15 84.07
Zhao Baodong 1859 591 1268 15 84.53
9  Here, 260 days is based on working five days per week, with 365 days in a year, but this does 
not take account of other holidays. Philip C.C. Huang came to 250 days in his own calcula-
tions (Huang, 2010b). 
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Table 1.2 Gengdian Greenhouse Vegetable Cultivation Model, Investment and Production 
(yuan; persons)






Net Profit Use of Labor  
per mu of land
Income per 
Working Day 
Geng Yiqing 14182 5625 8557 87.3 98.02
Shang Siquan 15323 5940 9383 101.6 92.35
Zhao Baodong 10657 4636 6417 76.3 84.10
Under the new cultivation model for producing greenhouse vegetables, the 
increase of net return per unit of land, directly increases the income of rural 
households relying on family run farms. This strengthens the identity of rural 
households as small-scale proprietors. As discussed above, the adoption of this 
new cultivation model was common in Gengdian: 95% of all rural households 
in the village had these large canopies. Thus, the strengthening of farmers’ 
identity as small-scale proprietors was also common throughout the whole 
village. 
A phenomenon that complemented the strengthening of farmers’ iden-
tity as small-scale proprietors was that the rural household remained at the 
heart of operations. In a departure from the contentions of Marx and Weber, 
the replacement of household-run farming by modern capitalist agricultural 
enterprises has just not happened in Gengdian. We came to realize that an 
important reason drawn upon by Weber in his argument that small-scale 
household-run farms would be replaced by agricultural enterprises was that 
the economic logic of the former would be vanquished by that of the latter 
within the context of the market economy. That is, household-run farming is 
driven by its main objective to satisfy the needs of the collective, with its own 
members as the main labor force and the optimum arrangement for produc-
tion being restricted by various traditional factors, whilst modern agricultural 
enterprises are driven by the aim of seeking uninterrupted profit by drawing 
on hired free laborers as the main source of labor power and allowing for the 
production factors internal to the enterprise to be combined in the most ratio-
nal way. According to Weber, the latter would prevail over the former (Weber, 
1997 [1906]). 
The experience of Gengdian demonstrates a different kind of possibility: 
within the context of the market economy, the small-scale household-run 
business will continue to exist, whilst at the same time its internal economic 
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logic will be adjusted to suit the market economy. In Gengdian, the household 
production of vegetables has already become firmly market-oriented, and 
its main objective is to seek profit. This is already entirely different from the 
small-scale agricultural production undertaken to satisfy the most basic needs 
of the family. From this perspective, to a certain extent, the economic logic of 
household-run farming is already similar to the agricultural enterprise. At the 
same time, the cultivation of vegetables requires a large amount of complex 
and refined manual labor, and household farming is just right for providing 
this form of labor, which also strengthens the vitality of small-scale household 
farming within the market economy. Thus, in Gengdian, small-scale household 
farming does not run contrary to the market economy, but rather has come to 
adapt to the market economy. Many scholars have already provided us with 
analysis and concrete evidence of the changes in the economic logic of small-
scale household farming within the market economy and its adaptation to fit 
the market (Chayanov, 1996 [1925]: 105–107; Huang, 2000a: 5–7; Huang, 2000b; 
Cao, 1996: 189–199). In fact, Weber himself once proposed that at the same 
time as large-scale agricultural enterprise was constantly developing in West 
Germany, subsistence farming remained predominant in southwest Germany, 
and the profits of the latter, within the environment of the market, remained 
somewhat substantial (Weber, 1997 [1906]). 
However, small-scale farming still has its weaknesses. Firstly, liquidity and 
the reserves of capital of small farmers are severely limited. The operators of 
small-scale household farms commonly lack specialist and business know-
how, as well as a broader business perspective. As such, when they partake 
in different aspects of concentrated capital, such as investment, the introduc-
tion of new techniques, opening up markets, and extending the agricultural 
production chain, household farmers do not have the same advantages as 
large-scale agricultural enterprises. Moreover, within the village, since land is 
scarce and a large number of the farms of small farmers are all right next to 
one another, it is very difficult for farmers to be at liberty to allocate land in 
the same way as an agricultural enterprise may be able to. This is certainly 
not unique to contemporary China with its implementation of the collective 
ownership system, and it is a common phenomenon amongst societies with 
developed small-scale farming, irrespective of whether or not the land is under 
private ownership.10 
If small-scale farming is unable to overcome these shortcomings, then 
this form of farming will remain in a position of relative weakness. Within 
10   See Zhao and Chen, 2006, 144–145.
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the context of a constantly expanding market economy, whether this type of 
farming can continue to exist remains a pertinent question. 
While transforming the economic logic by which it operates in order to 
adapt to the market economy, the small-scale farming of Gengdian, to a certain 
extent, has overcome the weaknesses that accompany this form of farming. 
In order to investigate how these weaknesses are being overcome, we need to 
step away from small farming itself, and further explore social change in the 
village. This points us towards the content to be discussed in the next section 
of this article. 
4 Village Governance and the Trend for Greater Cooperation 
As we have seen, following the agricultural transformation that occurred in 
Gengdian, small household farming was still at the heart of production in the 
village. Moreover, from the analysis above, we have already seen that although 
small-scale farms can adjust the economic logic by which they operate in order 
to adapt to the market economy, they continue to suffer from many inherent 
weaknesses. If we look specifically at Gengdian, after the traditional farming 
of grains and cotton was replaced by a new industry in greenhouse vegetable 
production, the farmers came up against many problems, which they found 
difficult to solve on their own. These problems included the introduction 
and replacement of different types of vegetables, improvements in the tech-
niques used in greenhouse farming, the maintenance of channels by which 
to sell their vegetables, acquisition of the land on which to build the green-
houses, and so on. Under these circumstances, the farmers were very much 
in need of some form of external force that would be able to help them solve 
these issues. 
In order to deal with the villagers’ needs, Gengdian witnessed an expansion 
in the substance of village governance. In addition to administrative affairs, 
the village cadres began to exert more and more energy in providing services 
for greenhouse production across the whole village and helping in finding 
solutions to issues that individual farmers were unable to solve. Moreover, 
under the leadership and mobilization of the village cadre, a whole series of 
villagers’ cooperative organizations began to be established within Gengdian 
itself, including a vegetable market, a cooperative society, and a seedling 
farm. Through these cooperative organizations, the economic requirements 
of the villagers were standardized and routinized. Then, the very existence of 
the organizations was helpful in bringing together the scattered funds of the 
villagers, so that they could undertake relatively concentrated investment and 
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make it possible to gain more from the marketized supply chain for agricultural 
products. 
In this way, the transformation of village administration, the increase in 
the substance of the cadres’ work, and the establishment of a series of coop-
erative organizations—all these changes, to a certain extent, helped to over-
come the weaknesses inherent to small-scale farming. As such, the greenhouse 
production of vegetables in Gengdian, with small-scale households doing the 
farming, could constantly be developed rather than coming to a standstill and 
ultimately, a failure.
Geng Zunzhu, the current Secretary of Gengdian Party Branch, entered the 
ranks of the village leaders as the deputy director of the Village Committee 
(村委) in 1999. From 2002 onwards, he had been elected in, with the majority 
of the votes, as Director of the Village Committee (村委会主任), whilst at the 
same time acting as Secretary of the Village Party Branch. For over a decade, 
Geng Zunzhu has continued to be at the very heart of politics in the village. 
Multiple interviews with Geng clearly demonstrate the change in the sub-
stance of their work and the extension of the village administration.11 
According to Geng Zunzhu, in the 1990s, the main work of the village cadres 
was the collection of agricultural tax, santiwutong and so on. Following the 
tax reforms of 2000, the original agricultural tax and the santiwutong were 
done away with, and only the new agricultural tax and additional fees were 
collected.12 In 2006, the new agricultural tax and the additional fees were again 
11   Currently there are altogether six village cadres in Gengdian. Geng Zunzhu is the 
Secretary of the Village Party Branch and the director of the Village Committee, and he is 
in charge of all work in the village. Geng Chuanxi is the deputy director, and is in charge 
of production within the village and of new rural construction. Geng Fuzhong is respon-
sible for managing the vegetable market, as well as acting as cashier for the Cooperative. 
Geng Qingxiang is the director of the village public security committee, he is charged with 
managing the seedling farm, and he is the accountant for the Cooperative; Shu Gaoqi is 
the local people’s company commander, and he is charged with the management of the 
market as well as water and electricity for the whole village; Wang Yuzhen is the women’s 
director. In Gengdian itself there are four Village Groups, each group has a Village Group 
leader. Aside from Geng Zunzhu and Wang Yuzhen, each village cadre is the leader of a 
village group.
12   In 1999, the average amount of agricultural tax per capita in Liaocheng was 26 yuan, and in 
2000 it was 25 yuan. Santiwutong is usually calculated according to 5% of the net income 
per capita from the previous year. In 1999 it was 75.5 yuan, and in 2000 it was 75.3 yuan. 
After 2000, the tax reforms were put into place. The “new agricultural tax” was calculated 
by multiplying the average per capita yield during the five years between 1994–1998 by 6% 
at a price of 0.57/0.5kg; the additional tax was calculated at 40% of the new agricultural 
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rescinded. This meant that the task of collecting agricultural tax no longer 
existed. However, for the last ten years, the work pressures of the village cadres 
have by no means eased, and instead they have grown heavier. This is because 
after the agriculture in Gengdian was entirely transformed from the growing 
of grains and cotton to greenhouse vegetables, the new industry brought out 
many issues that the farmers were unable to solve themselves. Under these 
circumstances, the villagers always looked to the village cadres to help them in 
seeking solutions. Nowadays, the main work of the village cadres is serving the 
greenhouses across the whole village. This created a striking contrast with the 
former form of village administration, which mainly involved administrative 
affairs like the collection of taxes. 
This transformation in the administration of the village was a gradual pro-
cess. When the greenhouse industry first began, the involvement of the vil-
lage cadres was far from what it is today. At that time, the villagers purchased 
materials themselves, and the sale of vegetables was done at the side of the 
road in the village. It was in 2003 that the priority of the cadres’ work was 
shifted to services for greenhouse production. In that year, villagers had to 
grow new assortments of greenhouse vegetables. Before 2003, all of the green-
houses throughout the whole Jiazhai Township, including those of Gengdian, 
were drawing on the experience of the villager in Wangyaobao Village, who 
grew kidney beans. This type of pulse, after three years of continuous cultiva-
tion, is easily affected by disease, causing the yield and the quality to slide. At 
this point, it was imperative that the crop be changed for a different type. A 
suitable new type of vegetable needed to be chosen, and with this came the 
need to learn the techniques involved in cultivating this new crop. Yet the 
majority of the villagers did not have the ability to introduce a new crop or 
the new skills involved. It was in this situation that Geng Zunzhu repeatedly 
reported the severity of the crop rotation issue to the township government, 
asking that they send people with the necessary skill to solve the problem. 
In 2003, the township government employed a specialist from Shouguang 
(寿光)—a county level city in Weifang (潍坊) in Shandong Province—who 
knew how to grow cucumber, peppers, and other vegetables in greenhouses. To 
replace the kidney beans, they invited him to give guidance on the crop rota-
tion that was to take place in Gengdian’s greenhouses. The village collective 
put up the funds, and through this specialist, they bought cucumber seeds and 
grafting clips for the cucumbers, giving them out, free of charge, to the thirty 
villagers willing to change their crops. With the help of this specialist, the 
tax. In 2001, the total per capita new agricultural tax for the agricultural population in 
Liaocheng was 91.42 yuan.
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thirty greenhouses of the villagers were successfully set up to cultivate cucum-
bers instead of kidney beans. Following the change, in that year each indi-
vidual greenhouse made a gross income of around 15,000 yuan. Having seen 
the benefits, the rest of the farmers who had not rotated their crops all began 
to follow suit the next year. It was in this way that by the end of the second 
year all of the greenhouses in Gengdian had rotated their crops. Meanwhile, 
within the jurisdiction of Jiazhai Township, in those villages that had not 
actively helped their villagers to rotate their crops, the greenhouse industry 
began to fail. This also shows how serious the inherent weaknesses of small 
farming can be. 
Through this matter of crop rotation, Geng Zunzhu and the other cadres 
came to realize that in order to keep the development of the greenhouses going, 
the village collective must be responsible for the introduction and updating of 
techniques for the greenhouses. Thus, from 2003 onwards, the village cadres, 
each year, would organize around thirty villagers to go to Shouguang to observe 
what was going on there and learn the techniques for producing vegetables. 
This has already become a regular part of their work. The transport, room and 
board of the villagers all came from the funds of the village collective. The orga-
nization of observation and learning tours had a notable, positive effect on 
prompting renewals in the types of vegetables and improvements in the tech-
niques for greenhouse cultivation. After 2003, Gengdian introduced a string 
of new vegetables from Shouguang, including bell peppers, chili peppers, and 
cherry tomatoes, which were all successfully cultivated. In 2006, Gengdian 
introduced a new style of “superior standard” greenhouse techniques from 
Shouguang. This type of greenhouse used a huge tract of land, and the bot-
tom of the canopy was around 1.5m below ground surface, which meant it was 
good at preserving heat in the winter season. So the yield was good, and the 
vegetables were of a high quality. An automatic machine was used to roll out 
and retract the curtains of straw thatch used to preserve heat over the film of 
the tent, saving time and labor. Beginning in 2006, the new greenhouses built 
in Gengdian were all of superior standard, and many villagers rebuilt their 
original greenhouses, swapping them for the new style. The superior standard 
greenhouse needs electricity to operate the automatic curtain machine, so the 
cadres also became responsible for laying electric cable for each of the farmers 
near their newly built greenhouses. 
From 2000, coordinating the circulation of land also gradually became an 
important part of the cadres’ work. The land for building the greenhouses had 
to fit a rectangle of a certain size, whereas the plots of allocated land in the 
villagers’ possession—one plot per household—more often than not, did not 
meet the requirements for size and shape. In Gengdian, when the collective 
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land was being separated up to allocate small plots to the villagers, the land 
allocated was running from north to south in length, and the narrow width 
of each plot ran from east to west. The building of greenhouses actually 
required the opposite: the length of the plot should be east-west, whilst the 
width should be north-south. This is aimed to increase the area of sunlight 
that the greenhouse gets in the winter. When the greenhouses were first pro-
moted, since the collective land was transferred, and the plots of land for the 
greenhouses were allocated altogether, this problem did not exist. However, as 
more and more greenhouses were built, the problem of the land allocated not 
being suitable for building greenhouses became increasingly prominent (this 
is also a reason for other villages’ being limited in their development of green-
house vegetables). The central government had already expressly prohibited 
revisions to the land that had been allocated for a period of 30 years beginning 
in 1999.13 Moreover, after greenhouse production had become the leading 
industry in Gengdian, it was not feasible to reallocate collective land across the 
whole village. Thus the Gengdian village cadres began to undertake services 
to transfer the land, coordinating the swaps of land or transferring the alloca-
tion between different farmers, in order to satisfy the requirements of building 
greenhouses. From 2006, the cadres had already helped in the exchange of over 
300 mu of land between 130 households, for new greenhouses to be built and 
older ones to be rebuilt. Also, they had assisted with the transfer of 170 mu of 
land, involving over 120 households. 
In 2003, at a meeting of village cadres, Geng Zunzhu proposed that a steel-
framed structure, covered with an awning, be built inside the village to serve 
as a vegetable trading market. The purpose was to provide a stable sales chan-
nel for the whole village’s vegetables. The other cadres at the meeting, includ-
ing four cadres and four Village Group (村民小组) leaders, all agreed with 
Geng Zunzhu’s suggestion. Following this, Gengdian called a villagers’ meeting 
with 30 villager representatives to discuss about the vegetable market. With 
the support of the villagers’ meeting, the cadres from the Village Committee 
and the Village Group leaders all decided to adopt a share-holding system to 
find the money for building the market. The village collective invested 30,000 
yuan, and combined with the investments from the cadres and the ordinary 
villagers, they altogether raised 150,000 yuan. After the funds had been raised, 
Geng Zunzhu and the Village Committee accountant Geng Fuzhong (耿付忠) 
13   The twenty-seventh provision of the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Land 
Contract in Rural Areas, first implemented on 1 March 2003, stipulates that aside from 
instances of allocated land being destroyed by natural disaster, the contractor is not at 
liberty to alter allocated land within the given period of allocation.
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took two of the share-holding village representatives to Liaocheng, to inves-
tigate the building structure of vegetable markets, and then they went to the 
building materials market to purchase the materials for constructing the struc-
ture. During the construction that followed, the village cadres worked alter-
nating shifts to check the quality of the construction work and supervise the 
building materials right up until the market had been built. 
After the vegetable market had been built, the village accountant 
Geng Fuzhong was in charge of the management of the market. During whole-
sale trading, the shareholders took turns to work in the market, with two peo-
ple each day, taking responsibility for weighing the vegetables and dealing with 
miscellaneous jobs around the market. For each 0.5kg vegetables weighed and 
traded at the market, two fen (one fen = 0.01 yuan) was collected as a weigh-
ing fee. Three receipts were issued: one was kept by the person in charge of 
weighing the produce, the second was given to the wholesale vegetable mar-
ket cashier by the person who was in charge of collecting the weighing fee for 
that day, and the third was given to the vegetable market accountant to be put 
onto the books. Not only did the vegetable market provide a stable channel for 
the sale of the vegetables produced in Gengdian and the surrounding villages, 
but it also made a profit through the weighing service. Since the year the mar-
ket was built, the bonus has been shared out annually, and by 2009, this had 
already happened six times. The amount divided would reach over twice the 
amount invested, and both the village collective and the share-holding villag-
ers benefitted from this. 
After the vegetable market had solved the problem of selling the produce, 
in 2008 Geng Zunzhu and the other village cadres mobilized the villagers 
to establish the Chiping County Lüguan Farmers’ Professional Cooperative 
(茌平县绿冠蔬菜农民专业合作社). On March 3, 2008, Geng Zunzhu proposed 
the establishment of the Cooperative (合作社), and through discussions at a 
meeting of the village committee cadres and village group leaders, a unani-
mous decision was made amongst them in support of the motion. After more 
than three months of preparations, on June 19th, a general meeting was con-
vened to mark the establishment of the cooperative. In the same way as the 
vegetable market, the cooperative adopted a share-holding system to raise 
funds, and on the establishment of the cooperative, there were ninety-three 
households from across the village that had invested. A total of 320,000 yuan 
had been raised in funds from people joining the cooperative. The village 
cadres were responsible for the cooperative’s management. Geng Zunzhu, 
the Secretary of the Village Party Branch and Director of the Village 
Committee, became the Cooperative’s chairman, whilst both Geng Chuanxi 
(耿传喜), the Deputy Secretary of the Village Party Branch and Deputy Director 
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of the Village Committee, and Shu Gaoqi (舒高齐), the village army company 
commander, became joint vice-chairmen of the Cooperative. The position of 
accountant was taken by Geng Qingxiang (耿庆祥), the village public security 
director. The Cooperative had multiple functions, which included integrating 
the purchasing of both materials for the greenhouses and the vegetable seed-
lings in order to ensure quality, whilst at the same time reducing the costs for 
farming households making their purchases separately. A second function of 
the Cooperative was to integrate the techniques of the villagers in producing 
the vegetables, standardizing the use of pesticides and ensuring that they were 
able to reach the standards required of green food. A third function was the 
building of a cold storage warehouse for storing the produce. In this way, after 
having stabilized a channel for the sale of the vegetables, through the organiza-
tional framework of the Cooperative, Gengdian’s vegetable industry could be 
coordinated and standardized at the production level. 
After successfully operating the vegetable market and the Cooperative, in 
the summer of 2010, Gengdian built a farm for the cultivation of vegetable 
seedlings, which encompassed five purpose-built greenhouses to provide the 
farmers from Gengdian and the surrounding villages with seedlings. Before 
the establishment of the Cooperative, the villagers would go themselves to 
vegetable seedling dealers in the township of Jiazhai to buy chili pepper and 
tomato seedlings, but for cucumbers, they had to buy the seeds and grow them 
themselves. After the Cooperative had been set up, the bulk buying of chili 
pepper and tomato seedlings meant that five fen could be saved on each seed-
ling purchased, but the cucumber seedlings still had to be bought as seeds and 
grown by the households themselves. In the case of cucumber, they needed to 
be grafted onto pumpkin sprouts. With each household separately doing all of 
the work involved in grafting, not only did this mean that each household had 
to arrange its own space to cultivate the pumpkin and the cucumber seedlings, 
but it also took up a great amount of the time of those households running 
greenhouses. Moreover, for those farmers who were not particularly skilled at 
grafting, their success had no guarantees. Meanwhile, in Shouguang, the seed-
lings were all cultivated in the same place, at seedling farms housed within 
greenhouses, thus bringing a great deal of convenience to its farmers. 
From 2009, Geng Zunzhu, Geng Fuzhong, and Geng Qingxiang came and 
went between Shouguang and Gengdian, making at least seven trips, to plan 
for the building of a seedling farm. They began by observing the structure of 
the canopies used in Shouguang for growing the seedlings, and then they went 
to learn how the farmers built their canopies, using cameras to take photo-
graphs during study. They then hired a specialist from Shouguang, who knew 
how to build the canopies, and six specialists, who were in charge of grafting 
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seedlings, helping building the seedling farm and passing on the techniques 
needed for the grafting. In order to build the seedling farm, Gengdian trans-
ferred 15 mu of the villagers’ allocated land, the fee for which was decided at 
a rate equivalent to the market price for 500kg wheat to be paid in cash per 
annum. The floating capital needed for building the seedling farm was mainly 
raised through the villagers’ buying shares.14 Altogether there were 158 house-
holds that invested. Geng Qingxiang was put in charge of the management of 
the farm. He was to be on-site to supervise the building process and to coordi-
nate the construction, and following the completion of the building, he was to 
be responsible for the day-to-day management. In 2010, all of the seedlings for 
growing pumpkins, cucumbers, bell peppers, chili peppers, aubergines and so 
on, which were needed in Gengdian and the surrounding villages, were sup-
plied by the Gengdian seedling farm. Not only did this make things convenient 
for the villagers, it also lowered production costs. 
Aside from providing services, Gengdian’s vegetable market, Cooperative, 
and seedling farm all made a certain amount of profit. The vegetable market 
collected its weighing fee; and the price of the materials for production sup-
plied by the Cooperative was lower than the market retail price, but higher than 
the wholesale price achieved by integrating all of the purchasing. The seedling 
farm made a profit during the process of producing the seedlings. This meant 
that the price for the seedlings it supplied was lower than the market price, and 
it was also lower than the wholesale price achieved by the Cooperative when 
buying in the seedlings. The price at which the Cooperative and the seedling 
farm sold the materials for production and the seedlings was the same for both 
shareholders and non-shareholders alike, but the profits were shared only 
between the former. In April 2010, the Cooperative managed to share out its 
profits for the first time following its establishment. The amount split between 
the shareholders was 79,052 yuan. Judging by its current performance, the 
seedling farm will recover all of its investment in 2013. This kind of capacity 
for making profit helped to spark a willingness amongst the villagers to invest, 
enabling all of the funds needed for the establishment of these cooperative 
organizations to be raised successfully. 
What all of the above shows is that when faced with an economic environ-
ment heavily affected by marketization and commercialization, the small-scale 
farming of Gengdian, just as with any other type of small-scale business, was 
14   Altogether a total of 1,015,000 yuan was raised, of which 800,000 yuan was made up of 
investments from 158 households of villagers in Gengdian, 75,000 yuan came from invest-
ments from cadres at the township (xiang) and county levels, 40,000 yuan came from 
villagers from other villages, and 10,000 yuan came from the Cooperative.
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confronted with many difficulties. Under these circumstances, it just so hap-
pened that there was a force ready to exceed the scope of the small household 
farmers, to complement and make up for their deficiencies. The emergence 
of this force, firstly, is down to the long-term construction of Rural Village 
Organization (农村基层组织) that has been underway since the establishment 
of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国). In the second section of 
this article, we have seen that right from the beginning of the Collectivization 
Period (集体化时期), the village of Gengdian had enjoyed a tradition of good 
governance. This tradition is one of the concrete achievements of the construc-
tion of village organization. The election system for the Village Committee 
that has formed since the Rural Reforms, the villagers’ general meeting system, 
combined with the Party Branch that already existed prior to the reforms, all 
provided a political structure that could be relied upon and could support the 
continuation and preservation of Gendian’s administrative tradition.15 Under 
this kind of political structure, certain individual gifted groups of cadres come 
to the fore and put their talents to use to provide services and support for the 
villagers’ production. The series of cooperative organizations established with 
the impetus of the village cadres, routinize and standardize certain services 
commonly required by the villagers, including the purchasing of materials, 
the sale of their produce, and guidance on techniques, enabling the villagers 
to rest at ease and rely upon these services. Moreover, the emergence of the 
cooperative organizations was also helpful in bringing together the scattered 
funds of individual households, enabling them to make investments that they 
would be unable to make alone as small farmers. Thus it was possible to extend 
the agricultural produce supply chain both upwards and downwards so that 
on the basis of maintaining household production “vertical integration” could 
be realized.16 This in turn achieves greater gains for villagers from marketized 
agricultural production. The pooling of the villagers’ money to raise funds for 
the vegetable market and the seedling farm, as well as the Cooperative’s invest-
ment for the cold storage warehouse, is an example of this vertical integration. 
15   The existence of this type of village politics is one of the key differences between rural 
China and other small-farming countries like India.
16   In the 1920s, Russian economist Alexander Chayanov clearly proposed that cooperatives 
formed by rural households joining together, controlling warehouse storage, credit, dis-
tribution, the processing of agricultural products, and the other stages that come with 
agricultural production, could form (in the broad sense) the “vertical integration” of the 
agricultural economy. This kind of vertical integration, characterized by its extension of 
the supply chain for agricultural products, is different from “horizontal integration”, the 
main characteristic of which is expanding the scale of the farm. See Chayanov 1996 [1925] 
Chapter 7.
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5 The Impact of Small Farming Development on the National 
Economy
So far in this article, we have seen the development of agriculture and the 
changes in village society that have been occurring for the last fifteen years 
in Gengdian. Faced with increased demand for vegetables, the cultivation of 
grains and cotton traditional to Gengdian was transformed into greenhouse 
vegetable agriculture. The village’s traditional form of administration, based 
on administrative affairs, was transformed into one based mainly on the provi-
sion of economic services. These days, the day-to-day work of the village cadres 
is mainly the provision of services for greenhouse production throughout the 
whole village, and management of the cooperative organizations. During this 
development process, both the villagers’ per capita income from labor and the 
returns from each unit of land have shot up. The identity of these small-scale 
proprietors has been strengthened. The trends for greater cooperation within 
the village and the transformation of the village’s administration into one most 
concerned with economic issues have strengthened the sense of cohesion in 
the village collective. 
As a case study, the development experience of Gengdian demonstrates a 
type of development vision for China’s small farming agriculture. In some rural 
areas, where transport is convenient and the natural conditions are suited to 
cultivating vegetables and fruit, or to rearing livestock, it is possible to achieve a 
transformation from involution farming to a new form of labor-capital, concen-
trated agriculture. This new model is built on the collective ownership system, 
and the heart of the model is household farming. Moreover, through coopera-
tive organizations arising within the villages themselves, the vertical integra-
tion of business operations and of the production of agricultural produce can 
be achieved. In this way, within the context of trade and circulation in a mar-
ket economy, considerable profit can be achieved, realizing increases in the 
incomes of people in rural China, as well as the development of the countryside. 
The prominent features of this vision for development are: firstly, what it 
reflects is the potential within agriculture itself for continued development—
the transformed structure of agriculture—thus forming a different way to 
increase the income of people in rural China without labor migrating to the 
cities and shifting over to non-agricultural sectors. Secondly, it is a way of real-
izing development through active participation in the market economy, and 
benefiting from the agricultural product supply chain, thus it is different to the 
rural construction of the days of the Planned Economy (计划经济). Thirdly, 
the leading forces in this form of development are the farming household, and 
the village collective. Thus this model differs from development of agricultural 
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industry and marketization that is reliant upon outside capital to integrate the 
key resources of rural land, and hire rural labor. 
The next question is: if this vision for the development of small farmer agri-
culture were to be commonly achieved, what kind of effect would it have on 
the Chinese economy?
Firstly, this involves an overall grasp of China’s economic structure. 
Professor Philip C. C. Huang through a series of recent studies has proposed 
that China’s urban economy is increasingly demonstrating the coexistence of 
the formal and the informal economy (Huang, 2009; 2010a; 2010b). Informal 
economy is characterized by its lack of welfare and job security. Indeed, it 
is almost entirely untouched by the protection of China’s labor laws. Those 
working in this informal economy already account for 168 million of a total 
of 283 million people employed in towns and cities across China. This is one 
and a half times that of those employed in the formal economy (Huang, 2009). 
As early as the 1970s, the United Nations’ International Labor Organization 
(ILO), based on empirical research undertaken in a great number of develop-
ing countries, pointed out that at the same time as modern urban economies 
are constantly expanding, the vast majority of laborers entering the cities from 
the countryside are not working in the formal sector built up of enterprises 
imitating those of the West, but rather, they are entering the informal sector 
(ILO, 2002: 9–10). These workers suffer discrimination in many different ways, 
including in the pay for their work and welfare, so the clear stance of the ILO 
is to advocate struggle for a dignified working environment for workers within 
the informal sector. In contrast with the binary division of the economy into 
“traditional-modern” or “agricultural-industrial,” which appear in mainstream 
development economics (Lewis, 1989), a different kind of analytical frame-
work based on “agriculture, the informal sector, and the formal sector,” more 
accurately captures the whole picture of China’s economy. 
Since the beginning of the Reform and Opening, although China’s economy 
has experienced sustained rapid growth, we cannot but accept that overall, 
the structure of industry is still for the most part dominated by labor-intensive 
enterprises at the bottom of the supply chain. Keeping wages and the welfare 
provided to workers low has become the main means to cut costs and main-
tain the competitiveness of enterprises. Meanwhile, for a long time, involution 
farming based mainly on the cultivation of grains and cereals has left rural 
China with an enormous amount of surplus labor. As there was no way to rely 
upon agricultural production to increase income, as urban labor- intensive 
industries have rapidly developed, people from rural China have arrived 
thick and fast in towns and cities, entering the informal sector and becom-
ing migrant workers (nongmingong, 农民工). The threshold for rural labor to 
shift between the urban informal sector and the agricultural sector is low. The 
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two are separated from the urban formal economy (for instance, made up of 
enlightened foreign enterprises and large-scale Chinese enterprises) by a deep 
chasm, which would be most difficult to cross. 
It is very easy for a distorted kind of entanglement to form between the 
involution agricultural economy and the urban informal economy. One ele-
ment of this is that the low income of the former and the existence of a large 
volume of surplus labor that accompanies it mean that even when pay is 
extremely meagre, and there is a lack of welfare and security, the informal sec-
tor is still able to attract vast numbers of migrant workers. At the same time, it 
is very difficult for migrant workers in the informal sector, with meagre wages 
and inadequate social security, to completely settle in the city. These migrant 
workers must continue to rely upon the village instead of the city to achieve 
their labor reproduction, and thus they are unable to extricate themselves 
entirely from the countryside (He and Dong, 2009). “Half farming, half work-
ing” thus becomes the norm for a vast number of rural families (Huang, 2007b 
[2006]). This kind of “locked” situation between involution farming and the 
urban informal economy is a problem that a country like China, with such an 
enormous population and a tradition of small farming, must solve during the 
process of economic development. 
The potential for development inherent to small farming agriculture pro-
vides a possibility for breaking through this lock. When the leading rural indus-
try is transformed from the old form of agriculture, based on the cultivation of 
grains, cereals and rice crops, into a new form of agriculture based on growing 
fruit and vegetables, rearing livestock, fish farming and so on, the income of 
people in rural parts of the country is notably increased. This, in turn, raises 
the expectations of people from rural areas about what they can earn when 
they go to the city to work. If the income and welfare working in the city does 
not compare with the income that can be earned on a person’s own plot of 
allocated land by growing fruit and vegetables, rearing livestock or farming 
fish, then he or she will not choose to go to work for a boss in the city. Instead, 
they will opt to run their own small farm in the countryside. In this way, after 
the transformation, the new industries in agriculture will battle with the urban 
informal economy for labor. This creates a kind of pressure, demanding that 
the latter provide better pay, that the state and enterprises provide welfare 
and security for workers in the informal economy, or that they invest more 
resources in providing a higher level of technical training for migrant workers. 
The alternative is that the cities would be unable to attract laborers to come 
and take up employment there. Compared with using administrative mea-
sures to increase the minimum wage and welfare of the informal economic 
sector, influencing the decision making of enterprises in the informal sector 
by the development of agriculture itself is a more amicable way of going about 
Gao32
things and would not create massive unemployment amongst migrant work-
ers. This would also have the effect of spurring on the transformation within 
the informal sector from low value added industry to high value-added indus-
try. If the turning point for change was the continued development of small 
farming, and increases were achieved in the income of those working in agri-
culture and in the urban informal sector, then this would directly help towards 
accruing wealth for those laborers who, for a long time, have been right at the 
bottom of the heap. This could also expand China’s long-standing seriously 
deficient domestic demand and in turn provide the basis for improving the 
whole economic structure. At the same time, it would also help us to come up 
with appropriate solutions to the problems of the Three Rural Issues (sannong, 
三农问题)—rural areas, rural people, and agriculture—and ameliorate a 
whole series of social pressures that have accompanied the expansion of the 
urban informal sector. 
6 Conclusion 
This article has done two things. Firstly, through empirical research and the-
oretical analysis, it has revealed the development logic of Gengdian’s small 
farming-based agriculture and village society within the context of the market 
economy. Secondly, it has examined the kind of impact the potential develop-
ment of small farming-based agriculture might have on the national economy 
as a whole. 
Within the greater context of an increasingly developed market economy, 
the village of Gengdian continues to maintain small-scale farming, which is 
still carried out by the individual rural household. However, the economic 
logic and mode of operation have undergone important change. The villagers 
have commonly shifted from cultivating traditional crops of grains and cot-
ton to running greenhouses to produce vegetables. There are far greater gains 
to be made in the market with the latter. The villagers’ production is already 
heavily market-oriented, and its aim is to achieve maximum profit. This kind 
of economic logic forms a sharp contrast to traditional small farming, the main 
aim of which is subsistence—to satisfy the needs of the family. Corresponding 
with the continued existence of household farming, the village administration 
of Gengdian and the substance of the village cadres’ work has also experienced 
an important transformation. Aside from dealing with administrative affairs, 
the village cadres are investing more and more energy in providing services for 
greenhouse production throughout the village. Meanwhile, within the village, 
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a series of cooperative organizations have been generated through the joining 
together of the villagers, in order to provide for stable sales, coordinate produc-
tion, and guarantee the supply of the materials needed for production. These 
changes within village society, to a certain extent, make up for the weaknesses 
inherent to small farming, thus bringing about sustained development of the 
vegetable industry in Gengdian. 
If this kind of vision for the continued development of small farming-based 
agricultural were to become a universal phenomenon, not only would this 
increase the income of rural laborers, it would also produce an impact upon 
the huge urban informal economy, pushing enterprises in the informal sector 
to give better pay to migrant workers, and to increase the welfare provided 
to them. Otherwise, these enterprises will have no way to compete with the 
small-farming industry for labor. This would also create the juncture at which 
the Chinese economy turns to rely more upon scientific and technological 
innovation, and a more people-oriented form of development. 
The internal logic reflected in the development of Gengdian creates a 
striking contrast with the classic thinking of Marx and Weber. They have 
both argued that large-scale agricultural enterprises using freely employed 
labor will replace household businesses. It is worth noting that the form of 
operation in Gengdian, based on “household farming + cooperative organiza-
tions”, is actually in keeping with what was envisaged by Russian economist 
Chayanov (Chayanov, 1996 [1925]) Whilst contemplating the future prospects 
of small farming in Russia after the Socialist revolution, Chayanov put forward 
this idea: agricultural production would continue to be based on household 
farming on a horizontal trajectory, whilst the “vertical integration” of agricul-
ture that individual farming households cannot achieve on their own would be 
undertaken by associations of farmers—cooperatives. Chayanov argued that 
this style of development would not entail a stage during which the peasants 
were stripped of their land, making them property-less, and thus it is more 
befitting of the tenets of socialism. This form of development would allow the 
majority of profit derived through the supply chain of agricultural products to 
find its way back to the peasants, in this way raising the income of rural people 
to the greatest possible extent, and giving impetus to the development of the 
countryside. Contemporary China is a developing country with a vast number 
of rural citizens, and it is an East Asian power with a long history of small-scale 
farming. Searching for a development path with the people in rural areas as the 
subjects and promoting the utmost well-being of rural people and the country-
side are meaningful in the most practical sense. It is academic explorations to 
this kind of end that this article hopes to initiate. 
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Chapter 2
“Beyond the Boundary”: A Countermovement to 
the Hollowing-out of Rural China*
Wu Chongqing**
Sun Village (孙村) is located in a coastal area of Putian (莆田) prefecture in Fujian 
(福建) historically known as Jiewai (界外)—“Beyond the Boundary.” This term 
derives from Putian’s “border relocation” policy during the early Qing dynasty 
(清朝). In 1647, Zheng Chenggong (郑成功) led a naval mutiny against the Qing 
that established his fleet’s control over the Nanri (南日) and Meizhou (梅州) 
archipelagoes off the coast of Putian until 1661. In 1662 the Qing issued an order 
to “cut the boundary (截界),” establishing new imperial borders along the coast 
and building walls to demarcate them with stone forts every five li (里, roughly 
2.5 kilometers). The state relocated coastal residents to areas within the new 
borders, while “strengthening defenses and razing fields” outside the borders. 
Qing forces did not recover the archipelagoes until 1680, reestablishing the old 
borders with the incorporation of Taiwan (台湾) in 1683 (see Putian Xianzhi, 
 《莆田县志》, 1963).
Although the border walls existed for only 21 years, the name Jiewai stuck 
and developed into a deeply rooted derogatory term for the area. For people 
in other parts of Putian, Jiewai denoted marginality, backwardness, poverty, 
ignorance, and incivility. Over the past two decades, however, this term has 
gradually lost its negative connotation. For the first time, Putian’s urbanites 
have begun to say, “You Jiewai people are good at innovating and getting rich.” 
Behind this reversal lies the diligent efforts of Jiewai residents to break out of 
their traditional situation.
*   This article has benefited from inspiring discussions with Professor Pun Ngai, who once 
accompanied me on a field trip to Sun Village. I also wish to thank Professor Philip C. C. 
Huang for the encouragement he generously gave when I was collecting data for this arti-
cle. My biggest thanks go to Dr. Mathew Hale, who has not only translated this article from 
Chinese into English with elegant simplicity and accuracy, but also made valuable sugges-
tions that have enhanced the article.
**  Chongqing Wu is a professor at the Institute of Marxist Philosophy and the Modernization of 
China, Department of Philosophy, Sun Yat-sen University.
© Wu Chongqing, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004326385_004 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
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1 Social Networks in a Peripheral Region
These urban appraisals of Jiewai partly match its changing reality. The region is 
peripheral not only in the geographic sense but also economically, culturally, 
and socially. Jiewai belongs to what was traditionally known as “areas beyond 
[Chinese] civilization (化外之区).”
Yao Zhongqiu (姚中秋) wrote of “China south of the Qiantang River” (钱塘江
以南中国) that after the fall of the Western Jin (西晋) dynasty, “the upper strata 
of scholar-gentry from Luoyang (洛阳) and surrounding areas migrated south. 
Numerous and highly organized, unable or unwilling to defend themselves 
against the despots of Wuzhong (吴中), they chose to cross the Qiantang River 
(钱塘江) and settle in the Kuaiji (会稽) area, where they established strong 
social organizations that later migrants could not penetrate, forcing the latter 
to move even further south. . . . The Qiantang River thus became an important 
line of demarcation for Chinese culture”: every subsequent war would push 
more “relatively Confucianized groups to migrate southward,” to the point that 
“China south of the Qiantang River” (coastal areas south of Ningbo, southern 
Anhui, Jiangxi, etc.) ended up surpassing areas to the north in the preservation 
of Confucian culture and governance (Yao, 2012: 38–39). This is a somewhat 
elitist explanation of why lineage culture and social networks are relatively 
developed in rural China south of the the Qiantang River—interpreting “soci-
ety” from the perspective of “rich and powerful clans.”
Actually many remote villages in coastal southeastern China lack the 
natural resources necessary for large lineages to take root, branch out, and 
multiply, yet their social networks have developed nevertheless. This begs 
the question of how to understand social organization from the bottom up, 
specifically how society is shaped through the everyday economic activi-
ties of ordinary people.1 This was also the perspective of Skinner (施坚雅), 
who argued that “standard marketing areas” were rural China’s most impor-
tant space of interaction shaping local sociocultural systems (Skinner, 1998 
[1964–1965]: 40).
Today most scholars tend to assume that rural China during the imperial 
period consisted of autarkic, self-sufficient social units, taking for granted 
that the geographic boundaries of a “natural village” coincided with its 
social boundaries. In southeastern coastal villages, however, rural social net-
works were more open than conventionally imagined, and the key to their 
1    In his research on Hakka Culture (客家文化), anthropologist Myron Cohen argues that lin-
guistic dialects are another variable in Chinese social structure, a major force in the forma-
tion of groups and their unique modes of social activity. See Yang and Wen, 1982: 302.
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formation of open social networks was the long-term development of mobile 
sideline industries.
There have been two main types of peasant sideline arrangements. One is 
the common on-site sideline associated with the phrase “men plow, women 
weave” (nangeng, nüzhi, 男耕女织). As Philip C. C. Huang (黄宗智) has pointed 
out, this has been “an extremely stable economic form throughout Chinese 
history,” occupying a considerable portion of traditional peasant economies 
(Huang, 2008: 267–87). The other type is known as “mobile sidelines.” Whereas 
on-site sidelines are performed by the household’s supplemental labor-power, 
mobile sidelines are performed by the household’s main labor-power, that is, 
the men mainly work outside the village as migrant peddlers or artisans, an 
arrangement that could be described as “men trade (or craft), women plow” 
(nan shang/jiang, nügeng, 男商/匠女耕). This type of sideline arrangement 
has been more common in coastal areas with frequent natural disasters and 
low ratios of arable land to population, which compelled the men to go out 
looking for ways to make money throughout most of the year, or at least during 
the slack farming seasons.
Since households with “men trading and women plowing” did not accumu-
late surplus or capital on a daily basis, they could only join the ranks of migrant 
peddlers with low requirements for start-up capital, and they had to contrive 
ways to minimize the need for operational capital. Sun Village is located near 
the Putian saltern, Fujian’s largest seawater evaporation facility. During the 
Republican Period (民国时期, 1912–1949), this saltern was monopolized by 
local warlord forces (known as the “the Northern Army”), but some employ-
ees managed to smuggle out “private salt” (私盐) and sell it for low prices. 
When going out as migrant peddlers, Sun villagers often bought 100 or 200 jin 
(斤, approximately 50–100 kilograms) of such “private salt” and carried it by 
shoulder-pole 20 or 30 kilometers to sell on the way to the Putian’s rice-farming 
plains. When they sold out of salt around dusk they would walk to the county 
seat of Putian, where they would rest for the night in a simple inn. Early the 
next morning they would buy plains products and “Western” household goods 
such as matches, hairpins, cigarettes, tea leaves, olives, citrus fruits, and water 
chestnuts, and then carry them back to the coast to sell them to the peasants 
of Jiewai. During this journey of interregional trade, they would stop along the 
way to carefully collect information about the consumers’ varying demand in 
different places and seasons. Each peddler had his own customary route and 
regular customers, sellers, and inns. These peddlers thus established social net-
works and conveyed information among villages and regions, and between the 
city and the countryside.
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The other type of mobile sideline arrangement could be called “men craft, 
women plow (男匠女织).” In Jiewai there was a common belief that boys 
should begin artisanal apprenticeships as young as possible, since “young 
hands are nimbler.” Sending boys to apprentice at an early age also relieved 
the household of less productive mouths to feed. Before the introduction of 
compulsory public education, Sun villagers often sent their sons to appren-
tice at the age of 12 or 13 years. These crafts were all related to everyday liveli-
hood. A few required heavy machinery and thus operated out of  storefronts 
(tailoring, blacksmithing, cloth-dying, etc.), but most were mobile (carpentry, 
masonry, stonework, painting, engraving), and some artisans hawked their 
services along the road (barbers, kitchenware-makers, bamboo workers, and 
pig-castrators).
The characteristics of the peddlers’ business determined the range of their 
movement—between Jiewai and the county seat of Putian. For migrant arti-
sans, that range may have been even larger, so their role in developing social 
relationships among villages and regions was not less significant than that 
of peddlers in terms of breadth; and in terms of stability, artisans’ relations 
between master and apprentice, between artisan and client, and among fellow 
artisans of the same craft were even more important. Sun villagers thus used 
the term “going out to society” to describe boys who left the village to appren-
tice or artisans who operated outside, indicating that they truly entered social 
networks outside the village.
During the People’s Commune (人民公社) period (1958 to about 1980), the 
activities of peddlers and artisans were regarded as “tails [remnants] of capital-
ism” (资本主义尾巴) that needed to be “snipped off.” Since in Jiewai the ratio of 
arable land to population was low, it would have been impossible for the peas-
ants to maintain their livelihood without these sorts of mobile sidelines, and 
agriculture could not absorb much more labor-power, so the production-team 
leaders basically turned a blind eye to such activities, merely requiring ped-
dlers and artisans to pay a “sideline fee” in exchange for grain.
2 From Periphery to Center: The On-Site Concentration of Dajin 
Resources
As early as the 1970s, a new type of artisanship emerged in Jiewai. Residents 
used the traditional terms for blacksmithing (datie, 打铁) and stonework 
(dashi, 打石) to name the art of producing and processing golden jewelry as 
dajin (打金, literally, “hitting gold”). Its inventor was a man named Ye Xianfeng 
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(叶先锋), from Chengtou Village (埕头村), three kilometers away from Sun 
Village. Ye was a traveling artisan who invented this type of goldsmithing to 
provide rings and earrings for girls preparing to get married. Although Ye was 
charitable, in order to protect the secrets of his craft he refused to take appren-
tices. Nevertheless, the profitability of dajin drove villagers to follow Ye around 
and steal his secrets. This just happened to be at the beginning of China’s eco-
nomic liberalization, so peasants could travel more freely, and rising individual 
cash income increased the demand for jewelry. The art of dajin thus quickly 
spread throughout the area.
At first, dajin was done entirely by hand, without using a mold for casting. 
This was not only slow but also required great skill. Eventually, several young 
blacksmiths and stone carvers from Sun Village seized the opportunity to pro-
duce iron molds for casting golden jewelry. Both the design and production 
of these molds were carried out by the same individuals. Often they did not 
even need a blueprint: relying on their skill alone, they could directly carve the 
molds with a diamond drill ( jingangzuan, 金刚钻).
This innovation suddenly decreased the skill level necessary for entry into 
the dajin industry, leading villagers to regard dajin as an easy and profitable 
craft to learn, so goldsmiths’ apprentices proliferated. Moreover, Sun Village 
happened to lie at the intersection of three Jiewai market-towns: Daitou, 
Beigao, and Dongjiao. In the 1980s, therefore, Sun Village became the center of 
the dajin industry as it developed rapidly in these three townships.
The invention of these iron jewelry molds had a revolutionary significance 
for dajin, leading to a division of labor that gave rise to jewelry designers, 
mold producers, mold vendors, and goldsmiths (dajinjiang, 打金匠), with 
production and sales eventually spreading throughout China as a way for 
Jiewai peasants to get rich in accordance with their tradition of mobile 
sidelines.
Sun Village produced a great variety of original jewelry molds, and this 
encouraged village goldsmiths to take them beyond Jiewai to the wealthier 
areas of Chaoshan (潮汕) and the Pearl River Delta (珠三角) in neighbor-
ing Guangdong province, where they set up dajin shops. As soon as these 
goldsmiths set up shop far from home, they could not easily leave the job to 
purchase new materials, so an army of mold vendors soon emerged. After tak-
ing a coach from Putian to Guangdong, they would proceed on foot to hawk 
their molds along the streets—an activity they called “walking the street” (zou-
jie, 走街).
During the New Year holiday of 2010, I interviewed two brothers from the 
first generation of jewelry mold vendors, Guo’en (国恩) and Guotai (国泰). 
Guo’en said,
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At the time, the iron molds were heavy. At most we could carry 30 or 40 
molds in a military canvas bag on our shoulders—that would weigh 40 
or 50 jin, so we couldn’t carry too many on a single trip. Usually as soon 
as we got off the coach in Chaozhou [a city in Chaoshan], we would walk 
along the street until we found a jewelry store. That was “walking the 
street”: walking, sitting, drinking tea, chatting about the news, learning 
which mold models were selling well or poorly, which new models had 
appeared from other sources. This was all information we got from walk-
ing, sitting, drinking tea, and chatting.
The producers of these molds were not related by blood to the vendors, but 
they were from the same village or township, so they let them wait to pay until 
after they had sold them, and the vendors were happy to provide the producers 
with information about consumer demand and the latest mold models they 
encountered on the road. Stimulated by this information, the producers even-
tually decided to switch from the heavy, costly, and slow-to-make iron molds 
to gypsum plaster molds, which could be produced in batches. The producers 
overcame their lack of funding by pooling their money to purchase equipment 
from Fuzhou and set up three plaster mold factories near Sun Village: Yatai 
(亚太), Jindeli (金得利), and Jindamei (金达美).
Plaster mold production had the advantages of higher volume, greater diver-
sity of models and speed of creating new molds, lighter weight, and lower cost. 
As soon as a new model came out, therefore, if it was favored by dajin shops 
in distant cities, vendors from Jiewai would swarm forth with the new plaster 
molds in the blink of an eye. According to estimates by industry insiders from 
Sun Village, at its peak there were 20,000 to 30,000 plaster mold vendors from 
the three Jiewai townships mentioned above (Daitou, Beigao and Dongjiao, 
埭头, 北高, 东峤), and they left their footprints throughout China. Before the 
advent of logistics companies, in a village two or three kilometers from Sun 
named Shangtang (上塘), the demand for transportation gave rise to many 
family-run passenger coaches (which actually doubled as freight coaches) with 
daily direct trips to major cities such as Guangzhou (广州), Shenzhen (深圳), 
Suzhou (苏州), Shanghai (上海), Kunming (昆明), and Chongqing (重庆), from 
where thousands of vendors then went on to second- and third-tier cities and 
county seats.
This vast army of plaster mold vendors from Jiewai were functionally similar 
to the vendors of the much-touted “Wenzhou model (温州模式),” playing the 
multiple roles of “information collectors, product sellers, market establishers, 
production organizers, and guides for [China’s] transition [from planned to 
market economy]” (Yuan, 1987: 66). They provided a great deal of feedback to 
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the plaster mold factories, so the designers could promptly replace outmoded 
molds with new ones, and Sun Village quickly became a famous center for the 
production of plaster molds. At the same time, Sun villagers cleverly made use 
of this sales network, which reached throughout China at no organizational 
cost, competing through personal networks to entrust vendors with the task 
of bringing back samples of new jewelry models and equipment from all over 
the country. This led to the emergence in Sun Village of small factories produc-
ing other dajin-related equipment such as gasoline furnaces, flamethrowers, 
hammers, tweezers, scales, and jewelry boxes. They also brought back all kinds 
of silver jewelry, leading some villagers to switch to silversmithing, which in 
turn gave rise to its own industry and market with its own specialty shops, and 
Sun Village goldsmiths throughout China also began to sell silver jewelry on 
the side.
The emergence of plaster molds had effects no less revolutionary than 
that of the iron molds before them. If iron molds stimulated more peasants 
to enter the dajin industry and mold-vending, then plaster molds not only 
further expanded participation in these two sidelines, but also promoted the 
onsite concentration of other production factors related to dajin, such as the 
family-owned transport and logistics businesses, dajin tool production, jewelry 
wholesaling, and the collection of information related to the jewelry industry 
and sources of gold. With its vast army of mold vendors and daily transport 
services to major cities throughout the country, Sun Village became China’s 
largest-scale point of concentration and transfer for all kinds of production 
factors related to the dajin industry.
According to Philip C. C. Huang, “in the process of Western Europe’s ‘early 
industrialization,’ manufacture gradually separated from agriculture. The for-
mer increasingly took place in independent factories, that is, atomized workers 
were brought together in collective production, mainly in urban areas. . . . In 
China, however, manufacture stubbornly remained tied to and inseparable 
from household agriculture up until the mid-twentieth century” (Huang, 
2012: 77). The rise of Sun Village’s dajin industry also meant the separation of 
manufacture from agriculture, but this separation differed from both Western 
Europe’s relocation of manufacturing to urban factories, on the one hand, and 
the 1980s Chinese model of TVEs (乡镇经济, i.e. township and village enter-
prises), on the other. If we borrow the recently popular concept of “headquar-
ters economy” (zongbujingji, 总部经济), Sun Village could be regarded as a 
“headquarters” of the dajin industry, with thousands of dajin shops and related 
equipment wholesalers dispersed in cities throughout China. However, this 
also differs from the typical “headquarters economy” in that Sun Village has 
broken into the “center” from “Beyond the Boundary.” This is a subversion of 
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the center-periphery relation rarely seen in economic history: the countryside 
has become the center, and the city has become the periphery. The secret lies 
in Sun villagers’ use of their unique socioeconomic networks to grasp all links 
in the production chain of the dajin industry. They have used the flexibility and 
low cost of informal economy to stave off competition with big capital and big 
enterprises.
3 Gaining the Upper Hand through Hometown-Based Economic 
Networks (Tongxiang Tongye, 同乡同业)
By the late 1980s, the concentration of the various dajin production factors in 
Sun Village and its environs had basically been achieved. For the young people 
of Jiewai, dajin had become the easiest non-agricultural occupation to enter, 
not only with regard to skill and access to information and social networks, but 
also with regards to the necessary start-up capital. They usually become appren-
tices to relatives or family friends. Against the background of these personal 
relationships, master artisans do not regard their apprentices as wage laborers, 
and the master-apprentice relation is not the usual wage relation. Masters not 
only teach their apprentices the key skills as quickly as possible; they also help 
them find appropriate places to establish their own businesses and lend them 
equipment and small amounts of money at no cost or interest. Within such 
personalistic networks (whether based on kinship or merely place of origin), 
“getting rich together” (gongtong zhifu, 共同致富) has become a commonsensi-
cal ethic. If an artisan looks out only for his own enrichment and fails to help 
his apprentices, in the future he will not be able to obtain help from other mem-
bers of that network. This situation differs from that of the nationwide network 
of printshops established by people from Xinhua (新化), Hunan (湖南), about 
which anthropologist Tan Tongxue (谭同学) concluded that “the wage relation 
always trumps relationships based on kinship or place of origin” (Tan, 2012: 80).
At the same time, Sun Village’s dajin industry also benefitted enormously 
from its good fortune with regard to timing (tianshi, 天时), place (dili, 地利), 
and people (renhe, 人和): timing, in that Jiewai was the first place in China for 
the industry to start; place, in that all the necessary production factors became 
concentrated in Sun Village; and people, in its social networks with their ethic 
of “getting rich together.” Within less than a decade starting in the late 1980s, 
people from Sun Village and its environs opened thousands of dajin shops in 
large and small cities and towns throughout China, such that if you see the 
word dajin hanging over a shop, without even asking, you can be almost cer-
tain that the owner comes from Jiewai.
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Why have these people from a place that is peripheral geographically, 
socially, economically, and culturally, with little capital or information about 
modern business management, managed to “invade the city” and carve out a 
niche in this new industry? Why have people from other places found it dif-
ficult to compete? This requires a discussion of Sun Village’s special socioeco-
nomic networks, that is, tongxiang tongye (same hometown, same industry).
In her research on the Putianese diaspora (莆田裔华人) in Ujong, Malaysia, 
Zheng Li (郑莉) defined tongxiang tongye as referring to “a group of people 
from the same region undertaking the same industry in the urban economy, 
using relationships based on kinship or common place of origin to establish 
commercial networks and monopolize control over markets and resources” 
(Zheng, 2014: 210–11). Zheng traces this tradition throughout Chinese his-
tory, for example, in the place- and kinship-based commercial and artisanal 
organizations (shangbang, zugong, zushang, ie 商帮 , 族工 , 族商) of the Ming 
(明朝) and Qing dynasties researched by historian Fu Yiling (傅衣凌), and the 
later lineage economies (xiangzu jingji, i.e. 乡族经济) researched by Fu’s stu-
dents Zheng Zhenman (郑振满) and Chen Zhiping (陈支平), analyzing the 
historical ties between such organizations and tongxiang tongye.
The concept of tongxiang tongye accurately reflects the mutually embedded 
relationship between economic activities and social networks, so I borrow this 
concept to analyze Sun Village’s dajin industry. Today’s tongxiang tongye differs 
from that of the past, however. Past tongxiang tongye may have indeed involved 
the monopolization of control over markets and resources, and thus Fu Yiling 
argued that “the intervention of lineage forces into China’s feudal economy” 
was one of the main reasons that the sprouts of capitalism failed to develop 
smoothly in China (Fu, 1961: 97). Sun Village’s present-day dajin industry is 
quite different, however. First, this industry consists of small-scale household 
enterprises, and their urban economic activities depend only on various small-
scale personal networks, among which no larger-scale associations have devel-
oped capable of monopolizing markets (as did the early-modern tongxiang 
huiguan, i.e. 同乡会馆 and tongye gonghui, i.e. 同业公会). Second, although 
this industry sets up shops and does business in urban areas, its production 
factors such as equipment, labor-power, skills, jewelry models, and informa-
tion all come from Sun Village, so it does not rely on urban-based networks’ 
control over resources. If so, then how has Sun Village’s dajin industry man-
aged to become so competitive and expansive?
In Tan Tongxue’s aforementioned study of how villagers from Xinhua, Hunan, 
set up printshops throughout China, he argues that “for some actors in the 
market, social factors help them to lower transaction costs and increase their 
vitality in the market. With respect to Ronald Coase’s judgment of  enterprises’ 
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economic characteristics according to transaction costs, we can say that social 
factors, including kinship and place-based networks, have a profound relation-
ship with the market” (Tan, 2012: 73). However, the low- capital economic activ-
ities of tongxiang tongye do not adhere strictly to modern business models, 
so in this case transaction costs actually constitute a much smaller portion of 
total enterprise costs than the costs of production factors. In other words, in 
researching tongxiang tongye, in addition to transaction costs, we should also 
pay attention to why this particular type of enterprise can effectively lower the 
cost of production factors.
First, Sun Village’s dajin industry relies on local social networks: all its pro-
duction materials can be purchased in Sun Village, which not only lowers 
their prices, but also makes it easier for buyers to purchase on credit if neces-
sary. Moreover, goldsmiths operating in distant cities can easily phone their 
relatives or friends back in the village and have them ship materials for only 
10 yuan per package via the passenger coaches traveling directly from Sun 
Village to cities throughout China, thus greatly reducing the cost of logistics.
Second, personal networks can help young people entering the dajin indus-
try to secure and carry out apprenticeships without paying tuition, after which 
such networks can then help them to quickly raise the capital necessary to 
start their own business at almost no cost, and to obtain appropriate real estate 
to set up shop.
Finally, goldsmiths often concentrate their activities in the same cities and 
towns as their friends and relatives, facilitating mutual aid. The income of a 
dajin shop derives mainly from the differential between the earnings from 
selling new jewelry and modifying customers’ old jewelry, on the one hand, 
and expenses such as the gold dust lost through the refining process, on the 
other. These activities require the constant exchange of information among 
goldsmiths, such as the rise and fall of prices for production materials and the 
popularity of various models of jewelry. Goldsmiths also help each other out 
by lending each other money and materials, repairing each other’s equipment, 
providing technical guidance, and looking after each other’s shops.2
This deep embeddedness of economic activities within social networks 
thus greatly reduces the costs of both transaction and production factors and 
increases this industry’s ability to compete and expand. This is why outsiders 
have not managed to follow in the footsteps of Sun villagers. However, this is 
not an expression of the capitalist logic of capital expanding to the point that it 
monopolizes market resources—of “the big fish eating the little fish.” We could 
2    Tan Tongxue (2012) observed a similar situation among migrants from Xinhua, Hunan, in the 
printshop industry.
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say that the more an enterprise acts as a competitor according to a modern 
business model, the more its costs of transaction and production factors rise, 
thus making it more difficult to compete with tongxiang tongye. This makes 
it so easy for young villagers to start their own businesses that today there is 
almost no one from Sun Village working as a wage laborer in a factory in the 
deltas of the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River Delta (长三角).
4 The Mutual Activation of Rural Social Resources and Tongxiang 
Tongye Economy
It has been said that “there’s no such thing as a free lunch.” A Sun Village gold-
smith whose business depends on the support of personal relationships must 
invest time and money in maintaining these relationships during holidays. 
This is not only a matter of repaying favors, but also an affirmation of his mem-
bership in the rural society of Sun Village and an investment in his continued 
accumulation of the social capital necessary for the development of his busi-
ness. For disadvantaged people who lack social capital, preexisting rural social 
networks are basically the only “social capital” they can mobilize, so rationality 
compels them to treat these networks with great care. Today, between 80% and 
90% of young people from Sun Village work in the dajin industry outside the 
village, but in contrast to people who leave the countryside to work in factories, 
these people maintain close ties with Sun Village through multiple channels. 
The first is the ties based on everyday business transactions. While cities and 
towns are the space of dajin retail, almost all of the industry’s production fac-
tors come from Sun Village. Along with the five or six coaches driving between 
Sun Village and cities throughout China every day, there is the constant flow of 
goods, people, money, and information.
The second is the affective bonds of personal relationships. During every 
major holiday or celebration such as Chinese New Year, Grave-Sweeping Day 
(清明节), Mid-Autumn Festival (中秋节), and the weddings, funerals, and 
important birthdays of relatives, villagers do not stint the time and money nec-
essary to travel sometimes great distances to return to Sun Village in order to 
host or attend banquets, or to take part in rituals such as xie’en (谢恩, offering 
thanks) and baichan (拜忏, chanting Buddhist scriptures to relieve spirits).3 
Such apparently irrational expenditures are actually productive, since dajin 
3   Both of these ceremonies (xie’en and baichan) require two or three days and nights to com-
plete. On the xie’en ceremony, see Zheng, 2009. Also see Wu, 2008.
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business and social interaction depend on personal relationships based in the 
village—the industry’s primary site for the accumulation of social capital.
The third is the localization of success. Sun Village is not only the gold-
smiths’ home but also an important base for their business outside the village. 
In contrast with most business people, the top priority for Sun Village gold-
smiths is to return home and display their success, for example, by building 
new houses there. They call this “making themselves recognizable,” meaning 
that such construction demonstrates that they are still members of the village. 
One young villager made the mistake of first buying a home in Putian’s county 
seat, and this led to so much gossip and social pressure that within a year he 
felt compelled to return to Sun Village and build a house there. Today, the vil-
lage is covered in new houses three to six stories high. Behind this competi-
tive display of wealth is an inward-oriented identification with rural society 
that is quite different from the logic of “outward-oriented villages” observed by 
researchers elsewhere.4
Finally, these goldsmiths actively identify with their status as members of 
Sun Village. It is a remote village on the coast with neither ancestral halls nor 
genealogy tablets, and only one small tutelary temple, the Yongjinshe (永进
社). Since the rise of the dajin industry in the 1980s, ceremonies honoring the 
Yongjinshe’s chief deity, Yanggong (杨公太师), on his birthday and the Lantern 
Festival have grown increasingly festive, and the charisma of the village elders 
running the temple has correspondingly increased, along with villagers’ belief 
in Yanggong’s supernatural power. This is because the goldsmiths actively par-
ticipate in Sun Village’s holidays: they not only value Yanggong’s blessings, but 
also want to take advantage of the opportunity to fulfill their duty as mem-
bers of the community. During the Lantern Festival (元宵节), each household 
gives a monetary donation to the temple—in the past usually about 10 or 
20 yuan, but now as much as a thousand yuan per household. These dona-
tions actually constitute a kind of public fund that the elders use to maintain 
the temple, purchase materials such as incense for offerings, and finance cer-
emonial banquets, dramatic performances, and so on. During the Lantern 
Festival, the elders often propose community projects such as paving roads, 
repairing bridges, and establishing schools and old people’s associations. They 
ask everyone to help out, and most villagers enthusiastically contribute dona-
tions. Likewise, on Yanggong’s birthday, goldsmiths must return home to host 
banquets, saying they want to “entertain the deity,” but actually this is also an 
affirmation of their membership in the community.
4    On He Xuefeng’s theory of “outward-oriented villages,” see Tong and He, 2002.
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Skinner studied China’s rural marketing arrangements according to their 
“central place systems,” arguing that, due to “distance costs,” markets were often 
located in the center of equilateral hexagons composed of villages (Skinner, 
1998: 21). From such a perspective, it is hard to understand why a peripheral 
place such as Sun Village would become a center for the concentration and 
transfer of dajin production factors, and geographically central cities would 
become the village’s secondary markets. This requires us to go beyond the eco-
nomic geography perspective of “distance costs.” Skinner himself was more of 
an anthropologist than an economic geographer, although the Chinese mar-
keting system that his “central place system” theory illustrated did not differ 
from the conventional models constructed by economic geographers. As an 
anthropologist, Skinner emphasized that a marketing system’s social signifi-
cance was no less important than its economic significance, and that a spatio-
economic system was also a sociocultural system (Skinner, 1998: 49). If we see 
that Sun Village is both a center for the concentration and transfer of dajin 
production factors and also a distinctive sociocultural system; if we see not 
only the “distance costs” of economic activities but also the costs of trans-
action and production factors; and if we see the concentration and transfer 
of not only production factors but also various sociocultural factors and the 
mutual embeddedness of the economic and the social, then we can under-
stand why Sun Village maintains its central position in the minds of thousands 
of goldsmiths.
Fei Xiaotong (费孝通) described the “Southern Jiangsu Model” (苏南模式) 
of economic development as “leaving the soil without leaving the xiang (离土
不离乡) [xiang: village, township, or hometown],” and the “Wenzhou Model” 
(温州模式) as “leaving both the soil and the xiang (离土又离乡)” (Fei, 1984, 
1986). The former referred to TVEs (township and village enterprises), and the 
latter to the hundreds of thousands of peasants from Wenzhou who became 
small-scale vendors throughout China. Here “soil” refers to agriculture, and 
xiang refers to one’s hometown or village in a geographic sense. Sun Village’s 
tongxiang tongye economy clearly involves “leaving the soil without leaving 
the xiang,” in some sense, but not through the local establishment of TVEs, so 
neither of Fei’s models seems to fit this case. If we expand the sense of xiang 
to include not only geographic but also social space, then we could argue that 
Sun villagers who leave the soil to pursue dajin outside their geographic xiang 
never actually leave their xiang in a social sense.
Moreover, Sun Village’s goldsmiths actively return home for a combination 
of overlapping reasons: business, kinship, and social identity. In the process of 
doing business in urban areas, they closely depend on rural social networks 
such as kinship relations, creating an economic model different from the 
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 currently popular market economy—a model based on the mutual embed-
dedness of social and economic networks. Their economic activities not 
only depend on rural social networks, but more importantly, the two activate 
one another, lending new vitality to rural traditions that might otherwise be 
regarded as remnants of the past.
5 A Countermovement against the “Hollowing-out” of Rural China
The “hollowing-out” (空心化) of rural China refers to the complete sucking-out 
of rural labor-power, raw materials, and money by industrialization and urban-
ization, the decline of agriculture, the outflow of labor-power, and the result-
ing inability of rural economy and society to reproduce itself and develop 
sustainability (see Wu, 2011). This hollowing-out has already become an irre-
versible trend because the tide of economic globalization cannot be stemmed. 
The essence of this hollowing-out is globalization and quanguohua (全国化, 
i.e. internal economic colonialism on a national scale),5 that is, the capitalist 
mode of production’s global and nationwide reorganization of production fac-
tors and “race to the bottom” regarding their prices. Economic globalization 
and quanguohua inevitably lead to the complete separation of the economic 
from the social: under capital’s inherent pursuit of profit, any kind of produc-
tion factor can be extracted from its former local background and reassembled 
in any place that can minimize costs and maximize profit, forming a heartless 
economic mutant.
In The Great Transformation, Karl Polanyi argued that there is a “double 
movement” between market and society. In his view, “market society” is shaped 
by the tension between these two types of movements: on the one hand, laissez 
faire capitalism’s movement to expand markets, and on the other, protective 
countermovements attempting to re-embed economic activities into the total-
ity of social relationships (Polanyi, 2007 [1944]). We have already grown accus-
tomed to assessments of rural China’s hollowing-out, and we tend to regard 
Polanyi’s century-old prediction as a distant myth, but “the Chinese country-
side” is too vast and diverse to be encapsulated within any single phrase. Along 
China’s southeastern coast from Wenzhou (温州) down to Chaoshan, there 
are similar rural cultural traditions and sideline industries that have given 
rise to a unique pattern of economic activity in which peasants who have “left 
5    Quanguohua (literally “nationwide-ization”) is a term I coined to indicate something like 
internal economic colonialism or globalization on a national scale in large countries such as 
China characterized by regional disparities and dynamic but uneven capitalist development.
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both the soil and the village” nevertheless despise wage labor and rarely go to 
work for large enterprises. Instead they prefer to undertake various tongxiang 
tongye enterprises in the informal economy throughout China and sometimes 
beyond, with the nuclear family or broader kinship networks as their unit of 
economic activity, like a flexible guerrilla army.6 Sun Village’s dajin industry is 
a typical example.
The vitality of tongxiang tongye economic activities expresses a counter-
movement against the hollowing-out of rural China. From an urban perspec-
tive, the countryside is merely a source of cheap labor and raw materials. 
When young people from Sun Village go to dajin in the city, they are not pas-
sively incorporated into the urban capitalist economic model as cheap labor. 
On the contrary, cities and towns throughout China provide another kind of 
production factor for Sun Village’s dynamic dajin industry: a steady stream of 
customers and marketing spaces. It is the Sun villagers, then, who have used 
their local social networks to gradually concentrate the dajin industry’s vari-
ous production factors in the vicinity of Sun Village, break into the city, and 
then reorganize the city’s own production factors. Over the past three decades, 
wave after wave of young Sun villagers have left to dajin in the city, but this 
has not led to the village’s hollowing-out. On the contrary, with this industry’s 
expansion, its production factors have dynamically developed in Jiewai, and 
the area’s pivotal position in the industry has only grown stronger. Since the 
industry is deeply embedded in local social networks, its development has in 
turn stimulated the development of social capital and civil society. Perhaps 
this is the sort of re-embedding of economic into social development that 
Polanyi predicted, and perhaps the tongxiang tongye economic model could 
be called a “social economy” as opposed to a market economy.7
Sun Village lies in Jiewai—an area that has historically been peripheral in 
geographic, social, and cultural senses. Today, its dajin industry is regarded in 
“modern” capitalist discourse as a backward, marginal, and unfashionable eco-
nomic form. It thus seems difficult for Sun Village to shake off its peripheral 
( jiewai) role. This, however, is far less important than the possibilities that such 
alternative economic practices offer for escaping from the presently dominant 
political-economic structure.
6    On “informal economy,” see Huang, 2009.
7    On “social economy,” see “Shehui jingji zai Zhongguo” (Social economy in China), parts 1 
and 2, Kaifang Shidai Issues 1 and 2 (2012), and the special section of Issue 6 (2012) on “social 
economy.”
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Chapter 3
Social Ties and the Market: A Study of Digital 
Printing Industry from an Informal Economy 
Perspective*
Tan Tongxue**
1 A Spectre Appears in the World of Speed Digital Printing 
Anthropology, which helps us to “set our gaze” upon different cultures, warns 
us to think about whether we “look at” but do not “see” those things that are 
right in front of us because they are overly familiar. Taking the subject of this 
research as an example, this kind of concern is clearly not unwarranted. I first 
began investigating the speed digital printing industry in 2001. At that time my 
research was based in Wuhan (武汉), a city in central China. The immediate 
reason for beginning these investigations was that the price of services in typ-
ing and photocopying shops caused the majority of students, including me, to 
stop in our tracks. For example, at the beginning of 2001, the various prices of 
the main services of typing and copying shops were as follows: 
(1) Inputting text was ¥5 per 1,000 Chinese characters. In 2001, the price of 
this service was ¥3. In comparison with other services in 2000, the price 
of this service was not high. The reason for this was that the majority of 
students found it difficult to shoulder the expense of the costly printing 
services, and instead would choose to use a computer to proofread 
repeatedly until they were sure that there were no mistakes, and only 
then would they go to the typing and copying shop to print it out. This 
kind of coping strategy was very much common amongst university stu-
dents. 
(2) There was also another method of pricing for inputting text: inputting 
text plus proofing the typesetting was ¥5, based on one page of A4 using 
size 4 Chinese characters. The pricing method of this type of service 
* Information within this article that touches upon the privacy of those participating in the 
study (for instance the names of participants) has already been dealt with in accordance 
with academic standards. The original text appeared in Open Times (2012, No. 6).
** Tan Tongxue is from the Department of Anthropology, Sun Yat-sen University.
© Tan Tongxue, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004326385_005 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
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meant that the actual cost was around 1.2–1.5 times that of the service 
described above (the price of the two should be roughly the same, but the 
member of staff charged with the typing would select a 1.2 or 1.5 line spac-
ing option, which meant that each page would hold fewer characters). 
Those customers that paid for this type of service usually did so because 
they were computer-illiterate and did not know how to input text, let 
alone the different typesettings, thus giving the typing staff the opportu-
nity to use this skill barrier to “cheat” them on price. 
(3) To print pre-typeset word documents, per A4 page (in black and white) 
was ¥1. If a word document included colour text, it would be ¥5 per page. 
(4) To print pre-typeset word documents that included images, per A4 page 
(in black and white) was ¥2 (the reason for this was that including images 
would use a relatively large amount of ink). If the document included 
colour images then the price would be ¥7–10.
(5) To print a pre-typeset B5 word document (in black and white) was ¥0.6 
per page. If the document included colour text, it would be ¥2 per page. 
(6) To print a pre-typeset B5 word document that included images (in black 
and white) was ¥1. If the document included colour images, it would be 
¥3–5 per page. 
(7) To photocopy an A4 word document (in black and white), it was ¥0.5 per 
page.
(8) To photocopy an A4 word document with images (in black and white), it 
was ¥0.6–1.0.
(9) To photocopy a B5 word document (in black and white), it was ¥0.3 per 
page.
(10) To photocopy a B5 word document with images (in black and white), it 
was ¥0.5 per page. 
(In 2001, the vast majority of typing and photocopying shops in Wuhan were 
unable to provide colour-printing services. It was even rarer that a shop would be 
able to provide colour photocopying). 
The people running typing and copying shops would often complain that 
they actually didn’t make very much money because their production costs 
were too high. Their so-called “high costs” were not made up of high wages for 
the staff employed to do the front-line work, nor were they due to expensive 
materials for typing and photocopying. Rather, they were mainly a result of the 
high prices of the machines themselves, the cost of their repair, and the fact 
that the machines aged quickly. To purchase a black and white photocopier 
imported from Japan was over ¥100,000. To buy a machine that could both 
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print and photocopy, one must spend almost ¥200,000 (this was more than the 
average price of a 100m2 apartment in Wuhan at that time). The moment this 
kind of precision instrument experienced stoppages or faults, the cost of get-
ting an expert to come and fix it would be calculated at ¥100–200 per call-out, 
or ¥300–500 per hour. Then there would be the cost of replacing parts. These 
costs were high. Ordinarily, after three to five years of use, a photocopier would 
become obsolete. 
However, whilst the operators of these shops had their complaints, it was 
without doubt that their gains were still quite considerable. I carried out an 
interview with Mr. Zhang (a Wuhan local), who was the boss of a small typing 
and copying shop within the campus of Central China Normal University 
(华中师范大学). According to Zhang, a small shop of over 10m2, with one 
printer, one photocopier, and two typists, could produce around ¥50,000–
80,000 net profit per year (he also added that should they be able to secure the 
orders of government departments or large enterprises, then their profit would 
be even higher). 
However, it just happened that in 2001 the majority of the owners who had 
already operated in the typing and photocopying business in Wuhan for many 
years became immersed in a “Waterloo.” Beginning in the autumn of that year, 
operators new to the typing and photocopying business in Wuhan began to 
appear and create huge shock waves by cutting prices. Again and again, the 
prices of those services described above fell. For example:
(1) Inputting text, beginning in September, fell to ¥4 per 1,000 characters. By 
the end of the year this was ¥3. The phenomenon of the “cheat’s” price of 
inputting text disappeared.
(2) Printing a black and white pre-typeset A4 word document (irrespective 
of whether it included images) dropped to ¥0.5 per page. By the end of 
the year, this had fallen to ¥0.3 or even ¥0.2 for a bulk printing order (over 
100 pages). In the end, by summer 2002, the price had fallen to ¥0.15 per 
page, and ¥0.1 for bulk printing. Should the word document contain 
colour text, the price would be ¥3 or ¥2 respectively, and by summer 2002 
it was as low as ¥1.5. 
(3) The price of printing a black and white pre-typeset B5 word document 
(irrespective of whether or not it included images), fell to ¥0.4 and then 
¥0.2. Should the word document include colour text, the price was ¥1.5 
and ¥1.0 respectively. 
(4) To photocopy an A4 black and white word document (irrespective of 
whether or not it contained images), the price fell to ¥0.3 per page, and by 
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the end of the year it had dropped even further to ¥0.2. For copying in 
bulk the price fell to ¥0.15 per page. In the end, by summer 2002 each page 
was only ¥0.1, and if you were copying in bulk it was ¥0.08 per page. 
(5) To photocopy a B5 black and white word document (irrespective of 
whether or not it contained images), the price first fell to ¥0.2 per page, 
and then by the end of the year it had dropped further to ¥0.15. In the 
end, by the summer of 2002, the price was as low as ¥0.1 per page, and for 
bulk copying it had fallen even further to ¥0.08. 
(The operating model at this time had also undergone great changes, for 
instance, the people running the shops were responsible for going to clients 
in person to find business, and after completing the text inputting, printing, 
copying or binding work, they would deliver the product to the client). 
I was told that the operators that had appeared and begun these price shock 
waves all came from Xinhua County (新化县) in Loudi City (娄底市), Hunan 
Province (湖南省). So, why was it that these people from Xinhua were able to 
lower the cost to such an extent? At the time, within the Wuhan typing and 
copying industry, there were all kinds of stories being circulated. One of these 
stories seemed to make a lot of sense, and many people believed it. According 
to this story, the main reason these people from Xinhua were able to lower the 
prices was that they were able to fix printers and photocopiers themselves, 
and they could even buy up second-hand machines that had been discarded 
and use them in their businesses. It was the vocational middle school of their 
county that was providing the training for them to learn how to fix printers 
and photocopiers. Perhaps because everyone had become so familiar with 
this story or because those in the same industry had suffered the impact of 
the blow so suddenly that they had not had time to carefully look into it, very 
rarely did anyone make more detailed inquiries as to the original version. The 
theory of “educational advantage” or that of “technical advantage” became the 
cause drawn upon to explain these shock waves. 
The result was that in less than ten months almost all those who had origi-
nally been in business in typing and copying across the whole city of Wuhan 
had been cast out of the market. After closing down his typing and copying 
shop, for the last time, Mr. Zhang complained to me: “Everyone says us Hubei 
people are a shrewd bunch. Who’d have thought that we couldn’t compete with 
you Hunan people (I’m also from Hunan). You Hunan lot are just too good; 
you’re basically like a bunch of spectres.”
It really was a veiled metaphor that Mr. Zhang, who had been deeply influ-
enced by Marxist teachings, should use the word “spectre” to describe those 
Xinhua people who worked in typing and copying. In fact, in 1999 and 2000, 
this “spectre” had already begun “floating around” Beijing (北京), Shanghai 
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(上海) and Guangzhou (广州). In the years following, the trend for reducing 
prices that they had started swept across almost every medium and large city 
in China. In September 2011, in Guangzhou, which is situated in the south of 
China, I interviewed a seasoned industry insider, Mr. Yi. He said: 
One thing we can say fairly arrogantly (proudly)—actually it’s not in the 
slightest bit an exaggeration—is that in the “speed digital printing indus-
try” in every city over prefectural level in China, over 90% of the people 
doing it (operating this type of business) are from Hunan. Amongst these 
Hunan businessmen, over 95% are from Xinhua, and of these Xinhua 
businessmen, around 80% are from two towns, Yangxi (洋溪镇) and Chaxi 
(槎溪镇), or at least are relatives or friends of people there. 
Of course, the statistics provided by Mr. Yi were only estimates. Due to the diffi-
culty of gathering statistics, we have no way of knowing the precise number of 
people working within this industry.1 However, through Mr. Yi’s “arrogance,” we 
can gain a general idea of the overall picture that people from Xinhua already 
occupy an important place within the speed digital printing business in China 
at present.
2 Embedding Familial Ties, Friendship and Local Ties into the 
Market
Since 2001, whenever I came across typing and copying shops, I would always 
inquire as to what was going on in the industry. On the basis of our being “from 
the same place,” people who were working in the typing and copying business 
and I, a customer, easily became friends and built up a kind of cooperation that 
had more of a feeling of familiarity to it. As we got to know one another bet-
ter, I became increasingly aware of how familial ties, friendship and local ties 
played an extremely important role in doing business in typing and copying for 
1 There are also reports claiming that people from Xinhua make up 50% of the national market 
in typing and copying; they account for 65% of those doing business in repairing second-
hand photocopiers and printers; they have an annual output of over ¥10,000,000,000, and 
that there are over 100,000 people from Xinhua doing this work (see Liu Jian’an, “Embodying 
the Dream of over a Hundred Thousand People, Xinhua’s Speed Digital Printing Holds 
High its Dragon’s Head”, Loudi News Website (“ningju shi wan ren mengxiang Xinhua 
shuma kuaiyin angqi longtou”, loudi xinwen wang) http://www.ldnews.cn/news/loudi/
thenews/201107/20110706201252_2.html (accessed on 6/7/2011).
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the people of Xinhua.2 They had built up a huge network of mutual assistance. 
When I met Mr. Yi in Guangzhou in 2007, I became all the more certain of this. 
When I mentioned a typing and copying shop’s boss in Wuhan, Mr. Yi would 
immediately say that he knew the boss really well, and that they were distant 
relatives. 
The above information, which somewhat appears to be inconsequential or 
even inaccurate (as it is akin to hearsay), is not drawn upon here to show the 
details or standards of my research, but rather to explain that this group has 
relatively stable boundaries. It can be seen that throughout more than a decade 
they have maintained high levels of stability in terms of local ties. It is also per-
ceptible that this group, wittingly or unwittingly, are protecting “secrets” that 
were already common knowledge within the group. 
Aided by my identity as a “person from the same place,” a “younger brother,” 
a “frequent customer,” and a “researcher,” I finally gained treatment from Mr. Yi 
as “one of his own.” Mr. Yi explained to me his own history and that of the 
industry. 
From Mr. Yi himself, I learned that Xinhua County had never had a so-called 
vocational middle school that specialised in typewriter and photocopier repair 
training. That is to say, the theory about Xinhua people’s “educational advan-
tage” in the rumour was not the real story. In the same way, the “technical 
advantage” theory was also not exactly correct. In Mr. Yi’s opinion, the magic 
weapons that secured them victory were their familial ties, friendship and 
local ties. Their technical advantage was just an added strength (“like wings 
added to the tiger”) that emerged later, and it was connected to these networks 
of familial and local ties rather than existing independently in its own right. 
According to Mr. Yi, to explain Xinhua people’s advantage in the typing and 
copying industry, we would have to begin with the 1980s, whilst their advan-
tage in the speed digital printing business was established in the late 1990s 
2 In recent years, Guo Xinghua et al. have also been focusing on the “Phenomenon of Xinhua 
People” within the typing and copying industry. Their perspective, for the most part, tends 
towards the impact of local ties on the movements of migrant workers and of urban experi-
ences on the behaviour of migrant workers; their work is rich with clear insight into the 
social identities of the migrant population (see Guo Xinghua et al. Drifting and Seeking 
Roots: A Study on the Social Identity of the Migrant Population, 2011, pp. 34–84, China Renmin 
University Press (piaobo yu xungen: liudong renkou de shehui rentong yanjiu). In contrast, 
what this article seeks to emphasise is the market significance of local ties on a macro-level, 
whilst at the same time stressing the economic impact of familial ties and friendship on a 
micro-level in businesses. Further, overall, what this article does its best to place analyti-
cal emphasis upon are the mechanisms of family and local ties and the market embedding 
themselves into one another, and the effect of this.
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(Mr. Yi treated the “typing and copying industry” and the “speed digital print-
ing industry” as two development stages, which were essentially different, 
though connected). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, in the towns of Yangxi and Chaxi that lay 
next to the Hunan Provincial Highway 312 (湖南 312 省道), a certain number of 
people taught themselves, excelled, and went on to gain a lot of practical expe-
rience as technical workers (the majority were from Yangxi). They began to fix 
a certain brand of typewriters (named Sitong) in a downtown district of the 
county-level city of Lengshuijiang (冷水江). As for who it was that first brought 
these kinds of repair techniques to Yangxi and Chaxi, which are far from the 
city, it seems to be difficult to draw a clear conclusion. One story goes that a 
veteran, who had served in the army in Beijing, brought these skills back to his 
hometown Yangxi. Another story is that people went to typing shops in cities 
like Changsha (长沙), Loudi and Lengshuijiang, worked there as apprentices 
and later took their skills back to the town of Yangxi. Another story is that peo-
ple from Yangxi came up with the repair techniques through their own explo-
rations. In the ten interviews I conducted with people working in the speed 
digital printing industry, none of the interviewees was able to judge precisely 
which one of these explanations had the most truth to it. For the most part, 
they tended to think that “these questions have no clear answers. Nor are they 
important.” Instead, what they usually placed most emphasis on were stories 
of “relatives guiding relatives, and neighbours guiding neighbours” in setting 
up businesses. Thankfully, it was not the origin of the industry with which I 
was concerned either. 
From the mid 1980s to the mid 1990s, more and more Yangxi and Chaxi 
junior high graduates and even those drop-outs began to join the ranks of 
Sitong typewriter repair workers. That was the result of a number of factors, 
such as the income from farming being too low, rural people’s burdens grad-
ually growing heavier, tuition being too high, and the increasing speed with 
which the population was on the move. In terms of their spatial distribution, 
they began to increasingly spread further afield, going to Changsha, Shanghai, 
Beijing and even cities that Xinhua people traditionally viewed as distant 
places, such as Harbin (哈尔滨), Urumchi (乌鲁木齐) and Kunming (昆明). 
During that period, there were three ways of doing typewriter repairs. First, 
if the shop was on the slightly larger side, repairers would provide services at 
that fixed space. Second, if the shop was too small, or if there was no shop 
at all, repairers would take their services to the customers (within the indus-
try this is known as “running a moving service”). Third, repairers would adopt 
both fixed services and “running a moving service.” People who opted for the 
first model were usually those who had entered the industry earlier and had a 
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certain amount of financial capacity. Those who went with the second model 
were usually latecomers to the industry or lacked finances. 
During this stage, familial ties, friendship and local ties played a crucial role 
in the development and spread of specialist skills among these people from 
Xinhua. First, when hiring other technicians, the operator, who usually also 
doubled up as a technician, would give special consideration to close relatives 
and friends. After this, priority would go to those who were not close relatives 
but were from the same clan, and those related through marriage. Then there 
would be distant relatives and common hometown fellows.
Second, when it came to skilled technicians’ taking on apprentices, these 
principles of familial ties, friendship and local ties would be observed in the 
same way. The parents and family members of apprentices also totally sup-
ported this way of doing things, as they could rest at ease handing their off-
spring over to relatives or hometown fellows to work and live together (free 
lodging and food for apprentices). Also, normally, after learning for around a 
month, apprentices were able to begin putting into practice what they were 
learning, and after a year they could finish their apprenticeship. 
Third, the most important channel for operators to exchange business exper-
tise with one another was the networks of relatives and hometown fellows. So 
it was for skilled technicians to exchange techniques. Before these people left 
their hometown to work, rarely had they been to other places, which meant 
that their networks of friends were usually included in the network of home-
town fellows. They would achieve the exchange of experience and techniques 
in everyday interaction, which was part of maintaining relationships with rela-
tives, friends, and hometown fellows. 
Finally, in terms of the supply of spare parts, people from Xinhua would 
also rely upon their networks of relatives and hometown fellows, for in this 
way they could provide one another with what they needed at a low cost. As 
a result, compared with other operators and technicians, business expertise 
and new techniques spread through the networks of relatives and hometown 
fellows extremely fast and at exceptionally low cost. This advantage helped to 
make up for the weakness that their level of schooling was not high, enabling 
them to gain a position of real weight within the typewriter repair industry. 
In 1995 and 1996, with the emergence and expansion of the microcomputer 
market, those from Xinhua who were in the typewriter repair business met 
with the “calamity of calamities”: in only two years, Sitong typewriters had 
been almost entirely eliminated. However, they did not flinch. They stood up 
to the difficulty and began attempting to fix ink jet printers and even laser 
printers and money-counting machines. With this as their foundation, they 
struggled their way to setting root in the cities. 
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From the latter half of 1996 to 1997, the people from Xinhua “inevitably” 
came across an opportunity “by chance.” A man named Wang, a repairman 
from Yangxi, had bought up many “waste” photocopiers from the junkyard of a 
hardware store in Nanhai, a city in Guangdong Province (it was later confirmed 
that those used photocopiers had been cast off by a Japanese). Unexpectedly, 
after undergoing repair, the machine could be used as normal. After this, he 
spent ¥600 per ton on a great amount of “waste” photocopiers and set about 
fumbling around to repair them. When he occasionally was able to fix one 
of them, he could sell it for around ¥10,000 to his friends, relatives or people 
from his hometown. Following this, one by one, more of his hometown fellows 
achieved “chance success.” In 1997, not a few people from Yangxi and Chaxi 
began to find people to translate the Japanese instructions for the photocopi-
ers, referring to the instructions to take apart and reassemble the “waste” 
photocopiers and printers bought by tons. Combined with the role played 
by networks of relatives and hometown fellows, all sorts of scattered repair 
techniques began to spread, collide with one another, merge, and improve. 
According to the master who taught Mr. Yi, by around 1998 or 1999, people 
from Yangxi and Chaxi had already basically grasped a complete set of fully 
matured skills and were able to turn “foreign rubbish” into copiers and print-
ers that could be reinvested in for use. It was from this time that the first set of 
people who had mastered these skills began to split up and move to different 
areas. For instance, after gathering millions of yuan in capital, Wang changed 
industries, developing mining businesses in Yunnan (云南), Guizhou (贵州) 
and elsewhere. Others went to Japan to specialise in recovering used photo-
copiers and printers, then selling them off wholesale in Guangzhou, Shanghai 
and Beijing. 
In 1999, like a great many other young people, Mr. Yi from Yangxi went 
to Beijing to “run a moving service,” but after working for three months, he 
changed industries because the income was too low. Then, he went to work at a 
steel plant for two months. At the end of the year, he returned to his hometown 
for the Chinese New Year. Mr. Yi went to visit his master, whom he had followed 
for many years learning martial arts, to wish him happy New Year. His master 
had opened his own typing and copying store in a foreign trade building in the 
Tianhe (天河) district of Guangzhou. So from 2000, Mr. Yi began at this store as 
an apprentice, with a monthly salary of ¥300. Mr. Yi was very smart. Since he 
was married, he had the pressure of supporting a family. As a result, he quickly 
managed to grasp all of the technical skills and gained business expertise. In 
2001, Mr. Yi’s master gathered a large amount of capital and moved over to the 
catering industry. He wanted to invite Mr. Yi to work at his restaurant, but Mr. Yi 
did not take him up on the offer, staying instead at another typing and printing 
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shop belonging to his master on Cangbian Road (仓边路) in Guangzhou. Not 
long thereafter, a cousin of Mr. Yi, who had just finished a sentence and been 
released, came to Guangzhou. This cousin, Mr. Yi’s elder brother and Mr. Yi 
himself became partners in taking over the shop. After some time, they had 
a falling-out, because the cousin wanted to go into business alone but Mr. Yi 
did not agree. As a result, Mr. Yi went to several of his “frequent clients” (PhD 
candidates from University S), through whom he became acquainted with a 
dorm superintendent. At a cost of ¥600 per month in rent, he turned one room, 
which was also a grocery store, into another small typing and copying shop. 
Through networks of relatives (including those related by law) and home-
town fellows, Mr. Yi was able to acquire relatively cheap machines and mate-
rials. He once said: “Machine repair relies half on money and half on fellow 
feelings.” The exchange of management expertise and technical skills was also 
extremely convenient. After the three years it took to complete his accumula-
tion of initial finances, Mr. Yi began to purchase modern equipment, such as 
a colour printer and photocopier, an electric cutting machine, and a binding 
machine. His profits did not mainly come from conventional printing and pho-
tocopying, but from colour image production, printing and copying, entering a 
stage that he referred to as “the speed digital image and text printing industry” 
(shortened as the “speed digital printing industry”). 
From the history of how people from Xinhua came to be in the speed digital 
printing industry and typically the individual case of Mr. Yi, it is not difficult 
to realise that the technical advantage that enabled them to eliminate their 
competitors did not come from education, but from their networks of familial 
ties, friendship and local ties. This can explain the cases of failure I came across 
in the investigations. For people who went to a school or college to learn repair 
skills, if they were not from Xinhua and were unable to enter these networks 
of Xinhua, they basically ended up being pushed out of the speed digital print-
ing industry. To put it another way, after people from Xinhua had embedded 
familial ties, friendship and local ties into the market, they reduced both the 
cost of learning and that of doing business, swiftly extinguishing the market 
competitiveness of other operators. This is where the “spectre” of the speed 
digital printing industry lies. 
3 Familial Ties, Friendship and Local Ties and Enterprise Involution 
Aside from lowering costs to increase market competitiveness, the networks 
of familial ties, friendship and local ties also played a positive role in internal 
management and in increasing work efficiency. In the following section, I 
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will take two different models of operation and undertake a little analysis 
of them. 
The first model is the small-scale shop. Usually, it consists of a husband 
and wife plus one or two apprentices or formal workers who are close rela-
tives. Normally, the equipment would be fairly simple. Typically, this might be 
one to two computers, photocopiers, printers, one binding machine or merely 
one hand-operated book-threading machine, and one hand-operated cutting 
machine. They would only have the capacity to provide text inputting, print-
ing, copying and simple binding services. This was referred to as a “typing and 
copying shop” by Mr. Yi and other industry insiders.
The second model was the relatively large-scale shop, which might even 
include branches in addition to the main shop. This was usually run by a hus-
band and wife plus several close relatives who were core to the business, and 
then there would be some distant relatives and hometown fellows or even a 
few tens of them, working as apprentices or ordinary staff members. This type 
of shop would be more fully equipped. Typically, this would at least include 
over five or even a few tens of computers, printers, copiers, more than two 
binding machines, more than one intelligent cutting machines, pressed film-
packaging machines, more than two high definition colour printers and pho-
tocopiers, broad width colour image output equipment and so on. This was 
referred to as a “speed digital image and text printing shop” by Mr. Yi and other 
industry insiders.
Of course, there were others who were operating on a scale and with equip-
ment that fell between the two. Mr. Yi said that it was not easy to categorise 
this type of shop, and anyway, these categories were not absolute. However, 
at the same time he emphasised that the first kind of shop was equivalent to 
a small workshop, whereas the second kind was a formal enterprise, and the 
difference in nature between the two was great. During my interviews, Mr. Yi 
enumerated several important signs that could show the difference between 
the two. The first type of shop was often unable to provide its customers with a 
formal receipt because the scale of the shop was too small, whereas the second 
type, as long as the customer was willing to bear the additional cost incurred 
for tax, was able to provide this formal receipt. The first type of shop was often 
unable to accept payment by bank transfer as it was not a registered enterprise, 
whereas the second type of shop did have the capacity to do so. Then, due to 
its limited floating capital, the first kind of shop often would ask the customer 
to pay up front, whereas the second kind of shop was able to charge work to 
an account for its “frequent customers,” particularly for danwei (单位 work 
units), and they would settle the account in a single transaction after a month, 
a season, or even a year. 
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In the first type of shop, it was usually the wife of the boss or the appren-
tices that took care of the printing and photocopying, while the boss would be 
in charge of binding, cutting, and going to clients to collect and deliver work. 
Since there were very few staff members, their relationship was very close. 
A typical example of this type of shop is the Gold Printing Shop, at which I 
undertook research several times between 2008 and 2011. 
The surname of the Gold Printing Shop’s boss is Huang (in Chinese, the 
Chinese character of this surname also forms part of the word gold). He him-
self and his wife were both from Yangxi in Xinhua County, and at the time 
when I wrote this article, he was 30 years old. In 2005, both husband and wife 
left the shop of a hometown fellow and rented a space only several metres 
squared in between and underneath sets of stairs at the vegetable market next 
to University S. It was here that they started up their business. To make the 
most of the set-up of the space between stairs, they put the photocopier right 
up next to the door (for they have to stand by the photocopier to operate it), 
whilst the computer, printer, scanner and binding machine went under the 
stairs, at which they were only able to work by sitting or squatting. Also under-
neath the stairs, they put a small bed for Mr. Huang to use at night-time when 
he was watching the shop. They had employed (or guided) three other people. 
One of these was Mr. Huang’s niece of 15 years old, who did not finish junior 
high and began to work as an apprentice at the shop in 2007. By 2008, she 
had already been able to independently provide common typing and copying 
services. Another one was the younger female cousin of Mrs. Huang on her 
father’s side. In 2005, she began her work at the shop as an apprentice and 
left in 2007. The third was a distant relative of Mrs. Huang, who began as an 
apprentice at the shop at the beginning of 2010, and she has been working 
there to this day. 
Seen from many aspects, the relationship between the Huang family and 
their staff was not just a pure boss-employee one. First, the “boss” did not seem 
much like a boss. For example, Mr. Huang and Mrs. Huang would eat together 
with their staff. In the evenings, Mr. Huang would sleep in the shop underneath 
the stairs, whilst Mrs. Huang would take their child and the two members of 
staff to sleep in the room they rented in an undeveloped part of the city. Every 
year, Mrs. Huang would buy clothes, shoes or other items of daily use and give 
them to the staff as “gifts” rather than as “rewards.” As the members of the staff 
were still very young, Mrs. Huang would often act like an aunt or a big sister to 
them, teaching them certain things about physical health and helping them 
handle the troubles of adolescence. When they fell ill, she would act like a par-
ent, accompanying them to see a doctor and looking after them. 
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Second, the “staff” did not seem much like staff. For example, one of the 
reasons that Mr. Huang’s niece went out to work without having yet completed 
junior high was that one of his members of the staff had resigned and he 
urgently needed a replacement worker. Outside working hours, the staff would 
often help Mrs. Huang to look after the child and even tutor the child in home-
work, English and math. During these times, they seemed more like nannies, 
relatives that had come from the countryside to take care of the child, or home 
tutors. In terms of the form of addressing, they would stick to the way they 
would address relatives in addressing Mr. and Mrs. Huang. They did not have 
a formal contract with their employer. There were no specific regulations as 
to the intensity of their work and working hours, nor did they have fixed days 
off. During my interviews, in relation to this they all said: “This is totally nor-
mal, helping out your own family. How can we quibble over every little detail? 
When there’s work to be done we’re busy, and when there isn’t any we have 
more free time.”
In the second type of shop, owing to the relatively larger scale of the opera-
tions, there was a clearer and more professional division of work and a rudi-
mentary hierarchical management system. However, at the very core, it was 
still possible to see that the basic framework was the network of familial ties, 
friendship and local ties. Mr. Yi’s speed digital image and text printing shops 
could be considered as typical examples of this type. 
According to Mr. Yi’s rough estimate, from 2001 to 2011, his speed digital 
image and text printing shops had employed over 100 members of staff. Aside 
from a very few exceptions, these staff members were all relatives or people 
from their hometown. Particularly, when it came to the core of the business, 
without exception they were all close relatives of either his or his wife’s. To be 
more specific, the division of work and the relationship were as follows (for the 
details of the relationship, see Figure 1 below):
1) Mrs. Yi (her surname is He): She is in charge of the main shop’s financial 
affairs, looking after their child, and assisting He Li in coordinating the 
daily business of the main shop. 
2) He Li, the younger sister of Mrs. Yi: Aside from the latter half of 2010 when 
she returned home to get her marriage license, from 2002 until the time of 
writing, she had been the manager of the main shop. Her skills in print-
ing, copying, manipulating images and editing were the best in the shop. 
Her interpersonal skills were flexible, and she was Mr. and Mrs. Yi’s most 
competent assistant. She was responsible for the management of daily 
business in the main shop, and the “teaching, helping and guidance” of 
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new workers. Aside from Mr. and Mrs.Yi, she was the only person autho-
rized to discuss large bodies of work with clients and to settle payments. 
3) Yi Mei: She is a younger female cousin on Mr. Yi’s father’s side of the fam-
ily, although falling outside of the “five generations” often considered by 
Chinese people to make someone a relative. From 2002 until 2007, she 
assisted He Li in coordinating the daily business of the main shop. Her 
printing, copying, image manipulating and editing skills were second 
best to those of He Li. 
4) Old Yi, Mr. Yi’s elder brother: He is in charge of Mr. Yi’s Tianhe branch. He 
had a small share in the shop (Mr. Yi was not willing to disclose the pro-
portion). He knew how to output broad-width colour images. Aside from 
operating the daily operations of the Tianhe branch, he was also respon-
sible for taking on large colour image printing jobs from the main shop 
and other branches. 
5) Bai Yong, the son of Mr. Yi’s elder sister: His strength was in repairing pho-
tocopiers, printers, cutting machines, binding machines, pressed film-
packaging machines and so on. He had basic skills in printing, copying, 
binding and pressed film-packaging. His main responsibility was the 
repair and upkeep of the machines at the main shop and the branches. He 
was also responsible for going to clients to collect and deliver work for the 
main shop. In the evenings, he watched over the main shop. Occasionally, 
he would also do binding, cutting and pressed film-packaging work. 
6) Luo Jun, the son of Mr. Yi’s paternal aunt: He mastered basic skills in 
machine repair, printing, copying, binding and pressed film-packaging. 
He was formerly a worker at the main shop. Occasionally, he would be 
responsible for going to clients to collect and deliver work. In 2009, Mr. Yi 
opened a new branch outside one of the gates of University S, and Luo 
Jun and his girlfriend were in charge of the daily operations of that shop. 
7) Old He, the elder brother of Mrs. Yi: He only had skills in binding and cut-
ting. Aside from binding and cutting, he was mainly responsible for going 
to clients to collect and deliver work. In 2010, after Mr. Yi opened a new 
branch in the teachers’ living quarters of University S (he had the greatest 
share in this branch, although he was not willing to disclose the propor-
tion), the wife of Old He became responsible for the daily operations of 
this branch. 
8) Yi Ju, a female cousin of Mr. Yi’s on the father’s side of the family: Her 
printing, copying, image manipulation and editing skills were all rela-
tively good. From 2006 until the time of writing, she had been responsible 
for the daily operations of a branch opened by Mr. Yi in the Humanities 
office building of University S. 
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9) He Liang, a female cousin on the father’s side of the family of Mrs. Yi: Her 
printing, copying, image manipulation and editing skills were all rela-
tively good, and she had flexible interpersonal skills. For a long time, she 
had been in charge of an important branch in Shanghai belonging to a 
proprietor named He, and during the period when He Li went back to her 
hometown to get her marriage license, He Liang went to Mr. Yi’s main 
shop to take over all of He Li’s work. 
Relatives and hometown fellows not only propped up the basic framework of 
Mr. Yi’s enterprise, but also served as the magic weapon that enabled him to 
achieve greater efficiency. To address Mr. and Mrs. Yi, the staff all used the terms 
they would use for relatives. It was only when joking or evading the requests 
of customers that they would address them as “boss” and “female boss.” The 
staff had one fixed day off every two weeks, but if there was a lot of work on, 
they would proactively alter this day off. Overtime was something common to 
them. Basically, each month there would be at least one or two days when they 
would work throughout the night, working over 20 hours. However, no one 
demanded the pay for overtime as it is stipulated in the Labor Law (劳动法) or 
other official regulations, let alone simply refused to work. Bai Yong’s decline 
Figure 3.1 The Kinship Relationship between the Staff Members of Mr. Yi’s Printing Shops. 
Legend: △ male; 〇 female; = husband and wife relationship; / parent and child 
relationship; ∩ brother and sister relationship; 1 Mr. Yi; 2 Mr. Yi’s wife; 3 He Li;  
4 Old He; 5 He Liang; 6 Old Yi; 7 Bai Yong; 8 Luo Jun; 9 Yi Mei; 10 Yi Jun
10 9 8
7
6 1 2 3 4 5
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of tip is a good case in point. One day at one o’clock in the morning, a certain 
customer woke Bai Yong, who was watching the shop overnight, asking him to 
hurry a job. Bai Yong worked right up until eight that morning. The customer 
wanted to give him ¥100, calling it money to buy a late-night snack, but Bai 
Yong politely declined the money, saying that he and Mr. Yi were family, and it 
was only right that he should work hard. 
If we look at the overall picture of the two different models of shop respec-
tively belonging to Mr. Huang and Mr. Yi, there is a great difference between 
the scale of work they take on and the level at which they work. However, as 
a result of their relationships through familial ties, friendship and local ties, 
they were both able to overcome the bureaucratic trappings of a hierarchical 
system—in terms of Mr. Huang’s small shop, perhaps we cannot even refer to 
hierarchical management. Indeed, in terms of the high efficiency of internal 
management and labor, the two types of shop were in fact exactly the same. 
To some extent, almost all of the staff would do everything they could to sat-
isfy customers’ need, and they invest more of their labor without worrying 
about the hard work or even the pay. From the perspective of the relationship 
between industry development and labor investment, these were precisely the 
characteristics of “involution,”3 and these characteristics were the result of the 
embedding of familial ties, friendship and local ties into the market system. 
4 Embedding the Market into Familial Ties, Friendship and Local 
Ties
The embedding of familial ties, friendship and local ties into the market cre-
ated a warm side to the Xinhua speed digital printing industry, so that to a 
certain extent the shops seemed like big families. However, if we only look at 
this side of the issue, it would cause a picture warped by idealism and romanti-
cism. In reality, from an industry perspective, this is after all, a market. From 
the perspective of the operating entity, whether they were a typing and copy-
ing shop or a speed digital image and text printing shop, in the end they were 
still market entities. 
First, in terms of the relationships inside a market entity, familial ties, friend-
ship and local ties have never replaced the employer-employee relationship. In 
3 The term “involution” was used by Geertz to refer to the “self-defeating” process of Javanese 
agricultural workers, who achieved the aim of raising income by constantly increasing their 
investment of labor (Clifford Geertz, Agricultural Involution: The Process of Ecological Change 
in Indonesia, 1963, p. 80, University of California Press).
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small shops like the Gold Printing Shop, it was very obvious that internal man-
agement was not particularly formal. In the words of Mr. Huang himself, Gold 
Printing Shop was a “mountain village” (“山寨”). Even so, the basic manage-
ment procedures still existed. For example, in terms of wages, the two sides had 
already come to an agreement early on: during the period of apprenticeship 
it would be ¥500–600 per month, and after finishing the apprenticeship and 
“formally participating in work,” it was ¥1,000 per month. Once they became 
an experienced worker, which would usually take a year after they completed 
their apprenticeship, this would increase to ¥1,500. Due to the lengthy period, 
if we make deductions for increasing commodity prices, the employee would 
feel the “shrinking of real wages.” In terms of work procedures, the boss also 
had a set of regulations for the worker. Since the boss and the staff all worked 
together, in practice this achieved the effect of supervision of the whole labor 
process. During the process of my interviews, Mr. Huang’s three workers all 
complained that their work was too tiring. When I teasingly reminded them 
they could “think of ways to slack off,” one after another they replied: “With the 
boss and his wife right next to us, it’s hard to slack off. Besides, we are relatives 
after all. Since the boss has arranged all of the work, even if you’re not happy 
about it, you just have to restrain yourself and forget about it.” In other words, 
to a certain extent familial ties, friendship and local ties were being utilized as 
a management tool. 
The market and these familial ties, friendship and local ties were so com-
plicatedly interwoven that the unilateral attempt to remove the market or 
employment relationship would often damage the relationship based on 
familial ties, friendship and local ties. For example, when Mr. Huang’s first 
employee sought an excuse to quit, Mrs. Huang was unhappy, believing that 
this displayed a lack of concern for their familial ties, friendship and local ties. 
She said: “This girl (the employee) didn’t give a second thought to the monk 
(the ordinary worker), and she didn’t give a second thought to the Buddha (the 
boss), either. She just said she was leaving and she was off, forcing us to franti-
cally look for someone to help out. The time we had was too tight, for it wasn’t 
easy to find someone suitable. In the end there was nothing we could do but to 
get that niece of his (Mr. Huang’s) who still hadn’t finished junior high to come 
over. There was nothing else we could do. At a critical time, you had to rely on 
your family, and only your own families are reliable.” The underlying meaning 
of her words was that she would no longer view this first employee, who was a 
relative of them, as “one of the family.” 
As for Mr. Yi’s speed digital image and text printing shops, the manage-
ment was far more formal. Aside from a relatively clear division of work, 
Mr. Yi gave his staff fixed working procedures and regulations, including the 
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duty schedule for the cleaning in the shops. There were also branch shops 
for Mr. Yi to administrate. Then, he was mainly in charge of purchasing raw 
materials, the comings and goings of large projects, and social networking. So, 
it was not possible for him to be with all his staff on a regular basis. Due to this, 
in both his main shop and the branches, he had installed surveillance cameras, 
the scope of which covered practically every last corner. In front of his staff, 
the reasons he gave for this were: first, it makes it convenient to monitor and 
control the procedures in the shop, to prevent anyone seizing the opportunity 
to steal when there are too many customers in the shop for the staff to look 
after; second, it makes it convenient for the main shop and the branches to 
exchange between them. However, all the staff members were clear about the 
third function of the surveillance cameras: the boss could use them to monitor 
their work. During interviews at the main shop and several of the branches, all 
of the staff members that I came across replied along the lines: “It’s not pos-
sible for Mr. Yi to look at the recordings every day, but occasionally he will pick 
some out to have a look, and if he finds that any staff member has been slack-
ing off, he will give him a telling off.” 
I once came across Mr. Yi when he angrily gave his staff a telling off. The 
rules upon which he criticized his staff were, of course, those of the formal 
management system. After he finished his criticisms, he said: “It’s only because 
we’re relatives that I had a go at you. You’re my relative, so I don’t beat around 
the bush with you. You don’t need to feel any embarrassment. If you weren’t 
my relative, I would say nothing. If I really thought that a person was no good, 
I would just tell them straight to clear up their stuff and go away at once. 
You don’t need to get upset about it, but work has got to be done properly.” 
These “admonishing words” have to them a certain element of management 
“artistry.” On the one hand, Mr. Yi expressed clearly that a distinction should 
be made between the employment relationship (public) and the familial ties 
or friendship ties (private). In managing a person’s work, he was unable to 
slacken his demands just because of their familial ties. On the other hand, he 
attempted to draw on their familial ties to eliminate the element of tension 
in the management-worker relationship. This meant that he embedded the 
market mechanism into the network of familial ties, friendship and local ties, 
and made it play a leading role. At the same time, he also embedded familial 
ties, friendship and local ties into the market mechanism, but his aim was to 
make more efficient use of his employees’ labor (whilst also maintaining the 
need of the market mechanism). 
Further, the turnover of Mr. Yi’s team of staff was rather high. Similar to a 
great many other industries in the Pearl River Delta, the speed digital image 
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and text printing shop demanded a deposit of one month’s wages from its 
young workers. If a worker quit before having worked for a whole year, in 
accordance with the agreement drawn up at the time of employment, Mr. Yi 
would deduct one month’s wage from his or her salary. This sometimes met 
with dispute. Mr. Yi said: 
If they merely play the cards of relatives or hometown connections with 
me, I won’t even give them the time of day. If they do not play by the rules 
just because they’re my relatives or hometown fellows, then I wouldn’t 
be in business for long. Of all the workers here, who isn’t a relative or 
come from the same place as us? There have been a few times when their 
parents called me from hometown and criticized me. I say to them: ‘a 
nation has its national laws, and a family has its family rules. Which line 
of work doesn’t have its own set of rules? It’s not just my shops that take 
a month’s wage as a deposit and even it’s not just the typing and copying 
industry. There’s no way I can return the deposit.’ If they think that this is 
not right, pull a face and want to wash their hands of me as a relative or a 
hometown fellow, then fine, so be it! If there are sound reasons for them 
to resign, they just need to explain to me. That’s another story. It’s not a 
case that because I’m doing business I disown all my relatives and have 
no time for human feelings. For example, if one’s health is not good and 
he need to go home to rest and get better, or if he need to go back home to 
get engaged, get married, or if one’s parents are ill and he has to look after 
them, or if there’s some urgent situation at home and there’s no way for 
one to carry on working here and so on, all in all if only there’s an accept-
able reason, they don’t even have to ask (to have their deposit returned), I 
would act of my own accord and quietly return it to them. But if they just 
job-hop after having acquired the skills or leave to go it alone in business, 
then of course I can’t give it (the deposit) back to them. 
Second, from the perspective of the relationships external to the market entity, 
familial ties, friendship and local ties have never been able to dispel relation-
ships of market competition. Above, we have already seen that familial ties, 
friendship and local ties provide people from Xinhua working in the speed 
digital printing industry with a natural basis for mutual cooperation. They are 
the “secret weapon,” allowing them to eliminate their competitors. However, 
networks of familial ties, friendship and local ties do not have unlimited space 
or effect. In many circumstances, the rules of the market will become embed-
ded into familial ties, friendship and local ties and dispel their effect. 
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Take Mr. Yi’s experience in the business as an example. The time he left his 
master’s shop and began to operate relatively independently at Guangzhou’s 
Cangbian Road, without question, he was beginning to invoke the rules of the 
market as far as it was appropriate for him to get around the disadvantageous 
restrictions that accompanied familial ties, friendship and local ties. Then, the 
reason that his master let him operate the shop at Cangbian Road, which is a 
great distance from the main shop in Guangzhou’s Tianhe District, is that he 
wants to avoid direct competition with Mr. Yi’s business. In other words, they 
were taking into account the importance of the rules of the market, but at the 
same time they were also doing their best to avoid these rules of the market 
causing harm to their network of familial ties, friendship and local ties. 
Not long after Mr. Yi, his elder brother and his cousin had begun operating 
as partners on Cangbian Road, another apprentice of his master’s also left to go 
it alone, deciding to set his business up opposite them on the same street. This 
type of competition caused their relationship as “brothers as students of the 
same master” to rapidly deteriorate. Soon after that, Mr. Yi requested that his 
master make this “younger brother of the same master,” who was also from the 
same hometown, leave Cangbian Road. The street was managed particularly 
strictly. It was essential to obtain a special permit in order to conduct busi-
ness there. A former military comrade of Mr. Yi’s master, who worked in the 
Department of Industry and Commerce, used this as an excuse to make this 
proprietor cease his business operations there. However, less than six months 
later, a feud developed between Mr. Yi, his elder brother, and their cousin, 
because the cousin wanted to go into operation independently and wanted 
them to withdraw from the business. After the quarrel between the two sides, 
Mr. Yi had calculated that a split would not be completely detrimental, because 
he did not want to further damage the bonds between relatives, and then since 
he was in charge of outside contact, he had a grasp on a considerable amount 
of customers (particularly those from University S). Mr. Yi chose to give up his 
share in that business and began independent operations on the campus of 
University S. 
After having enlarged and strengthened his business on the campus, Mr. Yi 
established his main shop in the basement of the university’s Building H and 
also set up three branches in the university and its surrounding area. Without 
a doubt, there were also varying levels of competition between these opera-
tions and those of his hometown fellows, which came to University S or the 
surrounding area relatively late. For instance, when being interviewed, Mr. and 
Mrs. Huang said that Mr. Yi was the sort of person who was decent to people, 
and in the past they would often go and hang out at his shop; however, after 
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they started operating in the same line of business, they began to feel a bit 
awkward. Mrs. Huang said: “We have absolutely no way to compete with him, 
for we have too little capital and our equipment is too poor. The jobs that we 
take on are all the ones he thinks aren’t worth bothering with. Now, sharing a 
bowl of rice is a bit different to how it used to be. . . . If I had to say what it (the 
problem) is, it’s nothing really. Maybe we are just too busy and we don’t have 
time to hang out together anymore.” 
If the “feeling” of Mrs. Huang about this competition was a little unclear, 
for in the end, she was more willing to use “too busy” to express the increas-
ingly distant relationship between them as fellow hometown people, then the 
conflict that emerged between Mr. Yi and Mr. Wang, another proprietor whose 
business was next to University S, was blatantly obvious. Mr. Wang’s shop was 
a little larger than that of Mr. Huang’s, but in 2006 when he had just begun the 
business, he did not have a colour printer. From time to time, when Mr. Wang 
had a small amount of colour printing work to be done, Mr. Yi would “help 
out” and do the printing at slightly lower than the market price (there was still 
some profit to be made). This went on until one day when Mr. Yi realised that 
Mr. Wang had been handing out promotional business cards in Building H to 
attract clients. The teaching staff in Building H were seen by Mr. Yi as core cus-
tomers for his colour printing services. As a result, Mr. Yi terminated this “help-
ing out” relationship and also lowered his price for photocopying from ¥0.1 per 
page, first to ¥0.08 and then to ¥0.05—this was the same as the market price 
in the surrounding area, whereas previously the price within the grounds of 
University S had always been a little higher than that of off-campus area. This 
directly created a not insignificant crisis for Mr. Wang’s shop. Mr. Wang said 
that he had gritted his teeth and borne it for about a year before finally seeing 
the end of this crisis. On this matter, Mr. Yi said angrily: “I often helped him out 
as we’re from the same place, but it hadn’t occurred to me that he would stick 
his hand through my own door. Where are the bonds between people from the 
same place? It was him that acted without benevolence in the first place, so I 
can’t be blamed for acting unjustly after that.” 
At a higher level, the process of the market being embedded into networks 
based on familial ties, friendship and local ties may even be seen in tangible 
form. For example, on the 6th July 2011, in the conference hall of the Xinhua 
County People’s Government, over 200 Xinhua people working in the speed 
digital printing industry came from all over the country to establish the Xinhua 
Speed Digital Printing Commercial Club. The County Party Secretary and the 
County Mayor were both in attendance at this meeting. The man in charge 
claimed that every year operations run by Xinhua people in the speed digital 
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printing industry produced the value of at least ¥10,000,000,000. He argued 
that the commercial club would establish a bridge to link government, busi-
ness and the consumer, standardise the behaviour of the enterprises, and form 
a composite force and strengthen competitiveness by bringing together differ-
ent kinds of resources. An example of this was the following: “To make group 
purchases from foreign companies will lower the cost by at least 10%.”4 In real-
ity, however, not every business operator deep within this local network had 
the opportunity to enjoy such a channel for integrated resources. Mr. Yi, who 
was rumoured to be worth over ¥10,000,000, said: “The main founders are big 
traders with businesses in Beijing or Shanghai, so ordinarily a little proprietor 
like me wouldn’t be invited along, but I’ve been good ‘brothers’ with several of 
them for years, so they did invite me to join them.” 
I have no way to judge whether Mr. Yi really had the clout to participate, 
for he modestly concealed the scale of his assets in the interviews. However, 
what we can determine is that for those Xinhua operators whose scale was not 
substantial enough, it was true that they did not have the capacity to enter this 
new network. On 4th October, 2011, whilst I were conducting research in typing 
and copying shops next to the grounds of Guizhou University (贵州大学) in 
the south west of China, one boss confided that he knew of the establishment 
of the commercial club, but he had not returned home to take part. He said: 
That’s a game for the big players, we don’t qualify. If it wasn’t that we 
weren’t strong enough, we wouldn’t have been squeezed out in the first 
place, ending up in a faraway place like this to put food on the table. . . . In 
fact, in the future, as their costs become lower and lower, the competition 
will become increasingly formidable, and they’ll gain more and more of 
a monopoly over the market, whilst the rest of us (small-scale operators) 
will find it harder and harder just to scrape together a little business. 
To put it another way, although the commercial club was coloured by familial 
ties, friendship and local ties, the real essence of it was that of a network of 
market relations, especially as an alliance of strong market players. For small 
operators, the network of market relations swallowed up those of familial ties, 
friendship and local ties. 
4 Liu Jian’an, “Ningju shi wan ren mengxiang Xinhua shuma kuaiyin angqi longtou”, (“Embodying 
the Dream of over a Hundred Thousand People, Xinhua’s Speed Digital Printing Holds High 
its Dragon’s Head”), Loudi xinwen wang (Loudi News Website), http://www.ldnews.cn/news/
loudi/thenews/201107/20110706201252_2.html (accessed on 6/7/2011). 
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There really was pressure for those who started out low or came into the 
industry relatively late, for their fellow business people who had made their 
wealth earlier on were now moving towards integrating resources and strength-
ening competitiveness. From Mr. Wang, who faced the heavy pressures of his 
business, and Mr. Huang, who had not seen any real improvement in his busi-
ness circumstances for many years, it was not difficult to realise that unless 
they were able to gather together a large amount of capital and directly get 
into the field of colour printing wherein there was higher profit to be made, 
it would only become more and more difficult to turn themselves from small 
players into big players and from weak players into strong players just by rely-
ing on their small scale comings and goings. I noticed a post on the “Typing 
and Copying” forum of the “Yangxi People’s Forum” on the “Yangxi Information 
Port” website.5 The title of the post was “You Can’t Do This, and We Can’t Take 
It”; the content was a photo of an advertisement on the window of a typing 
and copying shop, which read, “Printing five fen, Copying five fen.”6 Between 
October 7, 2011 when that topic was posted and the end of October, there were 
over 50 replies. Most repliers were full of lament. For instance, one reply read, 
“Begging for your rice would be better than this.” Another read, “Copying and 
printing is only five fen, but it’s four fen just to buy a sheet of paper these days, 
and then you have to pay for the toner and the electricity. How can you do busi-
ness like this?” But other replies pointed out the very fact that these “brothers” 
from Xinhua were “brutally killing one another off.” For example, one reply 
read, “I’m really feeling the pain from these cowardly scumbags.” Another said, 
“#@%*, really, the prices have been totally messed up this way.” And a third 
read, “People from the same place aren’t united, and all they can see is the 
profit right in front of them. We should learn from Jewish people!” 
5 The Possibilities and Limitations of the Informal Economy
Economic operations must always have certain institutional foundations. The 
formal economy is unquestionably required to respect national laws and other 
official institutions. In contrast with this, the informal economy often operates 
in the circumstances of dodging national laws and official institutions. Seen 
from the relationship between labor and management, those working within 
the informal economy lack the protection of their interests and the further 
5 See http://www.417628.org/bbs/read.php?tid=48614.
6 (Translator’s note) A fen is a unit of Chinese currency equal to one hundredth of a yuan.
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benefits bestowed by legal (for example the Labor Law) and other institutional 
regulations.7
Clearly, many stages of operations within the speed digital printing industry 
run by people from Xinhua have the distinct characteristics of the “informal 
economy.” As a kind of economic form that differs from the formal economy, 
this reminds us that the market is not something transparent in a vacuum. 
Social factors, such as networks based on familial ties, friendship and local 
ties, may be embedded into the market and can make up for many other fail-
ings. Particularly for some market entities, these social factors can help to 
lower transaction costs, thus giving them greater strength to exist and develop 
within the market. Taking Coase’s opinion that the lowering of transaction 
costs is the economic nature of a firm, we can go further to argue that social 
factors, including networks of familial ties, friendship and local ties, have a 
side to them that exists in deep accordance with the market.8 In contrast with 
Max Weber’s almost a priori verdict, this implies a kind of possibility that the 
development of the market does not necessarily require people who are totally 
7 Some time ago, Huang Zongzhi noticed the particular characteristics of China’s informal 
economy and its importance to the development of the Chinese economy (see Huang 
Zongzhi, “Zhongguo bei hushi de feizhenggui jingji: xianshi yu lilun (“China’s Neglected 
Informal Economy: Reality and Theory”), Open Times (Kaifang shidai), 2009, No. 2.). This 
research points out that it is common for Chinese local government to use land and cor-
responding infrastructure at less than cost price, add both visible and invisible subsidies and 
tax breaks, and allow the bypassing of national legislation on labor and environmental pro-
tection in order to attract business investment. It is precisely this kind of informal reality and 
the vast informal economy that has sprung up along with it that have really been the main 
power behind the astoundingly rapid growth of China’s GDP. At the same time, this is also 
the source of the increasingly intensifying social and environmental crises Huang Zongzhi, 
“zhongguo fazhan jingyan de lilun yu shiyong hanyi: feizhenggui jingji shijian” (“Theoretical 
and Practical Implications of China’s Development Experience: The Informal Economy 
in Practice”), Open Times (Kaifang Shidai), 2012, No. 10). In contrast with Huang Zongzhi’s 
research, which places emphasis upon the behaviour of local government, this article turns 
its focus to the paths and consequences of economic development when rural Chinese 
people spontaneously utilize traditional resources (such as familial ties, friendship and local 
ties), evading national laws and official formal institutions. In reality, aside from the actions 
of local government, the spontaneous actions of both urban and rural Chinese people them-
selves play a decisive role within the Chinese economy. As such, this research on the informal 
economy and that of Huang Zongzhi may form a complement to one another, confirming 
that whilst the informal economy has clear advantages for economic growth, in terms of 
social welfare, it also involves natural shortcomings.
8  Ronald Coase, “The Nature of the Firm” in Louis Putterman and Randall S. Kroszner (eds.), 
The Economic Nature of the Firm, 2000, pp. 75–98, Shanghai Caijing Daxue Chubanshe.
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liberal and in possession of the “Protestant work ethic.”9 Networks formed of 
familial ties, friendship and local ties can, in empirical terms rather than phil-
osophical (religious) and civilization terms, aid us in explaining the embed-
ding of the modern market into Chinese society, which is deeply influenced by 
Confucian culture.10 
However, if the issue was that simple, it would not merit voluminous delib-
eration. Perhaps, there is even deeper tension and paradox underlying the 
issue. 
At the same time as familial ties, friendship and local ties are embedded into 
the market, the rules of the market are also deeply embedded into these ties 
in ways that are often overlooked. Sometimes, they are concealed underneath 
the vestures of familial ties, friendship and local ties. However, at other times, 
they undisguisedly control the relationship between employer and employee 
within a market entity, as well as the competition between market entities. 
This is especially the case when an industry has already concluded the phase 
of expansion and super profit. Thus from the speed digital printing industry 
run by people from Xinhua, we have seen that when it comes to the relation-
ship between owner and employee, the former will often create an appropriate 
degree of separation between familial ties, friendship and local ties and the 
market, so as to dissipate the constraints of familial ties, friendship and local 
ties on the market mechanism. To this end, they might even treat the familial 
9   Max Weber believed that the “Protestant work ethic,” with its hard work and asceticism 
(frugality), was the basis for the rise of Capitalism (see A Collection of Weber’s Works XII: 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 2007, p. 51, Guangxi Normal University 
Publishing House), and that one of the most important reasons China was unable to 
develop a Capitalist (market) economy was that it lacked this base (p. 270). However, this 
cannot explain why rural Chinese, who are able to use the method of “involution” for eco-
nomic development, lead to non-Capitalist production methods, whilst in the same way 
being hard working and frugal.
10   During the 1980s and 1990s, this sparked great debate within economics and philosophy 
circles. The focal point of the argument was whether it was possible for Confucianism 
and the modern market to come to a kind of accord (see Du Weiming, “Du Weiming Wenji” 
(“A Collection of the Works of Du Weiming), Wuhan Chubanshe 2002, Vol. 2, 529–539.) 
Without doubt, the establishment of this proposition is diametrically opposed to Weber’s 
argument on religious ethics, as such the majority of its critical analysis was also under-
taken on the level of Confucian culture (Confucian Ethics). However, I believe that whilst 
analysis from this dimension is necessary, if we undertake our critique purely on a cul-
tural level, it would be very easy for us too to become caught in the trap of cultural essen-
tialism, in which Weber was once ensnared. Perhaps, by taking as our point of entry the 
specific social relationships through familial ties, friendship and local ties and their ethics 
in practice, we may be able, to a certain extent, to make up for those shortcomings. 
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ties, friendship and local ties as a tool to manage employees and maintain the 
“standardization” of employment relations. For people from Xinhua, when it 
came to outside competition, it seemed that there was even less they could do 
about the embedding of the market rules into familial ties, friendship and local 
ties. Tension never ceased to exist between the cold, harsh market relations 
and the warm sentiments of familial ties, friendship and local ties. When this 
tension grows to a certain extent, the assertions of Marx become quite clear: it 
is difficult to avoid the veil of warm emotion being eroded or even completely 
torn away.11 
In the end, after familial ties, friendship and local ties have been embed-
ded into the market system, the logic of the jungle (the weak becoming prey 
for the strong) cannot be avoided. This is connected to the very fact that the 
foundations of that logic were not avoided at the very beginning. When people 
from Xinhua used networks built upon familial ties, friendship and local ties to 
gain a central position in the market, the most fundamental aim in itself was 
to strengthen their own (private) competitiveness and to gain more market 
resources. It was not for some public or social aim. After this kind of com-
petitiveness has become strong enough to drive forces “alien” to the networks 
of familial ties, friendship and local ties out of the market system, those net-
works, the aim of which was to win more market resources, do not disappear, 
nor has their basic nature changed. Thus we might argue that even as early on 
as when the “spectre” of Xinhua people began to start a trend for sharp reduc-
tion in prices on a national scale, the tragedy of “brothers brutally killing one 
another off” was already destined to happen. 
Only when the practical forms of the informal economy, like the networks 
of familial ties, friendship and local ties, properly surpass purely “private” aims 
and establish certain levels of public or social aims, may it be possible to over-
come the pure market logic. If what we look at is just a case of familial ties-
friendship-local ties and the market embedding themselves into each other, 
at least when it comes to the competition in which “the weak becomes prey 
for the strong,” the weak will still not stand a chance in the end. In comparison 
with the employment relationship within the formal economy, since that of 
the informal economy somewhat escapes the restraints of the law and other 
institutions, there is scope to plunder even greater profit from labor (for exam-
ple, low wages, deposits and so on) and to violate workers’ rights (for example, 
overtime), thus distorting the pricing mechanism for wages and even under-
mining social justice. 
11   See Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 2000, pp. 144–146, China 
Renmin University Press.
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Today, one of the great difficulties we have to face is the pronounced ten-
sions and paradoxes between the advantages and disadvantages of the infor-
mal economy. The possibility of overcoming the disadvantages of the informal 
economy, or the possibility of coming to an accord between pure market aims 
and public and social aims, is an issue commonly faced by societies in transi-
tion. In essence, the tensions and paradoxes, which arise from the gap between 
the pure market and public aims, are those internal to a transformation soci-
ety, rather than those out of the choice of economic development model, or 
those between the modern market and Confucian culture (or civilization). 
If we go beyond discussing the principles and look at what we might do 
in practice, we can roughly come to the verdict that we should not live with 
the hope that some day the market will suddenly develop a kind side. Nor 
should we hope it will automatically continue or abandon certain “traditions” 
in accordance with our attachment or abomination. If you have decided to 
change the market, then it may be advisable to start with rebuilding society. 
Chapter 4
Discursive Dyslexia and the Articulation of Class:  
A Theoretical Perspective on China’s Young Female 
Migrant Workers (Dagongmei)*
Pun Ngai**
On 19 November 1993, a major fire engulfed a Hong Kong (香港)-invested toy 
factory in Shenzhen (深圳). The factory was subcontracted to process the 
products of a certain famous European toy brand. Over eighty workers lost 
their lives in this fire, whilst over fifty people were left with severe burns, and 
more than twenty people suffered minor injuries. This tragedy shook the inter-
national community. It also caused a great uproar within China, as if it was 
the first time since the Reform and Opening (改革开放) that China had suf-
fered serious injury at the hands of global capital.1 Only now, the mass media 
also seemed to have suddenly become aware of the heavy price being paid 
by migrant workers for China’s rapid economic development. This major fire 
etched a permanent scar into Chinese society’s dream of modernity, which 
is characterized with a deep belief in capital and in the modern market. The 
process of seeking modernity has to it a restlessness fuelled by both hope and 
longing, whilst at the same time, it is rife with the evils of development. During 
this process, there at the bottom of the heap, the sacrifice of the working class 
is viewed as necessary for development. 
It was by chance that I met Xiaoming. She was a young migrant worker 
who, in this fire, had been going through the pain of parting forever with all 
of her fellow workmates—girls from her own village. She had been the only 
one of them to survive. This fire was powerful enough to collapse the factory 
* (This article was first published in Chinese in Open Times, 2005, No. 2)
** Pun Ngai, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Division of Social Science.
1 The first fire at a foreign-invested industrial park in China occurred in May 1990. That was 
a major fire, which broke out at a Hong Kong-invested factory that produced raincoats for 
export to the European and American markets. The factory was in a heavily industrialized 
region of the Pearl River Delta (珠三角) named Dongguan (东莞). Over 80 workers were 
swallowed up in the sea of flames. Following the tragedy, I went to a hospital in Guangzhou to 
visit the injured workers. That was the first time I had come into contact with China’s migrant 
workers. Later, in July 1990, I went with a friend to do a follow-up study of injured workers 
from four different villagers in Hubei Province (湖北省).
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building, yet it was unable to reduce to rubble the dreams of these young 
female migrant workers. For over a decade, it is this very fire that has com-
pelled me to continue to scrabble around in search of a minor genre of social 
resistance. 
To this day, Xiaoming’s life is still a gentle glimmer in my mind, and there it 
remains, flickering away. I’d never expected to meet Xiaoming—a young girl, 
only twenty-one years old. She had been away from her home in rural Hubei 
for only a short time, working as a migrant worker. The first time I saw her, she 
was lying in a hospital bed, and almost her whole body had been burnt. The 
one part of her that had escaped the blaze was a bright, sincere pair of eyes, 
shining up at me from her pretty face. She appeared very frail, but she talked to 
me with a great sense of calm: 
Children like fighting, bounding around, and singing. But I like dancing, 
so I once thought that maybe someday I could become a dancer. . . .
It’s really not easy to get to our village. It’s halfway up a mountain, and 
it’s not connected by rail or by car. If you want to get to my village, you 
have to walk for about an hour. . . .
The people there are really poor, but they’re very decent. . . . In the city, 
there’s almost no sense of trust. I don’t like city people. I did quite a few 
years of farm work and housework for mum and dad. These days, young 
people don’t like farming; I don’t like it either. Everybody says it’s really 
fun working “out there,” and you can earn a lot of money too. 
In 1990, a few others from my village and I left home and went to 
Shenzhen together. I found work at a clothing factory. It was the first 
time for me to look for a job. Before entering the factory, the manager 
gave everyone an interview and a written test. I was absolutely terrified at 
that point. Inside that factory, everyone was fighting for a job. I felt really 
lonely while I was there fighting for that job. 
I told myself that I had to be a grown-up and that whether or not there 
was anyone else from back home at the factory, I had to look out for 
myself. The factory arranged for me to have a bunk bed in the workers’ 
dormitory, and I didn’t know a soul. It was only then that I really expe-
rienced the feeling of being away from home, which people often talk 
about: for everything, you have only yourself to rely on. 
But having just left the countryside, I still found it really exciting—
the big city, the huge skyscrapers, the shops, and such a lot of people. . . . 
It was like watching a film. And there was I, in the middle of the film. 
Everything was so new and interesting to me, whilst me, I thought I was 
a real hick, really naïve. . . . 
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But I wasn’t happy in my first job. The factory had been set up by a 
Taiwanese boss. Our wages were never paid on time. We were supposed 
to be paid on the first day of every month, but they were always late to 
pay us. Sometimes, they’d be a month late, and sometimes it was two. . . . 
The good thing was that the wages were no lower than those at any other 
factory, and I earned 300 yuan a month. 
I left that factory in May 1991. My elder cousin had introduced me to 
this toy factory, which was huge. . . . It was really tough work, from the 
early hours of the morning to the middle of the night, twelve hours a 
day. I was absolutely worn out every day . . . but I felt really happy there 
because I had a lot of friends and relatives around me. We’d often chat 
and help each other out. 
From then on I’d not had any more thoughts about jumping ship and 
going to a different factory. . . . Every three months, I would send 600 yuan 
back home to my dad, and I’d keep a couple of hundreds for myself. I 
thought I’d be able to work at that factory at least for several years. But 
then it caught fire, an enormous fire. . . . 
Social violence is an unavoidable part of the lives of dagongmei (打工妹, young 
female migrant workers). In order to bring this social violence to light within 
the context of a socialist China that is gradually being incorporated into the 
system of global capitalism, I began a long journey in search of a Chinese 
worker-subject. At the same time, within China—a country that was rapidly 
becoming the factory of the world and providing a vast amount of cheap labor 
and natural resources for global production—I was also attempting to explore 
the possibility of a form of alternative social resistance. For Xiaoming, life is 
pervaded with the flickering blaze, the pain and the memories, which con-
stantly flash before her. This clearly reveals the wounds of the era and narrates 
the social resistance in the life of every single migrant worker in the era of 
China’s transition. 
Over a decade has passed since that major fire. In China, which is hurtling 
towards globalization, I could see a new class of workers that are struggling 
hard in a desire to get out. Whilst attempting to understand this kind of totally 
unfamiliar yet brutal life experience, what perplexes me most is this: the living 
conditions of China’s working class are utterly dismal, and yet not only do the 
voices of this class fall into oblivion against the rumble of the state machine’s 
construction of modernization, but they also meet with disgust and loathing 
from the general public (this comes from the newly emerging middle class in 
the cities and sometimes even from the working class themselves). In other 
words, on the one hand, the class subject are not themselves able to speak, 
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whilst on the other hand, when it comes to the topic of class, the whole soci-
ety commonly comes down with a case of discursive dyslexia. It was this very 
quandary that drove me to seek out the whys and wherefores of class dis-
course in contemporary China. However, what is ridiculous is that the word 
“class” has already been washed and rung out to the extent that all that is left 
behind is a body devoid of its soul, like the spirit of the deceased, longing for 
reincarnation. 
The first focus of this article is a derivation of the genealogy of class in China 
from the Mao era to the post-socialist era. This is aimed to help understand the 
figurative “loss of voice and articulation of voice” of the newly emerging work-
ing class in China’s reform era. I believe that the “discursive dyslexia” of the 
working class not only has a powerful effect on China’s legislation and policies 
that are related to labor and population, but it also obstructs the formation of 
the working class itself. 
The second focus of this article is to emphasize that on the basis of more 
penetrating historical, sociological and anthropological research, we must 
establish more advanced theories of the highly contested concepts of “class,” 
“class consciousness,” and “class struggle.” In contemporary China, there is yet 
to emerge organized, systematic collective “class struggle” that aims to oppose 
the state and capital. However, that does not necessarily mean that within a 
rapidly changing Chinese society, “class consciousness” has not begun to take 
root. In this article, through the real daily lives of migrant workers and their 
social resistance, I will seek for the possibility of the expression of their voice 
as a class-subject, and the formation of a working class. 
1 Revisiting the Class-Subject 
In his study of the formation of the English working class, E. P. Thompson 
argues that “the working class did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. 
It was present at its own making. . . . More than this, the notion of class entails 
the notion of historical relationship. Like any other relationship it is a fluency 
which evades analysis if we attempt to stop it dead at any given moment and 
attempt to anatomize its structure. . . . The relationship must always be embod-
ied in real people and in a real context” (Thompson, 1963, 9). 
Here, Thompson’s insights remind us that we must do everything we can to 
avoid turning the real lives of China’s young female migrant workers—below 
referred to by the Chinese term dagongmei—into a pile of moribund statistics, 
patterns, or arguments that are padded out in the language of “class.” There are 
two main points in Thompson’s contribution. The first is that he questions the 
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notion of positivistic historical study, arguing that this ignores culture, as well 
as industrialization, the political environment, and the qualitative change of 
the working class subject. The second is that he challenges those Marxists who 
clung to the tradition of materialism, arguing that they over-emphasized mate-
rial determinism, whilst at the same time failed to see the dynamism of society 
and culture, thus overlooking the complexity of the class-subject and of class 
consciousness (McLennan, 1982). Thompson argues that class, far from being 
a structurally generated product, is reliant upon historical relationships, and 
that the emergence of this class is actually the outcome of its own reality. It is 
the agency of the working class itself and the cornucopia of its different expe-
riences that provides us with clues to understanding how this class is formed. 
Aside from the working class itself, there is no one else who can become the 
agents of their history. 
Although the agency of the working class has been restored to the cen-
tre of debate, in traditional Marxist class analysis, the dynamic relationship 
between culture, class-agency and the emergence of class has still not been 
fully explored in theoretical terms.2 Thus it has consistently been the focus of 
post-structuralist criticism. Post-structuralists emphasize the removal of the 
politics of articulation and the subject from the heart of the problem, yet it is 
these two elements that make for a vehement argument against any kind of 
one-size-fits-all or teleological notion of class. 
On this point, I wish to highlight two things. First, the politics of articula-
tion always exists within specific histories, spaces and cultures. The field of 
articulation is the arena right at the spot where these different forces converge 
and cross swords: the state, capital, intellectuals, the media, and last but not 
least, migrant workers themselves—all enter this site and attempt to interpo-
late the state and nature of the working class. In the Mao era, China’s prole-
tariat was created, and “announced” through socialist politics of articulation. 
Even before the corresponding subject had actually emerged, “class” was being 
constructed. In order to create class actors, it could be argued that the state 
machine monopolized the power to give them their identity.
Second, it is not fitting to use a teleological orientation to describe and 
explain class. This is because, just as Thompson has explained, whilst class is a 
historical, structural concept, it is also a cultural concept, and a concept based 
on lived experience (Thompson, 1963, 9–11). In the same way as gender and 
ethnicity, class embodies a specific kind of human relationship. These rela-
tionships cannot be integrated into one category, nor can they be simplified 
2 See the critical review undertaken by Don Kalb on the questioning of a class analysis 
approach: Kalb, D., 1997, 1–23.
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into the specific expression of one particular kind of nature. Kalb argues that 
this type of historical, relational class concept means a more open, contingent 
form of class analysis, and meanwhile it remains the best way to avoid falling 
into erroneous ways of thinking, like reductionism, reification and essential-
ism (Kalb, 1997, 6–7). 
Aside from the relational explanation of class, there is another argument, 
which leans towards using class struggle to supplant class itself. McLennan 
argues that Thompson’s treatment of the formation of the working class 
developed the notion that class struggle can exist separately from class itself. 
To Thompson, “struggle” is more important than “class,” whilst abstract “class 
interests” are not struggled over by a specific class and class identity. Thompson 
clearly recognizes that there was a huge gulf between the discourse of the 
working class and popular thinking, and that the latter was more inclined to 
identify with the traditional “moral economy” (McLennan, 1982, 113). Studies 
of strikes by workers have shown that without class struggle, there is no class. 
It is always through class struggle that workers arrive at class consciousness, 
and thus graduate to become a class. Fred Chiu has clearly given voice to the 
position that without class struggle, there is no class. He points out that “class 
exists only while individual workers are interpolated and involved in a process 
of forming a collective identity—a particular historical moment when indi-
viduals consciously formulate moral-political positions and carry them into 
the battlefield of concrete struggle. At such moments—not earlier and not 
later—one can conceive of ‘class’ ” (Chiu, 2003, 220). 
I would agree that subjectivity and the active participation of workers in 
worker action like strikes are requisite conditions for the formation of class 
consciousness. However, the hypothesis that “class” is “class struggle,” partic-
ularly the simplification of class into a kind of method of collective action, 
is still unreasonable. In my research on women factory workers, I have real-
ized that class consciousness is also formed in the practices of daily life. 
It might be expressed at any time and in any space; this class conscious-
ness is all but as strong as that in any collective class struggle. On the shop 
floor, both the managers and the managed, commonly and deftly make use 
of different techniques of political articulation, including condensation, 
displacement, and representation, which are also used and entangled with 
the language of gender, ethnicity, and rural-urban status (Perry, 1996). If no 
class struggle exists, it does not necessarily mean that there is no class con-
sciousness and no class. It is quite apparent that there is no sequential rela-
tionship by which class struggle, class-consciousness, and class one by one 
follow each other or vice versa. Differentiating between class in-itself (Klasse 
an sich) and class for-itself (Klasse für sich) is extremely helpful to us in 
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understanding the structural and historical constraints in the formation of the 
worker-subject. 
In China, class analysis goes far beyond the scope of a purely academic con-
cern. To a much greater extent, it is a political issue. For over half a century, as 
it has been influenced by reductionism, reification and essentialism, people 
have drawn close connections between the discourse of class and waves of 
socialist movements. If the revolutionary thought of Mao Zedong (毛泽东) 
engendered a discourse of class struggle in China, then the reforms started 
by Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) replaced it with a kind of discourse of moder-
nity, which allowed for and encouraged “some people to get rich first.” From 
the early 1980s, the Scar Literature or Literature of the Wounded (伤痕文学) 
genre appeared amongst China’s creative literary works, for the first time, 
revealing the scars caused by the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命), whilst 
at the same time questioning certain mistakes made by Mao, along with his 
belief in class struggle. As post-socialist China careered towards capitalism, 
class was no longer only a meaningless word, it was rapidly growing and con-
stantly rebuilding itself. However, it was just at this point that the spearhead 
of the state mechanism reversed its aim and was now pointing directly at class 
discourse. 
In contemporary China, a new elite has emerged, and it consciously resists 
against Marxist discourse in the common sense and the discourse of class 
struggle in a given sense, for these discourses could still potentially shape the 
popular memory and the history of socialism. Bearing the banner of neolib-
eralism, the new hegemonic machine was already fully prepared to attack 
class discourse and denounce other outdated and harmful ways of thinking. 
However, it was at this farcical historical moment that in the words of Derrida, 
the spectre of Marx made its return and it had to return. As Derrida puts it, 
“The objection seems irrefutable. But the irrefutable itself supposes that this 
justice carries life beyond present life or its actual being there, its empirical or 
ontological actuality: not toward death but toward a living-on” (Derrida, 1994). 
Within this, there is a kind of “visor effect”: we are unable to see who is cur-
rently observing us, but “this spectral someone other (quelqu’un d’autre) looks 
at us” (Derrida, 1994, 7). Just as class has been stripped of its language and 
has no way to articulate itself, a new dagong (打工) subject (worker-subject) 
is struggling to be born. At this moment, the spectral other hovers back and 
forth around us, looking at us, but daring not to hope that it can be seen, aside 
from its own image. Its sorry fate is both its misfortune and its fortune. It is not 
merely a process of its own formation; at the same time, it is a critical struggle, 
an opportunity for that specter to find life. 
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2 The Formation of Class 
Ann Anagnost (Anagnost, 1997, 17–44) tells us that in early twentieth century 
China, “making the subaltern speak” had become the revolutionary project of 
realist literature, yet borrowing from a skewed view of Marxist class analysis, 
the state machine subsumed it under the discourse of the Party and that of 
the state. Although in today’s China categorization by class is no longer an 
unfamiliar concept, the formation of the new dagong subject is much more 
complicated than it is explained by a traditional Marxist stance on class, which 
often treats the subject as a purely abstract entity or the product of the means 
of production and the relations of production. 
In this article, class is treated not only as a range of dynamic historical rela-
tions, but as a range of specific relationships, formed collectively by a whole 
host of factors, including countless tensions, structural contradictions and the 
clashes that arise from time to time. The new dagong class is emerging from 
the very bottom of the social heap. Its formation is destined to be a difficult 
process, for the moment it appeared it suffered destruction and decimation 
from the dominant class above it. This making and unmaking seem to be two 
sides of the same coin, coinciding with one another as the new dagong class is 
born unto a China hurtling towards globalization.3
Andrew Walder has argued that China’s process of proletarianization dur-
ing the Mao era was unique in that it was entirely determined by politics and 
not the market (Walder, 1986). First, Mao Zedong Thought (毛泽东思想) lent 
an entirely new interpretation to the Marxist theory of class, giving particu-
lar prominence to class struggle. In 1925, In his famous work “Analysis of the 
Classes in Chinese Society” (中国社会各阶级的分析) Mao pointed out that 
the reason to undertake analysis of the different classes in Chinese society was 
to identify friends and enemies for the Communist Revolution: “Who are our 
enemies? Who are our friends? This is a question of the first importance for 
the revolution.” He went on to state, “the leading force in our revolution is the 
industrial proletariat” (Mao, 1965, 13). However, at the beginning of the twen-
tieth century, the modern industrial proletariat in China was no more than 
around two million people, and “these two million industrial workers [were] 
mainly employed in five industries—railways, mining, maritime transport, 
textiles and ship building—and a great number [were] enslaved in enterprises 
owned by foreign capitalists” (Mao, 1965, 18–19). Although before the war, 
3 See Andrew Walder on the making and unmaking of the working class in socialist China: 
(Walder, A., 1984). 
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Mao Zedong placed great hope in the participation of China’s industrial 
proletariat in the revolution, he was keenly aware that the number of peo-
ple belonging to that class was still extremely limited.4 In effect, the war of 
resistance against Japan and the war of liberation against the Kuomintang 
(国民党) mainly relied upon the vast numbers of people in rural China. Mao 
Zedong proclaimed peasants to be “semi-proletarianized,” a class which was 
to be the most staunch ally of the proletariat (Schram, 1969). However, follow-
ing liberation, it was workers (gongren, 工人) in the urban areas, rather than 
the enormous population of people in rural China, that were proclaimed to 
be the vanguard of China’s proletariat and therefore the new masters of China. 
The unscrupulous nature of the relationship between political symbolism and 
class subject is quite explicit. The gaping chasm between actual intention and 
expressed intent maintained and meanwhile destroyed the token symbol of 
class discourse. 
During the Mao era, within the context of the planned economy, the for-
mation of China’s working class took only a short few years. In contrast, the 
formation of the working classes in Britain and other European countries took 
at least half a century, and it was determined by the market economy. The 
Chinese working subject had been interpolated with class status by the class 
ideology of Mao Zedong Thought. The politics of articulation was so powerful 
that it rendered class in-itself into class for-itself. 
At the end of the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping started China’s policy of Reform 
and Opening. In a few swift blows, the Reform and Opening shattered the 
class structure that had been created so quickly by Mao. The urban reforms 
that began in the mid 1980s smashed the iron rice bowl of the working class 
belonging to the state-owned enterprises that had, until that point, always 
been protected by the state (Leung, 1988; Walder, 1989; Sargeson, 1999; Lu, 
2002; Tan, 1993). The privileged status of China’s working class from days 
gone by was completely negated. As China progressed towards globalization, 
the leading parlance of the state and capital diluted the strength of class dis-
course. However, this does not necessarily mean that class analysis became 
outdated. In reality, nothing is quite that simple. In contemporary China, the 
newly emerging bourgeoisie, the urban middle class, and government officials 
hope to draw on the discourse of neoliberalism to rationalize the rapid social 
change taking place, and to restructure social relations and class structure. 
Class analysis was subsumed as a political tactic adopted to cover up their own 
class status and social privileges. In order to pave the way for a neoliberalism 
4 On contention between the role of peasants and the leading status of the working class in the 
revolution, see Schram, 1969, 236–237.
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that emphasizes individualism, the specialization and division of labor, equal 
opportunities and open markets, the discourse of class was completely stifled. 
Thus, it could be argued that the history of class in China has twice been dis-
placed, first by the state and then by the market. In a rapidly changing China, 
the double displacement of class has ensured that the real meaning of class is 
obscured, and in this sense, it is of a highly political nature. 
However, the migrant workers who have flooded to China’s towns and cities 
have already rapidly formed a new army of labor. The industrial and develop-
ment zones that are constantly appearing around the country have provided 
the conditions necessary for global capital to use China’s abundant resources 
of cheap labor. Thus, as China became embroiled in global capitalism, the bur-
geoning dagong class is mainly composed of migrant workers (nongmingong, 
农民工), and the fate of this class is jointly determined by the state and capital. 
As a class force, the burgeoning dagong (打工) class has suffered repression 
from the moment it began to emerge. In today’s China the newly emerging 
bourgeoisie not only overlaps with government officials, but it also inextrica-
bly links with China’s kinship-based networks (Bian, 1994; Lin, 1995). The com-
plicity between the bourgeoisie and government officials, who form a state of 
government corporatist governance, is also a cause for the suppression of the 
discourse of class, to the extent that it is the most powerful force in bringing 
about the non-articulation of class. The constantly increasing speed at which 
progress towards urbanization takes place and the almost universal improve-
ment in urban living standards are common themes over which the urban elite 
rhapsodize, yet the deepening social inequalities and the exploitation of non-
local or rural labor are always underestimated or overlooked. In the eyes of the 
urban elite, there is simply no such thing as class division. All they know is that 
the government is allowing some people to become rich first, and such being 
the case, it is only natural that disparity and divisions will emerge. The inten-
tion of the dominant class to use an open society to replace a society of classes 
is somewhat conspicuous. Moreover, the process of displacement of a class-
based society by an open society can be seen as a political process, legitimized 
by the market. 
3 Ambiguous Class Identity 
China has certainly not been the only socialist state to initiate an adoption of 
the main tenets of global capitalism. In the same way as in Eastern Europe, when 
faced with the multitude of ills that accompany the rigidity of a state planned 
economy, the Chinese government decided to introduce the mechanisms of 
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the market economy in order to solve social crises like a low level of devel-
opment, insufficient employment, vast numbers of unemployed, and a com-
mon decline in living standards. This was particularly true in the final days of 
the Cultural Revolution (Dirlik and Meisner, 1989). Following the Reform and 
Opening, the central government passed the power to develop the economy 
down to local governments, and thus there was a spate of local governments 
attempting to plan and develop their cities into a part of “the factory of the 
world,” In order to prioritize the realization of economic development targets, 
local governments had no hesitation in implementing strict social controls. In 
the deep chasm between the dream of the great modern metropolis and the 
desire for an intensified system of administrative control, emerged the exploit-
ative management mechanisms for the utilization of labor. 
China’s population control is mainly accomplished through the Household 
Registration System (户籍制度), which was officially established in 1958 in the 
state’s Regulations on the Household Registration of the People’s Republic of 
China (中华人民共和国户口登记条例). China’s household registration not 
only determined where a person lived, it also determined the vicissitudes of a 
person’s whole life—his or her place in society, wages, welfare, material pos-
sessions, and housing (Solinger, 1991; Yin and Yu, 1996; Lu, 2002). Before the 
reforms, the Household Registration System was a simplex, overarching, strict 
system, under which people fell into one of two categories: urban permanent 
resident hukou (户口) or rural permanent resident hukou.5 Under this sys-
tem, the fate of people in rural China was confined to the land by their hukou. 
Although the loopholes in the Household Registration System itself meant 
that some “illegal” citizens migrating between rural and urban China did exist, 
in terms of their numbers, there was no way that this would change the rural-
urban binary structure or the peasants-workers binary structure. 
In the early 1980s, the Shenzhen Municipal Government (深圳市政府) took 
the lead in making significant changes to the Household Registration System, 
issuing temporary measures to control the migrant population. They added 
a temporary hukou to the original hukou for permanent residence. This was 
mainly aimed at short-term migrant workers. The Household Registration 
System was intimately linked to the controls on labor, and its existence helped 
the emergence of mechanisms for the exploitation of labor. The government 
used the Household Registration System to delineate the population in the city 
into permanent and temporary residents, which meant that the government 
5 Unless it was at the request of the country, no one was able to change his identity. Sometimes, 
the government would allow for university graduates to change their hukou (户口) to move 
to a large city for work, because they were seen as professionals.
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did not need to bear responsibility for providing housing, job security and 
other types of welfare for these migrant workers (Solinger, 1999; Mallee, 2000; 
Zhang, 2001; Tan, 2000). The towns and cities needed the labor of the rural pop-
ulation, but the moment that their labor was no longer needed, they had no 
way to continue to survive in the city. In reality, the city did not allow the newly 
emerging dagong class to take root on its turf. Even worse, the intertwining of 
the Household Registration System and the labor controls has formed a spe-
cial modality of power, whereby an ambiguous identity has been constructed 
for migrant workers. This at once deepens and obscures the exploitation of 
them. Are these temporary residents urban residents? Are migrant work-
ers (nongmingong) peasants or workers after all? The answers to the above 
questions are always vague (Andors, 1988, 40–41). The ambiguity of migrant 
workers’ status meant that whilst the Chinese government had not fully 
acknowledged their identity as workers, it was still able to use them as it saw 
fit. As Solinger explains, this creates a state of, if not deformed, contested citi-
zenship (Solinger, 1999). This is most unfavourable to migrant workers turning 
themselves into workers in the city. The term nongmingong has blurred the 
line between a person’s sense of identity as someone from rural China (nong-
min) and someone who is a worker (gongren), imperceptibly suppressing the 
formation of a dagong class. 
Moreover, the town and city governments did not provide their temporary 
populations with housing, education and other basic infrastructures. It was not 
only the migrant workers themselves who did not enjoy the same basic rights 
as urban citizens, but their relatives were not allowed to live in the city, unless 
they were also able to find work there. Migrant workers were unable to register 
a marriage or a birth in the city. Officials saw migrant workers as rural peo-
ple and believed they should rely on their family network in the countryside 
for support. Thus, not only could local government, non-Mainland Chinese-
invested enterprises (including Hong Kong-invested enterprises and Taiwan-
invested enterprises) and foreign-invested enterprises lighten their load, at 
the same time they could also gain profit through their use of this rural labor. 
Meanwhile, the cost of labor reproduction had to be borne by rural society. 
Migrant workers were transient guests in the city. Generally speaking, these 
migrant workers—especially young female migrant workers (dagongmei)—
would work in a factory in the city for between three and five years before 
getting married. Their long-term plans, like marriage and having children, were 
all expected to take place in the countryside. Just as in other developing coun-
tries, the process of proletarianization in modern China was hugely reliant 
on a self-sufficient model of agricultural production. In China, another main 
characteristic of proletarianization was that it was not determined by market 
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forces. Instead, it was determined by political forces and the administration.
In other words, through the power of politics and the administration, the vari-
ous extant social relationships and economic structures were integrated into 
the process of developing a market economy. As China’s countryside had vast 
numbers of surplus labor, the urban governments did not have to concern 
themselves with the problem of the reproduction of labor. 
In short, if they wanted to develop a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) into a 
modern industrial town or city, it was necessary to rely upon the use of nong-
mingong coming from all over China. At the same time, the discourse of the 
state and capital, intentionally or otherwise, refuted the status of these migrant 
workers as a class. An ambiguous sense of self-identity was a peculiar mixture 
of both population control and labor control. During the process of China’s 
integration into the global economy, the ambiguity of this identity helped 
to maintain the volume and flexibility of cheap labor. With its emphasis on 
modernity and development, the neo-liberal discourse works to rationalize the 
exploitation discussed here, and meanwhile it determines the weak standing 
of China’s newly emerging dagong class, for this class had not even been given 
the space to articulate its own existence. The most fundamental problem faced 
by the newly emerging class was that its workers did not have the right to settle 
in the city, so it was as if they had been stripped of the soil in which their class 
took root. Slums are a place where the proletariat can organize and develop 
into a class force. In large cities like Guangzhou (广州) and Beijing (北京), 
densely-populated communities of migrant workers did rapidly grow in some 
suburban areas (Zhang, 2001; Wang, 1995; Wang et al. 1997; Zhao, 1997), yet in 
the majority of big cities, this kind of areas were often the main targets of man-
agement and cleanups by government. The proletarianization of the country-
side is a unique phenomenon in contemporary China. During this process, for 
every nongmingong, life as a worker in industry was a brief and temporary one. 
It was rare for someone to dare hope to genuinely change their social status 
from peasant to worker. When migrant workers are sent back to the country-
side, the roots that they may have put down against all adversity are destroyed. 
Thus it could be argued that in contemporary China, the forces of politics and 
the administration, combined with the discursive dyslexia on class, determine 
the making and unmaking of the newly emerging dagong class.
4 Social Actors or Dagong Class Subjects?
In contemporary China, the race towards modernity means that Chinese soci-
ety must allow for private and global capital not only to permeate and regulate 
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Chinese economic life, but also social and cultural life. In my anthropological 
research about dagongmei, aside from drawing on Foucault’s “techniques of the 
self,” Marx’s analysis of class struggle, and women studies on gender and labor, 
I have also been informed by the highly acclaimed works of Alain Touraine and 
his concept of the “social activist.” As China transforms from an agricultural 
society to an industrial one and from socialism to market capitalism, in the 
resulting rapid and profound social change, dagongmei like Xiaoming, working 
at non-Mainland Chinese-invested factories (including Hong Kong-invested 
enterprises and Taiwan-invested enterprises) and at foreign-invested enter-
prises, are amongst the pioneers to experience this transformation. As women, 
as people from rural parts of the country, and as migrant workers, dagongmei 
are a drifting subject, living in a changing society. Their voice will not be easily 
drowned out and washed away by any leading discourse (be it intellectual or 
political discourse). 
Young female migrant workers are now living and learning from their 
experiences, thinking about and resisting against the trajectory of their own 
lives. The struggles of this newly formed social subject are unique, diverse, and 
carried out in abundance, thus they can no longer be simplified as politicized 
class struggles. As a weapon of social struggle, class analysis is effective only 
when it is rooted in the experiences of struggles by the class at the very bottom 
of society. Only in this way can it make its comeback. In other words, class 
analysis will play its role only when it is within the infrapolitics of the migrant 
workers’ own resistance against capital and the market.6 Locked within the 
confines of triple oppression, these young female migrant workers must live 
through their own class experiences and make these experiences a part of 
their living resistance. If in the past, the class at the bottom has been injured 
by the leading discourse of the dominant class, the new subject, the dagong-
mei subject, which has emerged at the point where global capitalism and 
China’s modernity project meet, is raising her head in hope for the return of 
class analysis. 
5 The Making of the Dagong Subject 
Dagong denotes the process of turning individuals into working subjects, 
particularly when they are working for a capitalist boss. The addition of the 
6 Just as Elizabeth Perry argues, “Labor politics begins with laborers themselves: their geo-
graphical origins, gender, popular culture, educational attainments, work experiences and 
the like” (Perry, 1993, 4–5).
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Chinese character mei goes further to demonstrate the gender identity of the 
worker subject in a given context. The term dagong originates in Cantonese—
the language spoken in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, labor relations are mainly 
determined by the market. Basically, dagong means “to work for a boss,” 
and it carries strong connotations of the commercialization of labor or the 
sale of labor in return for wages (Lee, 1998). In the last twenty or so years in 
China, dagongmei and dagongzai (打工仔, the male equivalent of dagong-
mei) have become two widely used terms, forming a contrast with the term 
gongren (worker), the proletariat, which was more commonly used during 
the Mao era. Under Mao, gongren enjoyed a privileged status unparalleled in 
society. The state claimed that they were the masters of the country, and they 
would no longer be alienated by labor. Marx had argued that under capital-
ism, the alienation of labor was a common phenomenon. Gongren were the 
laborers that socialist China had liberated from alienation. Moreover, during 
the process of labor, they would fully realize the ideal type of their own new 
subject. In reality, in the socialism practiced in the past, gongren were work-
ing for the state. The state, as the “socialist boss,” not only issued the wages 
of the gongren, it also provided them with the security of lifelong employ-
ment, housing, medical care, and education for their children (Walder, 1986; 
Li, 1992). 
Dagong not only means a departure from the socialist boss, it also means 
the arrival of a new boss belonging to the global capitalist community. Dagong 
means that the laborers are no longer completely under the wing of the state, 
they are temporary labor, labor that can be arbitrarily let go, and labor that can, 
at any moment, be replaced be even cheaper labor. If indeed there is any, the 
value of dagong is determined by the market. The surplus value is extracted 
from their labor by capital for profit. In other words, the word dagong means 
a transformation from socialist labor relations to capitalist labor relations, yet 
dagongzai and dagongmei are a new configuration: they are now aware of the 
exploitation, and they are in possession of class consciousness. 
How does the newly formed dagong subject develop a subjectivity and a 
sense of identity that are totally different to the gongren class subject of the 
socialist era? In the formation of the dagong subject, how do migrant workers 
gain power and survival tactics from the bottom rung of society in order that 
their subject won’t be subsumed into any single political agenda? Moreover, if 
we leave behind the teleological perspective on proletarianization, what kind 
of individual or collective forms of rebellion will this dagong subject come up 
with? These are all extremely important questions. 
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6 Subject, Desire and Resistance 
The arrival of the era of global production in China trumpeted the beginning 
of waves of workers migrating from rural to urban China. On the one hand, 
industrial capital deftly manipulates demand, lack and desire, and on the 
other hand, it sanctifies modernity amongst migrant workers who dream of 
becoming not only urban workers, but also modern consumers. The creation 
of desire and of lack is the art of the market economy, which, in the words 
of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari “involves deliberately organizing wants 
and needs amid an abundance of production; making all of desire teeter and 
fall victim to the great fear of not having one’s needs satisfied” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1984, 28). 
The vast waves of people surging from rural areas to the industrial zones 
in the cities demonstrate the desire to dagong. Within this, we can see the 
political manipulation by capitalist production of social lack produces a desire 
within migrant workers to fill in the void. However, just as we can see through 
the genealogy of the rural-urban disparity and gender inequality, historical and 
systemic corrections have been made to this void by the socialist system (Perry 
and Wong, 1985; Seldon, 1993; Solinger, 1993, 1999; Stacey, 1983; Wolf, 1985; Croll, 
1985, 1994). An understanding of the pressing urge of young females to leave 
the countryside must go far beyond the common explanations that draw on 
poverty and surplus rural labor (West and Zhao, 2000; Zhang, 2001; Tan, 2002; 
Sun, 2000). It could be argued that a different side to poverty is abundance 
(i.e. an abundance of surplus labor), and as a specific form of social lack, this 
has been created through the joint forces of the state and of capital. Poverty, 
especially enormous urban-rural disparity, has been forged by history and by 
people, and most importantly, it has become a kind of consumer discourse that 
exists within social desires to rise above it, fill in the gaps, and change things. 
The depreciation of agricultural labor and the striking contrast it forms with 
industrial production quietly signifies the connection between the politics of 
difference, hierarchy, and the creation of the other, to the formation of the new 
dagongmei subject (Pun, 1999). Just as many studies of female workers and 
industrial capitalism have shown, the physicality of people in rural areas is often 
thought to be tough, dirty, rustic or lazy; contrastingly, the physicality of workers 
is described as deft and nimble, as young, single, and female, and particularly 
as well-suited to the new global division of labor (Nash and Fernandez-Kelly, 
1983; Kung, 1983; Leacock and Safa, 1986; Ong, 1987; Lamphere, 1987; Rosen, 1987; 
Hsiung, 1996). The construction of a new sense of self and of identity is an act of 
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empowerment (Laclau, 1990). It is a process of self- subjectivization, exclusion 
and displacement (Foucault, 1988), which is connected to systemic control, tech-
niques used to tame and subdue, the art of designation, and the power of dis-
course (Kondo, 1990). The construction of the new dagong subject meant that 
socialism and rural people, seen as old- fashioned and behind the times, were 
constantly being devalued, degraded and cast aside. Rural people were viewed 
as a plebeian subject. In other words, they were the dark, muddy underbelly 
of the new, modern, ideal identity. Social difference, such as urban and rural, 
northern and southern, male and female, married and unmarried, and so on, 
were all used to maintain, expand and alter the distribution of power and place-
ment within the hierarchy. As a new form of identity and a product of culture, 
dagongmei was created within the specific context that emerged right at the 
moment when the global capitalist machine began to reap its harvest in the era 
after Mao Zedong. It marks the beginning of a new era, within which the mar-
ket, the state and society together influence the process of proletarianization. 
If Marx has already indicated that the urban-rural divide is the basis of 
capital accumulation, in this article, I will add another necessary condition 
for capital accumulation—gender difference. This is particularly true in an 
era of global production (Nash and Safa, 1976; Ong, 1987; Stitcher and Parpart, 
1990; Ward, 1990). In the Mao era, China emphasized class and refuted gender 
difference, whereas after the Reform and Opening, China was inundated 
with discourses of sexuality and images of the female body (Croll, 1995; 
Evans, 1997). Capitalist production and consumption rely upon gender dis-
course as the basis of a system of difference and hierarchy. Xiaoming was 
recruited to the factory not only because she was a migrant worker from the 
countryside, but also because she was female, which meant she was thought to 
be cheaper and more easily managed and controlled. In China, non-Mainland 
Chinese-invested enterprises (including Hong Kong-invested enterprises 
and Taiwan-invested enterprises) and foreign-invested electronics factories are 
often likened to a Utopian land of joy and plenty, where young women are 
just waiting for men to come and sweep them off their feet. The machine of 
production has no interest in the commonplace body; it is interested only in 
particular bodies, female bodies. This is because the bodies of women are usu-
ally thought of as being easily tamed, more patient, and better able to conform 
to the machine. 
However, dagongmei are far from a simple cultural product, and even less so 
are they merely the result of power and discourse or merely a gender construct. 
It is the process of dagongmei becoming a worker-subject, contending against 
the social forces that are trying to shape their subject, in a struggle to return 
as an actor, that forms this subject (Pun, 2000, 2002). The consuming desire of 
 97Discursive Dyslexia and the Articulation of Class
people in rural China to remove themselves from a life of long-term isolation 
coincides perfectly with political techniques used in an attempt to control their 
own physical being. Thus, as actors, rural people undertake actions to change 
their own lives. As a specific class at the bottom of the heap, dagongmei, who 
are characterized by various forms of cooperation, resistance and defiance, 
embody the dual process of domination and resistance. It is this dual process 
that creates the complex, dissident and heterogeneous dagongmei subject 
(Certeau, 1984; Guha and Spivak, 1988; Scott, 1990; Willis, 1981). What they are 
faced with is an inherently incomplete system of dominance, and they have 
come to understand how they should rebel within the tiny cracks between the 
systems of power and discipline (Ong, 1987; Kondo, 1990). Before the disciplin-
ary regime emerges, no matter how powerless they are, dagongmei are not 
merely simple, docile bodies. In fact quite to the contrary, they are agile and 
rebellious bodies, sometimes openly and sometimes covertly resisting against 
hegemony. There are even instances when they are able to turn the disciplinary 
powers on their heads, subverting or even breaking them down. It is certainly 
not my intention here to romanticize these “everyday life practices” (Certeau, 
1984) or “cultural struggles,” but when woven together, the stories and experi-
ences of female factory workers, their pain and suffering, their cries and their 
nightmares—all those do form a moving portrait of “the politics and poetics of 
transgression” (Pun, 2000). 
7 Conclusion 
In short, in contrast to the path of proletarianization taken in the West, in 
China, dagongmei do not undertake organized, open resistance against capi-
tal, nor have they become an important force for opposition. As temporary 
visitors to the city, migrant workers have two important characteristics— 
capriciousness and transience. While they are in the city, these characteris-
tics can form an obstacle in their growth to become a collective class force. 
However, even though the road to the formation of an organized dagong sub-
ject is blocked, as soon as there is an opportunity, the workers will have no 
reservations in undertaking various types of short-term, spontaneous collec-
tive action, such as strikes. When their collective action suffers suppression, it 
will beget and spread all kinds of rebellious collective behaviour, ranging from 
ordinary labor protests to resistance in their everyday lives. 
If we step away from the tendency towards an essentialist reading of 
class, the specific worker-subject of dagongmei not only embodies the rela-
tions of production, but also social and cultural discourse, the relations of 
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consumption, social networks, family relationships, gender metaphors and 
social resistance. If the traditional class subject is the result of a process of 
othering and an abstract political form, this new dagong subject is a “return to 
the actor” (Touraine, 1995, 207). Just as Alain Touraine has argued, he (or she) 
is “a call to transform the self into a social actor,” whilst at the same time the 
subject must still strive to resist erosion by the power of the state and the mar-
ket.7 This is a return to the experience of the individual, the realization of his 
(or her) self-determined status in relation to others. Beginning with this real-
ization, the individual decides to adopt action in collective or individual form. 
This is a firm return to the self, whereby mastering one’s rights as a subject can 
guard against political hegemony. The dagongmei are female worker (dagong) 
subjects, and their social resistance should not be reduced to traditional class 
struggle, because their resistance is not like the workers’ (gongren) struggles 
delineated in the traditional sense. Their social resistance is the opposition of 
workers (dagongzhe, 打工者) to the system and capital, and it is also a chal-
lenge posed by females to the patriarchy. 
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Chapter 5
The Class Formation: Control of Capital and 
Collective Resistance of Chinese Construction 
Workers*
Pun Ngai, Lu Huilin, and Zhang Huipeng**
A Song for Wages Unpaid
Working for a boss, we can take sweltering heat and bitter cold,
But we can’t take no wages.
Workers, don’t stay silent, reticent,
We just need to make our voice heard.
How many years have you given,
Changing the city’s complexion.
We have to fight for our labor rights,
Unite.
Get back our wages.
Written by Da Jun (大军), Construction Worker 
∵
In June 2008, at a construction site at Taoyuan (桃源) Village1 in the suburbs of 
Beijing (北京), a construction worker named Old Zhang (老张) was anxiously 
* (This article was first published in Chinese in Open Times, 2010, No. 5.)
**  The authors of this article would like to extend their deepest gratitude to the follow-
ing people for all of the contributions they have made towards this study: Lian Jiajia, Liu 
Jing, Li Dajun, Liu Xiaohong, Zhou Lijuan, Li Qingsu, Xiao Qiang, Li Ding, Zhang Jieying, 
Wang Dunmeng, and Zhu Qian. This study received the following support: the Hong Kong 
Research Grants Council (HKRGC) research project “Yi ge xin gongren jieji de xingcheng: dui 
huanan diqu sushi laodong tizhi xia jiti xingdong de yanjiu” (The formation of a new work-
ing class: research on collective action within the context of the dormitory regime in the 
south of China); the National Social Sciences Fund project “Nongmingong qunti de jieceng 
xingcheng he shenfen renting” (Migrant workers: class formation and sense of identity), 
(project number 06CSH009); Peking University-Hong Kong Polytechnic University China 
Social Work Research Centre project “Xinyidai nongmingong de shenghuo kongjian: jieji yu 
© Pun Ngai, Lu Huilin, and Zhang Huipeng, 2016 | doi 10.1163/9789004326385_007 
This is an open access chapter distributed under the terms of the CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license.
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waiting for his boss to issue his wages. Back at home, the wheat had already 
fully ripened and was waiting for him to go back and harvest it. Old Zhang 
had been doing construction for over 30 years, and on this occasion, he had 
brought with him around a dozen plasterers from back home to work for his 
head contractor. From the beginning of the Lunar New Year in spring up until 
now, aside from 100–200 yuan in living allowances, they had not yet received 
a penny of their wages. A week ago, Old Zhang went to the head contractor, 
representing over ten workers in requesting that their unpaid wages should be 
cleared up. At the time, the head contractor had been full of promises. The day 
they had agreed on was almost upon them, but the head contractor said that 
for the time being, he didn’t have that much money and asked them to wait a 
bit longer. The workers were angry, but there was nothing they could do, and 
all they could do was agree to wait a few more days. 
The final deadline arrived, but there was no sign of the head contractor. The 
laborers made their way to the project department of the construction com-
pany to demand their money. The manager of the project department called 
the head contractor, telling him to get his skates on and come and deal with the 
issue. Finally, the woman boss (the head contractor’s wife) turned up and was 
surrounded by the workers, who told her to clear up their wages. She said that 
the work on the construction project hadn’t been finished yet, so she couldn’t 
give them their money. She told them to go back home to harvest their wheat 
and come back to the site later to finish off their work there, and only then she 
would give them their wages. The workers were furious at this; one of them 
flung the bowl he had been eating out aggressively to the ground. If it wasn’t for 
the fact that the boss was a woman, it was likely that the workers would have 
already come to blows with her by that point. Several of the workers went off 
to buy hammers and threatened to smash up the work they had already done. 
Some of the workers threatened that they would go to the Bureau of Labor 
(劳动局) and sue the boss. Old Zhang told the woman boss that she had to sort 
out the problem of their wages, for otherwise he didn’t dare to imagine what 
the workers would do in anger. 
At 11 o’clock that evening, the head contractor sent someone over with 
30,000 yuan, saying that in a few days they would be given more, and that the 
rest wages would be cleared up only after the workers returned to Beijing. In 
gongmin yishi de tansuo” (The living space of the new generation of migrant workers: an 
exploration of class consciousness and civic awareness). Pun Ngai: Hong Kong Polytechnic 
University, Department of Applied Social Sciences, Lu Huilin: Peking University, Department 
of Sociology, Zhang Huipeng: Peking University, Department of Sociology.
1 “Taoyuan Village” is a pseudonym.
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a helpless position, all Old Zhang could do was split this money amongst the 
workers and tell them to go back home and harvest their wheat, whilst he him-
self would stay behind and wait for the remaining money. In the early hours 
of the next morning, a little past two o’clock, these workers boarded the bus 
home. 
This scene at Taoyuan Village, both saddening and infuriating, is being 
played out time and time again at construction sites all over the country. It is 
common that the head contractor will conjure up all kinds of ways to send the 
workers back home, promising that their wages would be cleared up at the end 
of the year and even giving them an IOU. However, when the workers turn up 
to demand their wages at the end of the year, they would be beset with setback 
after setback. The head contractor will either claim that there is no money and 
just keep putting them off, or he will simply flat-out refuse to acknowledge the 
debt. Almost every construction worker has had some experience of chasing 
up wages. It would be fair to say that unpaid wages has become a deep-seated 
problem within the construction industry. An analysis of the conflicts and 
clashes connected to the failure to pay wages demands that we broaden our 
horizon to squarely face up to the capitalist relations of production and adopt 
a class perspective, which, though often dismissed as old-hat, can actually be 
something fresh and illuminating. 
1 The Significance of Class Analysis to Chinese Social Science
It is widely known that the centrality of class analysis is a fundamental prin-
ciple of the Marxist doctrine. However, from the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury onwards, almost half a century of development in Western Marxist theory 
has basically created a process of skepticism and refutation of this principle. 
Western left-wing intellectuals have been deeply perplexed by a phenom-
enon within Western society: why is it that the working class, who have been 
accorded hope by Marx, have been so slow to rise up and take up the mission 
that they are apparently meant to shoulder?
In other words, why is it that the revolutionary subjectivity of the working 
class has been so slow to appear? In their attempted explanations, they have 
approached the question “why hasn’t it happened” from different angles, yet 
together they have built an enormous space where deviation may exist between 
class structure, class consciousness, and class action. For Marx, although “class 
in-itself” is differentiated from “class for-itself” (Klasse an sich—Klasse für 
sich), the inherent uniformity of class structure, class-consciousness and class 
action is predetermined. The transformation from “in-itself” to “for-itself” is a 
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naturally occurring historical process. Marx believed that the mode of capital-
ist production would inevitably lead to simplification of the class structure and 
sharp class antagonism: “Our epoch, the epoch of the bourgeoisie, possesses, 
however, this distinctive feature: it has simplified class antagonisms. Society as 
a whole is more and more splitting up into two great hostile camps, into two 
great classes directly facing each other—Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.”2
The revolution foreshadowed by Marx never actually came, but instead quite 
the opposite, following the Second World War, the West ambled towards a path 
of relative prosperity and stability. In order to bridge the chasm between the 
reality of Western social progress and Marxism, Western post-Marxist scholars 
have developed a whole series of elaborate explanations, three of which are 
particularly influential. The first is the theory of “a crisis of ideology,” arguing 
that the capitalist state machine has created a stream of veiled ideology, which 
together with consumerist culture, has successfully obstructed the develop-
ment of the workers’ awareness of class.3 
The second is the theory of “plurality of positions,” which criticizes the 
“economism” and “class reductionism” of traditional Marxism, arguing that 
economic interest is only one of the dimensions by which workers delineate 
their self identity, and that multifarious social factors such as gender, ethnicity, 
religion and culture, all participate in the construction of a worker’s identity. In 
other words, there is no a priori guarantee that workers will come to recognize 
their plight and their interests according to their location in the relations of 
production, let alone undertake class action.4 
The third is the theory of “middle class,” which draws to our attention the 
trend for a process of Western workers becoming middle class. From the per-
spective of economic exploitation, the middle class is in the same position as 
the ordinary worker, in that they do not own the materials of production, and 
share the same attributes as the working class. However, in terms of the alien-
ation experiences during a life of labor, because the middle class can manipu-
late knowledge, skills and organization, and has a certain amount of autonomy 
at work, it is less common for them to feel the alienation experienced by 
2 Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, tr. Central Compilation and Translation Bureau 
for the Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin (1964) Beijing, People’s Publishing House.
3 Lukács, G. History and Class Consciousness [1922] tr. Du Zhangzhi, (1999) Beijing, The 
Commercial Press (Ch); Gramsci, A Gelanxi wenxuan, (Selected Works of Gramsci), tr. Central 
Compilation and Translation Bureau for the Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, (1992) 
Beijing, People’s Publishing House (Ch); Wood, E. M. The Retreat from Class: A New ‘True’ 
Socialism, tr. Shang Qingfei, (2008) Beijing, Suzhou People’s Publishing House (Ch). 
4 Laclau, E. and Mouffe, C., Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, London: Verso, (1985).
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the working class. Thus the class positioning of the middle class is more 
contradictory and vague.5
Placing the blame for the loss of the workers’ revolutionary nature on capi-
talist ideology constructs the independence and dominance of politics and 
ideology. For this very reason, these scholars have been eager to view Maoism 
(毛泽东思想) during the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命) as some kind 
of magic wand, and they use the ideology of socialism as a weapon to resist 
against capitalist hegemony. However, in doing this, what they were actually 
doing was departing from the essence of Marx’s class analysis and removing 
the relations of production and exploitation from their central place in social 
structure. The middle class theory looked at the changes that occurred in the 
structure of Western societies themselves. However, it was lacking a third world 
perspective. As such, it failed to grasp the nature of class formation in the West 
as the historical phase that it was in the context of inequality in the division of 
labor in the global economy. In fact, quite to the contrary, this made it easy to 
view class formation in Western societies as simply a matter of course. From 
this perspective, post-Marxists overlook the structural changes that happened 
within Western societies, whilst at the same time, over-exaggerating the util-
ity of ideology. Bidding farewell to the working class in the West was not just 
a consequence of ideology, and it also had an objective social basis. In short, 
the first world of the West exploited the third world, and to a great extent class 
contradictions were transformed into contradictions between nation states 
in order to maintain an enormous army of emergent middle class workers, 
thus weakening the revolutionary subject of the working class. At the same 
time, in third world countries, this shift had caused even more serious class 
contradictions. 
Returning to China, the Reform and Opening (改革开放) has been a grad-
ual and historical process, drawing China into the global capitalist system. As 
China has become the factory of the world and the construction site of the 
world literally, a two hundred million strong group of migrant workers has 
been formed. Over 30 years, these workers and the lives they face have attracted 
widespread attention and have even become a major issue with which Chinese 
social science is commonly concerned. However, there is important diver-
gence in opinion over critical questions like the social status of migrant work-
ers and the causes that have led to the plight that they face. One of the central 
arguments is whether or not we should use a class perspective to look at the 
migrant worker problem. 
5 Wright, E.O., The Debate on Classes, London and New York, Verso, 1989.
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The dividing line between the social stratum perspective that currently 
occupies a mainstream position and the new class perspective is not whether 
the relations of capitalist production exist within the Chinese experience. 
Instead, it is in the different verdicts about the nature of society and social 
conflict within the capitalist relations of production, and in whether the social 
conflicts today are built on the basis of fundamentally antithetical interests, or 
whether they can be mediated or avoided. A social stratum perspective refutes 
the structural factors of the antagonism inherent in the capitalist relations of 
production and argues for the possibility of mediation between the interests 
of different social stratum and of social mobility. The social stratum perspec-
tive eagerly awaits solutions to the migrant worker problem through channels 
such as improvement of allocation systems, better legislation and law enforce-
ment, and an improvement in the level of migrant workers’ education. In other 
words, they believe that through tireless efforts to create a better institutional 
culture, social conflict can be mediated. 
Some scholars even perceive the very appearance of migrant workers to be a 
manifestation of the upwards social movement of peasants and do not pay the 
slightest bit of attention to the exploitative relationship behind the creation 
of this kind of migration. A classic example of this is the explanation offered 
by Xu Jing’an (徐景安), the author of Zhongguo Zouxiang (中国走向, trans. as 
Trends in China): “No judgment about China’s reforms can escape from the 
context specific to China, and what is particularly important to get straight is 
that we are currently in the midst of a historical phase. . . . but migrant workers 
think ‘this is always going to be an improvement on the countryside,’ they actu-
ally like being exploited. It’s not just that migrant workers lack ‘class aware-
ness,’ the whole of China is the same—more than happy to be the factory of 
the world, welcoming capitalist exploitation.” 
A class perspective, on the other hand, gives prominence to the structural 
basis of the conflicts of interest inherent in the relations of capitalist produc-
tion, emphasizing the unavoidable labor conflict between the capitalist class 
and the working class. It argues that only if the lost, misplaced, and twisted class 
discourse is rescued, can we directly face up to and respond to the structural 
roots that produce conflicts of interest and create social injustice. According 
to the class perspective, the migrant worker problem is mainly a manifestation 
of the unequal relationship between the capitalist, who occupies the means of 
production, and the laborer, who has lost the means of production. Proposing 
the issue of migrant workers not only presents the need to deal with the com-
mon topic of class conflict within the capitalist relations of production, but 
it also pays particularly close attention to a special subject, which has been 
formed owing to the making of the Chinese working class in the process of 
post-socialist transformation. 
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The class perspective argues that any solution to the migrant worker prob-
lem is inevitably linked to the birth and resistance of a migrant worker class 
subject, that any solution is inextricably linked to changes in and the rebuild-
ing of capitalist social relations, and that any solutions are also inseparable 
from substantive change in the relations of production and allocation within 
the structural status quo. Shen Yuan (沈原), in an article entitled “Social 
Transformation and the Reproduction of the Working Class” (“社会转型与工
人阶级的再生产”) advances a class perspective for understanding the migrant 
worker problem. Shen proposes that capitalism, through its expropriation of 
the means of production and the relations of production, in the end finds it 
impossible to avoid causing the exploitation of labor. Those migrant workers 
who work in foreign invested or private enterprises in the coastal regions of 
China are currently forming a working class in the Marxist sense of the term. 
Aside from selling their own labor to capital, they have nothing.6
The paradox is in that, right at the moment when Western social theory has 
been bidding farewell to the working class, China has been in the midst of gen-
uinely facing the process of the difficult birth of an enormous working class. In 
order to clear the way for a neo-liberal discourse that emphasizes individual-
ism, professionalism, equal opportunities, and open markets, the discourse of 
class in China was, intentionally or otherwise, distorted or stifled. In this sense, 
for the two hundred million migrant workers who have been hurled into the 
relations of capitalist production, there is really something in the notion of 
“having been born at the wrong time.” However, they are using the most direct, 
spontaneous forms of resistance against the exploitation that has been forced 
upon them, tenaciously revealing to the world the class structure and class 
antagonism that have been concealed by multiple forces, and they are calling 
for the legitimacy of their own existence as a class. 
For two years by now, we have been researching migrant workers on con-
struction sites—their negative encounters, their feelings, and their live expe-
riences of labor, life and resistance. This research has compelled us to revive 
the class perspective, which is apparently “behind the times.” We came to see 
that from “in-itself” to “for-itself” the complex, changeable relations between 
class structure, class awareness, and class action would be a thorny process, 
a constant trial of strength against mainstream ideology, but nothing could 
cancel out the necessity or centrality of a class perspective. In fact we came 
further towards understanding the great significance of the class perspective 
to Chinese social research. 
6 Shen Yuan “Shehui zhuanxing yu gongren jieji de zaixingcheng” (Social Transformation and 
the Reproduction of the Working Class) in Sociological Studies, No. 2, 2006, (Ch). 
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2 The Concept of Class and Class Formation 
To Marx, class is a notion of antagonistic relations caused by different posses-
sion of the means of production. One of the two opposed parties is the capital-
ist. Capitalists rely upon squeezing the surplus from labor to achieve growth in 
their capital; they reproduce capital relations on an expanded scale by mak-
ing expansions in the scale of reproduction or accumulation. The other party 
is made up of hired workers—the proletariat, which depends on selling their 
own labor to obtain the means to live. Marx went further to point out that 
meaning of proletariat implies freedom in two different senses: “As a free man 
he can dispose of his labor-power as his own commodity, and that on the other 
hand he has no other commodity for sale, is short of everything necessary for 
the realization of his labor power.”7
Marx’s concept of class is built upon the objective class structure of the 
capitalist relations of production, and what is emphasized is the conflicts of 
interest and the clashes inherent between the working class and the capital-
ist class. He does not, however, pay particular attention to how working class 
consciousness is formed, and how the self-identity and the emotional lean-
ings of the working class impact upon their collective action. In other words, 
Marx did not provide us with a theory from a micro-perspective to explain the 
mechanism behind the formation of class. As such, we draw on the treatises of 
Thompson and Katznelson to complement our explanation. 
The Making of the English Working Class is dedicated to solving the problem 
of the mechanism by which class is formed. Thompson points out, “The work-
ing class made itself as much as it was made.” What he emphasizes is the initia-
tive of the workers themselves within the class formation process, highlighting 
in particular the important role of the workers’ labor and life experiences 
in the process, by which class consciousness develops. At the same time, he 
emphasizes that the formation of class is a dynamic historical process: “If we 
stop history at a given point, then there are no classes but simply a multitude of 
individuals with a multitude of experiences . . . Class is defined by men as they 
live their own history, and, in the end, this is the only definition.” Thus “class 
itself is not a thing, it is a happening.”8 Thompson understands this moving 
historical process as the process of class struggle. It is only through long-term 
7 Marx, Das Kapital, tr. Central Compilation and Translation Bureau for the Works of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin (1964) Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 2004, 192, (Ch). 
8 Thompson, E. P., The Poverty of Theory: and Other Essays, New York, Monthly Review Press, 
1978, 295.
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conflict and learning through struggle that the formation of class can be 
completed in the end. 
Katznelson, having made comparative studies of the history of the forma-
tion of class in different countries, including Germany, France and America, 
went further to propose four levels upon which we can understand the for-
mation of class: class structure, socio-economic organization, shared dispo-
sitions, and collective action.9 He posits that in any given space and time of 
history within different societies, the formation of class will reveal different 
kinds of complex and changeable forms. However, the prerequisite conditions 
provided by the capitalist relations of production for the formation of class 
are the most fundamental, in that they decide the different positions within a 
society. In short, they establish a society’s class structure. 
Class structure, together with socio-economic organization, builds for us an 
understanding of the formation of class on a socio-economic level. The class 
map built by these two levels is mainly one of the objective position of a person 
within the networks of relationships shaped by the ownership of the means of 
production—his or her labor, dwelling, and lifestyle. However, there is still no 
way to locate the positions of consciousness, culture, or politics on this kind 
of class map. The levels of disposition and collective action manage to make 
up for this major shortcoming. Shared dispositions are the thoughts and feel-
ings formed by workers on the basis of their experiences of life and labor. They 
pertain to judgments about how the social structure should be viewed, how to 
understand justice, how to see the reasons behind the creation of the current 
situation of the workers, and whether or not this can be changed. 
Katznelson takes care to point out that when it comes to the level of collec-
tive action, we must be mindful that workers with shared dispositions will not 
necessarily automatically move towards jointly undertaking collective action. 
Workers’ use of collective action in the form of movements and organization 
has exerted influence on society and thus changed their own fate, which is 
a constant process of mobilization and triumphs in overcoming obstacles. 
Disposition and collective action constitute the cultural and political level 
upon which we can understand the formation of class. If we combine this with 
the socio-economic level, then we acquire a more comprehensive and at the 
same time more complex view to understand the formation of class. 
9 Katznelson, I. and Zolberg, A. R., Working-class Formation: Nineteenth-century Patterns in 
Western Europe and the United States, Princeton University Press, 1986.
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3 On the Construction Sites with the Workers
Through 30 years of Reform and Opening, China has already become the con-
struction site of the world. China, at present, has the world’s largest construc-
tion market: the volume of construction accounts for over half of the world’s 
construction; the volume of consumption of concrete and reinforcement 
metal accounts for half and one third of world consumption respectively.10 
The rumbling great construction sites have contributed to the emergence of a 
breathtaking material culture and made a striking contribution to China’s eco-
nomic growth. For years by now, the construction industry, combined with the 
real estate industry, has continued to be an important branch of the national 
economy. In 2008, for example, the contribution made by the construction 
industry and the real estate industry to the growth of GDP exceeded 10%.11 
However, construction workers like Old Zhang, whose blood and sweat have 
been shed on these great construction sites, have never received the attention 
they should deserve. 
It was at the end of 2007 that we began to venture onto the construction 
sites, coming into contact with construction workers on a large scale. We 
selected Taoyuan Village in the suburbs of Beijing as the location for our 
fieldwork. Taoyuan Village is situated to the northeast of Beijing, outside the 
Fifth Ring Road, and is typical as a community of people not local to the area. 
According to government plans, this village is on the verge of being demol-
ished, and a large-scale development and construction of commercial hous-
ing is about to begin. When we first went to this village, the expropriation of 
agricultural land had already been completed, and the first signs of a group of 
mansions had appeared on the northern side of the village. The construction 
workers were in the middle of working overtime to make sure they hit the com-
pletion date. The construction site was in a flurry of activities, enveloped in 
dust. Each evening, a large number of construction workers were to be found 
on the main road to the north of the village. It was this construction site and 
these workers that captured our gaze, turning our attention to this particular 
construction site and these workers. 
It was as we attempted to approach the construction site and got closer to 
the construction workers that we realized that their plight was in fact far worse 
than we had once imagined. Although the new Labor Contract Law (劳动合
10   Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development. Website: http://www.cin.gov.cn/
ldjh/jsbfld/200809/t20080924_177077.htm.
11   Speech by an official from the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development, see: 
http://www.hsw.cn/news/2008-03/17/content_6865658.htm. 
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同法) had already come into effect, almost none of the workers on this site 
had a labor contract. They would work for over ten hours a day, their work 
was intense, and their living conditions, including what they were eating, were 
poor. Even harder to accept was that they were not even able to get their wages 
each month. Even worse, they worked away a whole year, but they could not 
even get their hands on their wages at the end of the year. Over a period of 
two years, we focused our visits on five of Beijing’s construction sites, came 
into contact with over 1,000 workers, and interviewed over 100 of them. The 
majority of these workers came from major labor-exporting provinces includ-
ing Hebei, Henan, Shandong, Sichuan, Jiangsu and Hubei. The majority of our 
interviewees were men, but we did interview a small number of women, and 
almost every type of work was represented amongst our participants—who 
were both skilled and unskilled workers—including carpentry, steel work, 
work with cement, plastering, and plumbing. We also interviewed head con-
tractors, company management, project managers and so on. Our research 
did not stop at the construction sites: we also made use of the Chinese New 
Year, the spring wheat harvesting, and the autumn harvest season, following 
the construction workers back to their respective homes in the countryside. 
Altogether, we undertook research in rural China three times, going to four 
different areas of countryside in Baoding (保定) and Xingtai (邢台), both in 
Hebei Province (河北省). 
Construction workers are China’s new working class subjects. According to 
the second national economic census of 2009, by the end of 2008, China had 
a total of 39,011,000 people working in the construction industry, amongst 
whom those working on-site actually doing the construction work were 
basically all migrant workers. Drawing on both the theories of Marxism 
and Western Post-Marxism to inform our perspective, we attempt to locate 
China’s migrant worker problem within the larger context of the historical 
processes of social transformation, and the formation of the working class. 
The central question, the one with which we are most concerned, is that of 
the process of proletarianization. Aside from sharing the basic characteristic 
of being migrant workers, construction workers also have their own impor-
tant characteristics as a group. In comparison with the factory workers in 
southern China, these construction workers had much closer links with the 
countryside. Many of them, during busy seasons in farming, also engage 
in agricultural production, and they most identify with a rural or farming 
identity. These characteristics of construction workers enabled us to bet-
ter observe the difficult process of proletarianization of the migrant worker 
group, as well as the many different obstacles and resistances they encounter 
as a new working class in formation. 
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In this article, we observe and investigate how, within the context of the 
multi-layered subcontracting system, capital controls labor, and how workers 
carry out resistance. What are the particular characteristics of construction 
workers’ resistance? How do the experiences of workers, which are accumu-
lated over long periods of time in their daily lives, form their class conscious-
ness? And how do the state and capital shape the new working class? What 
kind of class identity and subjectivity will workers possess? We carry out our 
investigation from a perspective encompassing the interactions of all three 
parties: the state, capital, and laborers. 
4 The Semi-Proletarianization of China’s Migrant Workers
The class formation of China’s migrant workers displays both similarities to the 
experiences of Western industrializing nations and its own historical unique-
ness. After 30 years, the proletarianization of China’s migrant workers remains 
unfinished, so that a vast army of hired laborers has been sunk into the plight 
of “semi-proletarianization.”
Marx drew upon the experiences of Britain to understand the formation 
of the working class. In Britain at that time, as the industrial revolution got 
underway, large swarms of labor moved from the countryside to the towns and 
cities, and peasants were transformed into workers. What Marx concentrates 
on in Das Kapital is the conflict between workers and capital. He argues that 
the exploitation of the workers’ surplus value by capital will spark resistance 
from the workers, transforming them from a class in-itself to a class for-itself. 
It is within the conflict between capital and labor that Marx understands capi-
talism. The capital to which he refers to is capital in the typical sense; and the 
labor that he understands is labor built on the foundations of a free and equal 
social contract. An equal contractual relationship has been arrived at between 
the worker and the capitalist.12
However, since the beginning of the Reform and Opening, the reality in 
China is that the process of industrialization has triggered great waves of 
labor moving from the countryside to the towns and cities, but institutional-
ized obstacles mean that this labor force has no way of truly transforming into 
12   Chakrabarty, D. “Gongren jieji shenghuo he gongzuo zhuangkuang de renzhi tiaojian: 
1890–1940 nianjian jia’erda de guzhu, zhengfu he huangma gongren” (Rethinking Working 
Class Living and Working Conditions: 1890–1940 the employers of Calcutta, government 
and jute workers) in Subaltern Studies, Liu Jianzhi and Xu Zhaolin (eds.), Beijing, Central 
Compilation and Translation Press, 2005, (Ch). 
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workers. It is hard for a free and equal contractual relationship to get estab-
lished between themselves and capital. The emergence of migrant workers is a 
phenomenon difficult for Marxist theory to deal with. In today’s China, prole-
tarianization is a process not merely manipulated by capital, but what is even 
more difficult to ignore is the important role played by the state. 
The laborer of Marxism is a labor subject in possession of labor relations. 
The process of the subsumption of labor under capital, which Marx addresses, 
occurs after the laborer has entered the field of production, and the result of 
subsumption is the expropriation of the value of labor by capital. Meanwhile, 
for the migrant workers who form part of our discussion today, before they 
have even entered the field of production, their labor relations and identity as 
a labor subject have already experienced the process of subsumption under 
the state and the Chinese system. After they have stepped into the city and into 
the field of production, they are faced with a further process of subsumption 
under capital. In other words, China’s migrant workers have experienced a pro-
cess of “double subsumption.” This means that the extent of the expropriation 
of their labor value is much more serious. 
In order to adopt a class perspective with which to understand today’s 
migrant construction workers, aside from developing an understanding 
of class structure and class relations on a macro-level, we must also under-
stand the complex process of the formation of their class identity and status. 
Although the great majority of the migrant workers working within the con-
struction industry have a plot of land back at home in the countryside, from 
the perspective of the relations of production, they have already become typi-
cal hired workers, no different to the proletariat in Lenin’s analysis of Russia 
a century earlier: “(All they have is) insignificant farming on a patch of land, 
with the farm in a state of utter ruin, unable to exist without the sale of labor-
power, an extremely low standard of living (probably lower even than that of 
the worker without an allotment).”13
From the perspective of identity, China’s migrant workers have become 
thrown into an extremely sorry state. On one hand, because a certain amount 
of rural land has been retained, the reproduction of migrant workers’ labor has 
partially been left with the countryside to deal with. Thus the state and capital 
are constantly strengthening their rural identity. On the other hand, in the city, 
they have no legitimate identity as a labor subject; the state is also absent in the 
process of their reproduction of labor. They are neither peasants nor workers, 
13   Lenin, “The Development of Capitalism in Russia” in Collected Works, Vol. 3 tr. Central 
Compilation and Translation Bureau for the Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin 
(1984) Beijing, People’s Publishing House, p. 147, (Ch). 
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so their identity has become ambiguous. Returning to Marx’s reflections on 
the alienation of labor, the alienation to which Marx referred was alienation 
within the field of production: because the laborer and the means of produc-
tion were separate, the laborer had no way of controlling his (or her) own labor 
process or the products of that labor. However, for the migrant workers today, 
aside from alienation in the Marxist sense, there is a further kind of alienation 
on a deeper level, which is the alienation of their being labor subjects yet with 
an identity as migrant workers (nongmingong, 农民工). What migrant workers 
are experiencing is a process of double alienation. 
For construction workers in China today, the distinctiveness of the forma-
tion of the working class is precisely that they are locked in a state of double 
subsumption and double alienation. The state system, by maintaining their 
identity as nongmingong, is already demeaning the value of their labor before 
capital even gets to expropriating their labor value. The migrant worker iden-
tity represents a lowly social subject status. Before they enter the field of pro-
duction in the city, they have already been branded as second-class citizens 
and inferior laborers. This is the political secret behind the identity of contem-
porary China’s migrant workers, who exist in a state of semi-proletarianization. 
This is the harming effect that the system has upon them, and this harm is fur-
ther used by capital, becoming a basis for capital to better control and exploit 
construction workers. 
5 The Transformation of the Relations of Production in the 
Construction Industry 
After 30 years of Reform and Opening, profound changes have occurred within 
the Chinese economic structure. The non-public ownership economy has seen 
enormous development; even state-owned and collectively-owned enterprises 
have, through reform, transformed their style of operation. The aim of the lat-
ter has transformed from seeking social benefit to seeking economic benefit, 
and there is already very little difference between their labor relations and 
those of non-public owned enterprises. Following on from this, fundamen-
tal changes have occurred in the production relations that dominate Chinese 
society. This transformation is most clearly visible in the construction industry. 
Within the construction sector, before the reforms, China’s construction 
projects were all taken on by state-run construction companies. All of the 
funds needed for the construction projects were allocated from state finances 
and were incorporated into the fixed assets investments of that year. The work-
ers in construction companies were, for the most part, fixed workers, who 
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collected their wages on a monthly basis. They had similar social status and 
welfare allocations as those enjoyed by staff at state-owned enterprises in 
other industries. Under the labor relations of the socialist era, construction 
enterprises were not simply a place where production took place, and they 
were also a place that took care of their people. They would take responsibil-
ity for cradle-to-grave welfare and security. At the same time, at an ideological 
level, the state was propagating the notion that members of the working class 
were the masters of the country, taking great care to develop class sentiments. 
Labor was championed as honorable, and the labor value of those doing man-
ual labor was respected. 
The construction industry was the earliest to introduce economic reforms. 
From the beginning of the 1980s, the state started to introduce a whole series 
of major reform measures towards marketization in the construction indus-
try. The management system was restructured, the construction market was 
opened up, state-owned construction companies were permitted to manage 
themselves independently, and mechanisms were established for competi-
tive bidding for construction projects. With the guidance of state policy, came 
the burgeoning of a modern contracting system. The contractors from within 
state-owned enterprises were out on their own, becoming independent from 
the enterprises at which they were originally based, and the enterprises began 
to hire rural labor, which was to become one of the first groups of modern 
contract workers. Meanwhile, some tradesmen who were teaching more inex-
perienced workers or apprentices in the countryside also began to lead people 
away from their own villages to find work in urban areas. This formed another 
enormous army of contracted labor. These earliest teams of contractors com-
pleted the primitive accumulation of capital.14
Along with the change in the composition of the system of ownership of 
these enterprises were changes in the system of using labor in the construction 
industry. In accordance with national plans for reform, state-owned construc-
tion enterprises were, on an enormous scale, to use rural laborers as teams of 
contractors. At the same time, they were to recruit great swarms of rural labor-
ers as contracted workers to replace the fixed workers. The proportion of fixed 
14   At that time, the earliest group of head contractors emerged in China; they became one 
of the first groups to become wealthy. It was common that these people had a low level 
of education, and they were not from influential family backgrounds, but relying upon 
contracting construction projects, they built up fortunes almost over night, engendering a 
flood of success stories. It was the policies of the state that made these people. On today’s 
construction sites, it is still possible to hear people speak of their stories from those days. 
Nowadays, these people have already become bigger fish as capitalists.
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workers within state-owned enterprises shot down, and they were gradually 
separated from the frontline of production, becoming the company’s skilled 
and management staff. Following this, construction companies began to draw 
heavily on armies of rural contracted workers led by head contractors, forming 
a system of recruiting and using labor shaped by layer upon layer of subcon-
tracting in the construction industry. 
The market reforms in the construction industry also meant changes in 
the relations of production. The construction workers today are already com-
pletely different from workers in the state-owned enterprises during the social-
ist era. They possess no means of production and are already free to the extent 
that they have nothing. All they can do is rely on selling their labor to support 
themselves and their families. For them, their wage income from working on 
the construction sites has already become the main source of their family’s 
income. Their relationship to the boss of the company is entirely one of hired 
labor. They are the subjects of China’s new working class. 
6 The Subcontracting Labor System and the Control of Labor
In contemporary China, construction workers are entirely typical as hired 
laborers, whilst at the same time the multi-layered subcontracting system of 
the construction industry thrusts workers into an unusual dilemma, in which 
their labor relations have gone astray. The control of labor by capital reflects 
not only universal characteristics but also characteristics particular to China. 
In today’s construction industry, regardless of the region in which a construc-
tion site is found, the type of construction or the form of capital, the frontline 
work is almost entirely taken on by teams of contracted rural workers, with 
the head contractor at the heart of operations. Under this system, hundreds of 
thousands or even millions of migrant workers from rural China have poured 
into the cities to become construction workers. Often, these migrant workers 
will be led to the construction site by individual head contractors. They partici-
pate in production under the direct management of this head contractor and 
then collect their wages from the same person. 
Multi-layered subcontracting is a fundamental characteristic of the subcon-
tracting labor system in China today. Following layer upon layer of subcon-
tracting, a kind of temporary management hierarchy in the form of a pyramid 
is created on the construction site. At the very top level of this pyramid is the 
developer (or in a municipal government project, the government), and at 
the very bottom are the construction workers. In between are multiple levels 
composed of construction companies, labor agencies, contractor teams, those 
leading the workers and so on. There are at least four levels and at most over 
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ten. In Figure 5.1, we have used a simplified five-layer contracting system to 
further illustrate the basic structure of this labor subcontracting system. 
The developer is located right at the very top of the subcontracting system. 
This is the party that initiated the entire construction project, yet they have 
almost no involvement in the actual construction work. Instead they adopt 
methods such as inviting tenders, to contract the work out to one or more con-
struction companies. On the basis that they fit the qualifications required for 
the construction project, the construction company putting in the lowest bid 
will normally be successful. 
After the construction company has taken over the specific construction 
project, they will only participate in part of the management of the project. 
The specific production tasks are often broken down and further subcon-
tracted to other construction companies; these companies then subcontract 
the work out again to specialist labor agencies or to individual teams of con-
tracted workers. Some of these teams of contracted workers do not have the 
requisite qualifications to undertake the construction, but may instead be affil-
iated underneath labor agencies that do qualify, taking a backdoor approach to 
begin work on the project.15 
15   See “Baogongtou zhidu de lishi chengyin yu zhidu quxiang” (The historical reasons behind 
the formation of the head contractor system, and the orientation of the system) in 
Figure 5.1 Basic structure of the subcontracting system.
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The labor agencies, or the top-level head contractor, may be directly respon-
sible for the recruitment and management of workers, or they may again 
break the project down and subcontract out to a smaller-scale head contrac-
tor. Finally, following layer upon layer of subcontracting, they directly come 
into contact with the head contractor of the workers or the daigong (带工, 
the person leading the workers), who are the direct managers of the construc-
tion project.16 They are not only responsible for the recruitment of workers, 
but also completely in charge of setting the specific plans for daily production, 
assigning tasks, supervising the labor process and so on. In addition to all of 
these, after the labor process has been completed, they must also be either 
entirely or partially responsible for settling wages. 
The subcontracted labor system of the construction industry has a whole 
series of effects upon both the control and resistance of labor on the construc-
tion site.
6.1 Multi-Layered Subcontracting: Who Is the Boss?
In this multi-layered subcontracting system for the recruitment and use of 
labor, workers are introduced onto the construction site by someone from the 
same village back in rural China. They follow the head contractor as they get 
on with their work, and during their time both on the job and outside of work, 
they will often only come into contact with this head contractor. They regard 
this head contractor as their own boss. After multi-layered subcontracting and 
re-subcontracting, head contractors of all sizes on the spectrum span the gap 
between worker and the construction company, obscuring the real labor rela-
tions. The direct result of this is that when a labor dispute arises, the workers 
do not know who their own boss is. 
In March 2009, at the Beijing Wenquan Zhen Beichen (北京温泉镇北辰) 
construction site, competing against a bitterly cold wind, a construction 
worker named Shi Dongdong, climbed up a tower crane, threatening to take his 
own life. His intention was to fight back for a compensation payment he was 
owed after an accident at work. Shi Dongdong came from Jiangsu Province. In 
October 2008, he accompanied a head contractor named Li Longfa from the 
Information of China Construction, 2007, No. 1, 51, Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural 
Development, Policy Research Center Research Team (Ch).
16   Daigong (or person leading the workers), is a term often used by the workers themselves. 
It refers to those who are responsible for recruiting ordinary workers, yet they are not 
head contractors themselves. The daigong are often like ordinary workers, themselves 
participating in labor, whilst their wages are slightly higher than that of an ordinary 
worker. 
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same village to a construction site in Beijing’s Beichen, to work as a carpen-
ter. The main contractor of the construction project was the Beijing Liujian 
Construction Group (北京六建集团), whilst the labor agency was a company 
named Beijing Hongjia Jianzhu Gongcheng (北京鸿佳建筑工程). To begin 
with, in the same way as other workers, Shi Dongdong knew only his own head 
contractor, Li Longfa, his fellow villager. He knew absolutely nothing at all 
about the developer, the contractor, the construction company, or the relation-
ship between them. In December 2008, Shi Dongdong fell from the building 
whilst working 10 metres above the ground. The doctors diagnosed him with a 
cracked pelvic bone. Following this unexpected work injury, the project man-
ager of the company refused to acknowledge that Shi Dongdong was one of 
their workers, instead claiming that Shi had been brought there by one of the 
head contractors, Li Longfa. Li, the project manager argued, should be respon-
sible, and the matter had nothing to do with the company. Shi Dongdong went 
twice to the Bureau of Labor, but the personnel working there reasoned that 
there had not been a labor contract, and there was not sufficient evidence. It 
was on this basis that they refuse to accept the case. For the next six months, 
Shi Dongdong made strenuous efforts and was put through the mill, just to 
prove his own identity as a worker.
6.2 Divide and Conquer—Breaking the Whole into Parts
The multi-layered subcontracting system for recruiting and using labor not 
only masks labor relations, but also breaks up the whole project, shattering it 
into fragments, and as a result the strength of the workers’ resistance is whit-
tled down. As a major defining feature of post-Fordism, this flexible manu-
facturing model, based on specialist subcontracting, can actually be seen in 
a great many different industries. Yet it is most obvious in the construction 
industry and is far more extreme there. This multi-layered subcontracting sys-
tem not only enables capital to achieve flexible accumulation by splitting up 
the construction project, it also causes the division of workers, making it easier 
for capital to control them. 
The multi-layered subcontracting system first separates the workers into 
different teams of contracted workers, and at the same time creates divisions 
within the teams themselves. A relatively large-scale team of contracted work-
ers are usually made up of people from different parts of China, split up and 
led by their respective overseers. Although they all share the same boss, work 
together, and usually eat and live together, the workers’ social comings and 
goings are still based on place-of-origin networks, which act as a bond between 
them. This leads to the formation of different relationships, some close, and 
others distant. In some instances, people from different places live in the same 
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dormitories, but they communicate very little with one another. Added to this 
is that workers move around very frequently, so it is difficult for people from 
different areas to form meaningful relationships, and it is hard for them to 
establish feelings of trust for each other. At the construction site in Taoyuan 
Village, Old Jin, a supervisor with a great wealth of experience, explained to 
us that the boss usually selected workers from different areas: in this way, even 
if some of the workers were to make trouble, the other workers would not go 
along with them and make a bigger noise, which meant that it would not affect 
the progress of the whole construction project. 
6.3 The Misappropriation of Place-of-Origin Ties
On the construction site, the relationship between the workers and the boss is 
that of employer-employee. However, it is common for place-of-origin ties and 
friendships between workers and their boss, or workers and the management 
staff, to blur their relationships in terms of rights, interests and obligation. The 
place-of-origin ties are used by capital, which then becomes able to achieve 
the aim of controlling the workers through the head contractor. 
It is precisely the existence of this type of relationship that makes the boss 
refuse to pay the workers’ wages monthly. Instead they put it off until the 
completion of the construction project, or even until the end of the lunar year 
when the workers return home. What was originally a conflict within the field 
of production is shifted outside of the place of production, again weakening 
the consciousness and strength of the workers’ resistance. 
On the construction site, the relationship between the workers and the 
boss is mainly reflected in the relations of production. Any problems that per-
tain to direct economic interests can be brought to the table for discussion. 
However, after returning to the countryside community, the environment in 
which they find themselves has changed: the place-of-origin and friendship 
ties between the workers and their boss are more pronounced, and they are 
constrained by the norms of their local society. There is a common saying 
about this kind of society of acquaintances: “In the countryside you know 
everybody, and you’re always going to bump into someone sooner or later.” 
The norms of this kind of localized society can constrain the head contrac-
tor, and similarly they have an inhibiting effect on the workers. People care 
about “face,” and it is not deemed good to upset or embarrass others, or to 
take things too far. In Yao Village, Hebei Province, many people showed to us 
old outstanding IOUs. The person who owed them money was a head con-
tractor from the same village. A fifty-year-old worker told us that every year 
when it came to Chinese New Year, he would make his way to the house of the 
head contractor and ask for his money. The head contractor would always say 
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he had none. The years passed, and in the end even the worker himself was 
too embarrassed to go to the head contractor’s again. Here, we can see that 
the place-of-origin relationships within pre-modern society can become a 
resource within modern society, misappropriated by capital to seek the great-
est possible benefit. 
In summary, the fundamental nature of the subcontracting labor system of 
the construction industry is that it is obscuring. Under the subcontracting labor 
system, the relationship between the head contractor and the workers, based 
on the society in their local village, obscures the labor relations between work-
ers and capital. To migrant construction workers, the dividing line between 
resistance against a boss and showing tolerance and restraint for a relative or 
an acquaintance is often totally blurred. “Boss” reflects a kind of labor relation-
ship, whilst “relative” and “acquaintance” connote interpersonal relationships 
that belong to a pre-industrial society. When labor relations and interpersonal 
relationships become interwoven, it is common for workers to be able to see 
only the interpersonal relationship, leaving them unable to get any kind of a 
clear view of the labor relations. 
Marx and those who have followed him have already provided us with pene-
trating analysis into obscurity as the fundamental nature of the capitalist labor 
system, proposing that the essence of the capitalist labor process is the simul-
taneous securing and obscuring of surplus value.17 However, the obscurity in 
the construction industry has a further layer of meaning: capital obscures not 
only the surplus value but also the labor relations, and by obscuring the iden-
tity of migrant workers as workers, it secures even greater surplus value. In 
Marx’s time, exploitation was manifested through the extension of working 
hours and increases to the intensity of work in order to squeeze out as much 
surplus value as possible. Making good on the value of labor—namely, wages 
being issued on time—was not a major problem. However, under the subcon-
tracting labor system, making good on the value of labor is spread out over 
time or is delayed, and sometimes it does not happen at all. By not paying out 
when wages are due, capital uses the cheapest possible option to secure the 
profits from the work of the laborer. The existence of the subcontracting labor 
system means that as today’s construction workers actually enter into capital-
ist relations of production, their labor relations are being obscured one layer 
at a time, until in the end they are plunged into the plight of losing their labor 
relations altogether. 
17   Burawoy, M., Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly 
Capitalism, tr. Lin Zonghong et al., Taipei, Socio Publishing Co. Ltd., 2005, 154 (Ch).
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7 Antagonism between Labor and Capital 
Marx asserts that capital eschews the absence of profit or very small profit in 
the same way that “nature abhors a vacuum, and that with adequate profit, 
capital is very bold”.18 But capital’s profit, in the end, comes from labor and 
the surplus value produced by the laborer. Capitalist production, in essence, 
is the production of surplus value and the exploitation of the laborer. In order 
to chase profit, different capital subjects will enter into intense competition 
between them. The law inherent to this competition is like a coercive force, 
urging capitalists to constantly raise the intensity of labor, and to lengthen the 
hours of labor, squeezing as much surplus value from the laborers themselves 
as possible. However, when capital’s exploitation of the worker surpasses the 
worker’s bottom line, this will spark the resistance of the worker. 
Marx’s depiction of the inherent quality of capitalism’s greed was based 
upon the 18th Century factories of Britain. In 21st Century China, within the 
construction industry, we have come to find alarming similarities with history. 
China’s real estate industry has only sprung up in the past decade or so. Yet this 
has been a period of rapidly expanding wealth, and real estate has become a 
veritable cornucopia. At the same time as capital in real estate and capital in 
construction have become rich overnight, vast numbers of construction work-
ers have found themselves sunk into a position entirely without any safety 
net. Under the construction industry’s multi-layered subcontracting system of 
using labor, a construction project is separated layer by layer. From the little 
guy to the big boss, all these bosses want to get their hands on part of the profit, 
while the workers are right at the very bottom of this chain of interests and 
have to bare the most intense pressure. At the same time as the bosses acquire 
a high level of profit, the workers have no choice but do excessively long hours 
of high intensity labor, merely in exchange for meagre wages. However, even 
with this paltry wage, it is difficult for workers to lay their hands on it. Some 
workers have no choice but adopt violent methods, climbing tower cranes, 
blocking roads, sometimes even paying with their own life.
On June 1, 2008, on the construction site in Taoyuan Village, at the same 
time as Old Zhang and his counterparts were in the midst of demanding to 
be paid, another group of workers was also in the process of arguing for their 
wages. They came from Xingtai in Hebei Province, and they had already been 
on the construction site for three months, from the beginning of the spring to 
18   Marx, Das Kapital, tr. Central Compilation and Translation Bureau for the Works of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin (2004), Beijing, People’s Publishing House.
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the time when the wheat had ripened, waiting to be harvested. They had still 
not received any wages. 
The head contractor was yet to receive the funds for the construction proj-
ect from the company, so he used their place-of-origin ties, doing all that he 
could to placate the workers and get them to keep working. He gave his word 
that as soon as the project was completed, he would give them their wages. 
The workers and the head contractor were all from the same place. Seeing the 
certainty with which the head contractor reassured them, and tied by feelings 
of obligation to not over-upset someone from their own home-turf, the work-
ers agreed to keep working. 
After the work was finished, the workers again began to press for their 
money. The head contractor repeatedly asked the company for money, but the 
company claimed that the money had still not reached their account, using 
this as reason to keep stalling. The workers went to the Commission of Urban-
Rural Development (建委), but the people from the Commission told them 
that without a labor contract, there was nothing they could do. 
Little Fang, a young female worker, seemed very anxious: “What can we do? 
We’ve worked so hard for three months, but in the end they’re not giving us our 
money. How are people from the countryside meant to live?”
Another female worker, Wang Rong, was determined to not be pushed 
around: “Relax. If they don’t give us our money, we will have it out with them, 
we’ll see if they dare not pay us.” On the construction site, the female work-
ers had even more pressure on them than the men. They could only do the 
unskilled jobs in a supplementary capacity to the rest of the work on the site, 
but even for the same work, the women’s pay was far lower than male workers. 
Incensed and implacable, Wang Rong said to us: “For the first three months we 
were putting every ounce of ourselves into getting the work done. For the last 
month we were waiting for our money. Do you want to tell me that doing work 
like this is easy? When you’re working, each boss will squeeze you even more 
than the last, but when it comes to giving you your money, they just get better 
and better at stalling. They’re hateful!” 
“If you run up debts, you pay them off; if you kill a person, you pay with your 
life. That’s just the way it should be. We want our money now, and we’re totally 
confident we’ve got on our side,” the workers fumed. 
The workers decided to take action. But there were not enough of them. So, 
Little Bo got in touch with some people from back home who were working 
in Changping District (昌平区), Beijing, and asked them to come and lend a 
hand.
Little Bo said, “Tomorrow, our main troops are going to get here. We’ll kick 
up a good fuss and let them know that workers won’t easily be walked all over.”
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Early on the morning of June 8th, these people from back home rushed on 
over. They had decided to arm themselves with banners and block up the road. 
The banners announced, “Give us back the money we’ve earned with our blood 
and sweat, so we can go home and harvest the wheat.” 
The full development of the capitalist relations of production in China’s con-
struction industry has established a class structure that is commonly colored 
with antagonism. However, the subcontracting labor system widely adopted 
across China’s construction industry (i.e. the socio-economic organization 
of Katznelson’s framework for class analysis) has the effect on the workers of 
obscuring class structure and class relations. The multi-layered contracting 
labor system, the complex chain of subcontracting, and particularly the exis-
tence of the head contractor obscure the real labor relations, making it difficult 
for the workers to tell who their boss is. On the one hand, the subcontracting 
labor system uses place-of-origin and the other ties in traditional society, to 
suppress, ameliorate, and transform the discrepancies and conflicts that occur 
at the scene where labor takes place. On the other hand, since the contracting 
system cannot fundamentally solve the conflicting interests inherent to the 
class structure, in practice, from day one these conflicts are being bottled up, 
right up until in the end when they explode. The system of subcontracting 
labor, as a type of socio-economic organization, enables exploitation by capital 
to be pushed to the very limit. It careens through the boundaries of morality, 
law and physical limitations, to the extent that the payment of wages, the most 
fundamental of preconditions upon which the capitalist mode of production 
is based, becomes a real problem. In the end, this pushes the workers into a 
corner: they have no way to survive, and in turn this prompts them to strike 
back. Although it appears to be a simple economic struggle, the demanding of 
wages actually brings the inherent antagonism between labor and capital, the 
previously obscured class structure, and class relations all into clear focus for 
the worker. 
According to Thompson’s understanding, class consciousness does not 
come before resistance; but rather the two are mutually intertwined and 
inseparable. Workers experience exploitation, they become aware of oppos-
ing interests, and undertake struggles over these issues. During the process of 
these struggles, they each realize that they are a class, and their realization of 
this is class consciousness. Class and class consciousness often appear at the 
final stage of the historical process and not during the first stage.19
19   E. P. Thompson, The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays, New York, Monthly Review, 1978, 
151.
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However, the socio-economic organization of China’s construction industry 
gives the formation of working class consciousness its own particular charac-
teristics, causing it to be more complicated. We can see that terrible labor and 
living conditions often cause workers to become dissatisfied and resentful of 
their bosses, and yet this remains as an embryonic form of class-consciousness. 
It is fragmentary, blurred, and changeable. Then, it is constantly being diluted 
or strangled by the subcontracting labor system of the construction site. 
The existence of place-of-origin ties between the workers and the head con-
tractor makes the workers accept labor conditions and exploitation difficult to 
imagine in other industries, whilst at the same time it makes their dissatisfac-
tion and resentment often stop at the head contractor and change in step with 
the head contractor’s attitude. As such, class consciousness and place-of-origin 
consciousness often become entangled and displaced, causing a multitude 
of difficulties in the formation of a clear class-consciousness. Yet the natural 
proclivity of capital to seek maximized profits will always push the head con-
tractor into an irrevocable impasse. The dissatisfaction and resentment of the 
workers build up little by little until the moment when they are unable to lay 
their hands on the wages that they have labored long and hard for when their 
anger explodes into action, the veil of feelings associated with place-of-origin 
ties finally peels away. In the action through which they demand their wages, 
with appeals for the “return of our money earned through blood and sweat” 
and so on, the resentment that has been built up during the daily life and 
labor of the workers explodes in this final moment and causes them to reveal a 
shocking amount of strength. 
Action to demand the payment of wages is stirred up and incited by the 
resentment accrued in daily life. This action also leads diffuse feelings of 
resentment towards a relatively clear direction, enabling the workers to shake 
off the complicated entanglement with place-of-origin ties, and a blurred 
class-consciousness gradually becomes sharper and clearer. During this pro-
cess, workers gain experience and growth. They come to clearly recognize the 
true face of their boss, and the difference between workers and the boss. This 
process helps them to accumulate precious experience for later resistances.
8 The Politicization of Workers’ Action
In the past, it has been common for studies of the working class to tirelessly 
debate one question: whether workers’ resistance is of an economic nature or of 
a political nature. They have understood resistance aimed at fighting for improv-
ing labor conditions, higher wages and so forth as a kind of purely economic 
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struggle. In doing so, they place economic struggle and political struggle into 
simple, diametrical opposition with one another. They bestow upon the work-
ers’ class action a certain teleological trajectory, and in other words, in the end 
class action must be highly organized and political in form, for only in this way 
can it achieve the ultimate aim, the self-liberation of the working class. 
At this stage, the instances of workers’ collective action on Chinese con-
struction sites are almost entirely struggles within the economic sphere, 
revolving around the non-payment of wages. Moreover, they are defensive 
struggles, directed at damaged interests. In this sense, it would seem that they 
could all be treated as economic struggles. However, within a series of struggles 
during which workers were seeking to argue for their wages, we came to realize 
that the action of workers always went through a constant process, becom-
ing increasingly politicized. First, even the simplest workers’ action involved 
a complicated process of uniting individual workers to undertake collective 
resistance. Second, in their resistance, the workers were always unable to avoid 
coming into contact with the state: they would either directly seek the assis-
tance of the government and cross swords with related departments, or they 
would draw on relevant laws or policies to resist capital. Irrespective of how 
they came into contact with the state, through this process, the workers were 
forging a deeper understanding of the state and the Chinese system. In the 
context of post-socialist transformation, the state and capital are tightly inter-
woven, so that the politicization of workers’ action is even more unavoidable. 
When workers suffer injury at work but are unable to obtain compensation, 
or when they have worked long and hard for a whole year but still are unable 
to get their hands on their wages, the first thing they think to turn to is govern-
ment. Almost entirely without hesitation, they believe that all they have to do 
is go to the government, and any problem can be solved. However, during the 
process of resistance, the workers see first hand the role played by government 
departments during a clash between labor and capital, and they inevitably 
experience an enormous contrast between their expectations and the reality. 
There is always a palpable change in their opinion on and understanding of 
government. 
In 2008 after Chinese New Year came to an end, eight workers from 
Shijiazhuang (石家庄) in Hebe Province arrived in Beijing, where they had 
come to work at the Malianwa Yicheng (马连洼亿城) construction site. 
According to the initial agreement they had made with their head contractor, 
they would be on a rate of 85 yuan per person per day. But at some point, their 
head contractor made a run for it, leaving the project manager of the company 
to ask them to stay on and continue their work. The project manager promised 
them that their wages would definitely be paid. When the work on the project 
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was completed, the company gave the workers 500 yuan per person for 
transport, telling them to return home, but their wages were not paid. 
The workers would not accept this, saying that if they did not get their 
wages, they would go to the Bureau of Labor to lodge a complaint against the 
company. The company came back, “You can go wherever you want to com-
plain, you can complain to the Bureau of Labor if you want, we don’t care.” 
So the workers went to the labor department at the sub-district government, 
where the staff first asked them for their labor contracts. None of them was 
able to produce a contract. The staff were only able to calculate their wages in 
accordance with the Beijing minimum wage, which varied between 35 yuan, 
45 yuan and 65 yuan per person per day, and then deducted 10 yuan to cover 
their meals. The workers would not agree to this, instead insisting on the origi-
nal agreement for calculating their wages. The staff categorically refused to 
accept the workers’ demands: 
If you think you can request as much as you want and you’ll just get it, 
that’s just not going to happen. I know, there’s just nothing we can do. 
This guy (the head contractor) has been gone, and there’s no way find-
ing him. That’s the fact of the matter, isn’t it? If we can’t find him, what 
can we do about it? We’re going to have to go to the next level up in the 
company, right?. . . . We can’t just give you all of your wages, because this 
problem, well, we’ve all got to take a bit of responsibility, haven’t we. . . . 
your direct boss (the head contractor) has gone, and there’s no finding 
him, and that’s not something we can do anything about.20
The workers were very unhappy with the response of the sub-district govern-
ment labor department. Liu Xiaobing, a representative of the workers, just 
could not understand it: how could the staff at the labor department come out 
with something so unprofessional? Liu Xiaobing could not get his head around 
why the government had formulated so many laws and was always saying that 
migrant workers’ rights and interests should be protected, yet nothing on the 
20   Their past experience told the workers that the government is just not reliable, the atti-
tude of their staff is often really poor, and a common way of dealing with things is to treat 
workers like they would a football and kick them about, so before going to the Bureau 
of Labor, the workers had secretly started up a recording device. The intelligence, cour-
age and insight of the workers enabled us to see just what the government personnel’s 
attitude towards and method of dealing with ordinary construction workers is like. The 
way this official behaved was typical in terms of the situations we came across during 
our research.
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construction site was done according to these laws: “The law now in China is 
absolutely clear. We have an eight-hour system, and what, you’ve got the two-
day rest thing where you’re supposed to get double-pay, but on the construc-
tion site it’s still like this. You’re working over ten hours a day, you’re eating this 
same food, and you live in the crappiest conditions. . . .” 
Also involved in the argument to get their unpaid wages, along with 
Liu Xiaobing and the others, was Ma Bin, a worker from Linzhou in Henan 
Province. He was out on his own (being the only one from Henan), and he had 
even less means to win back his own wages. It was their common misfortune 
that brought them together. After leaving the labor department, they were all 
furious. Ma Bin, deeply exasperated, exclaimed: “I don’t know whether these 
law enforcers are helping the workers or helping the bosses.” Liu Xiaobing put 
it even more bluntly: “I reckon, the officials are cozying up to the rich. If offi-
cials are helping out people with money, who’s going to help us? You see?” 
The staff at the sub-district government labor department were not going 
to do anything, so they went to the next level up—Haidian District Bureau of 
Labor (海淀区劳动局). Yet the staff there also insisted that when there was no 
contract, all they could do was use the minimum wage to calculate what the 
workers were to be paid. 
Ma Bin was incensed, “At the very least I should be paid for doing special-
ist work, OK? I’ll tell you what I do, and you can go and check. My kind of 
specialist work, low voltage electrical work, how much does that pay a day?” 
The member of staff replied, “Don’t talk to me about market price. Even if the 
market price was 30 yuan, I could still find someone to do the work. . . .” Ma Bin 
was speechless. 
Capital’s aggression and the inaction of government forced the workers into 
a corner. The next day, the workers took their action to the next level, locking 
up the doors to the storehouse and the project department, not allowing any 
staff or vehicles in or out. They were hoping that in this way they could force 
the company to pay their wages. 
The project manager called the police, and a policeman immediately made 
his way over. After he had found out what was going on, he turned to Liu 
Xiaobing and the others: “It’s your wages you want, and it’s only natural that 
you want your money, but the way you go about things, you shouldn’t be affect-
ing their normal production.” The policeman took Liu Xiaobing and one other 
worker to the local police station. 
At the police station, the police both coaxed them and tried to intimidate 
them, persuading the workers to accept the conditions offered them by the 
labor department and hurry up to take their money and leave, for otherwise 
they would have to hold them legally accountable and keep them in custody on 
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criminal charges. The workers would not agree, so the police kept them locked 
up in the police station. They were shut up there from 11 o’clock in the morning 
right up to two o’clock in the afternoon, when the project manager turned up, 
and only then were they released. The company agreed only to calculate their 
wages at a rate of 65 yuan per person per day, but again, the workers would 
not accept this. On seeing that the workers were determined and not going to 
budge, whilst at the same time not wanting to let things get any worse, in the 
end the company agreed to the demands put to them by the workers. That eve-
ning, each of the workers collected all of the wages they were owed. 
This instance of action gave the workers a much deeper understanding 
about the local government. They were learning through their struggle. They 
found that they could only depend upon themselves: only by uniting could 
they solve their problems.
Incidents of workers’ trying to obtain unpaid wages from construction 
sites around China, always and in various ways, get the state involved. In this 
respect, the political nature of worker action is very clear. Just as Lenin com-
mented over a century ago: 
The living conditions of the mass of working folk places them in such 
a position that they do not (cannot) possess either the leisure or the 
opportunity to ponder over problems of the state. On the other hand, the 
workers’ struggle against the factory owners for their daily needs auto-
matically and inevitably spurs the workers on to think of state, political 
questions, questions of how the Russian state is governed, how laws and 
regulations are issued, and whose interests they serve. Each clash in the 
factory necessarily brings the workers into conflict with the laws and rep-
resentatives of state authority.21 
No analysis of the antagonistic conflict between capital and labor can overlook 
the important role of the state. If the work of Marx revealed the structural 
effect of the relations of production, and both Thompson and Katznelson 
have complemented our understanding of the historical, cultural, and political 
factors in the formation of class, then Burawoy reminds us to pay attention 
to the political forces that affect labor relations. He particularly draws our 
attention to the various institutional arrangements and methods of gover-
nance put in place by the state to standardize the processes of production and 
21   Lenin, “Draft and Explanation of a Programme for the Socialist Democratic Party” in 
Collected Works tr. Central Compilation and Translation Bureau for the Works of Marx, 
Engels, Lenin, and Stalin (1984), Beijing, People’s Publishing House, 87–88, (Ch). 
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reproduction.22 In short, the exploration of the control and resistance of labor 
requires that we understand not only the micro-level operations of capital and 
labor in production and reproduction, but also the dual nature of the activities 
of capital and the state. 
For a China that has become drawn into the global capitalist economic sys-
tem, the nature of the state is far more complex than that of Western capitalist 
states. It bears the weight of the ideological legacy of a socialist state, whilst 
at the same time having become the helmsman of a post-socialist market 
economy. This imbues the role of the state with internal tensions. On the one 
hand, when faced up with frequent conflicts between labor and capital, it must 
appear as the guardian of the working people, even often issuing laws that sur-
passes those in the West in its forward-thinking. On the other hand, when actu-
ally dealing with labor disputes in practice, because the interests of the local 
government are tied up with those of capital, it will ignore the interests of the 
workers, to the extent that legislation comes to nothing, revealing the side of 
the state which subsumes class and remains close to capital. 
In 2003, after the efforts of migrant workers to obtain unpaid wages received 
media coverage, Premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) launched what was referred to 
as a powerful “storm on unpaid wages” throughout the whole country. The 
Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development (住建部), the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (中华全国总工会), and the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Security (劳动和社会保障部) each issued documents calling for all 
departments involved to properly regulate over illegal subcontracting of con-
struction projects, protect the labor rights and interests of migrant workers 
working in the construction industry, and ultimately find practical solutions to 
deal with the problem of construction workers’ wages. A whole series of poli-
cies and regulations were issued, from the central down to the local govern-
ment. Nothing was left uncovered, from establishing specific bank accounts 
to the form of wage payments, the entire sequence of processes involved in 
the payment of wages was considered painstakingly, down to the finest detail. 
However, without exception, all of this legislation and policy was turned into 
castles in the air.23 The state made great promises to the workers, and yet time 
22   Burawoy, M., Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly 
Capitalism, tr. Lin Zonghong et al., Taipei, Socio Publishing Co. Ltd., 2005, (Ch).
23   The Labor Contract Law stipulates that the wages of workers should be issued in full by 
the month. In practice, no construction site is able to do this. In consideration of what 
can realistically be achieved, the Beijing Municipal Government made a compromise, 
stipulating that the wages of construction workers should be paid by the season. Even 
though this was a marked down standard, as far as construction workers are concerned, 
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after time when the workers would go to a government department for help, 
filled with confidence, they would, time and time again, leave disappointed. 
The tensions inherent in the role of the state further reinforce the extent to 
which workers’ action is politicized and prompts the tendency for it to become 
more militant. Owing to their performance during labor-capital conflicts, the 
law enforcement departments of the administration weaken the faith of the 
workers in the state, in its laws and its policies. Instead, the workers turn to rely 
more upon their own strength. On the construction sites, we have seen many 
construction workers who have past experience of seeking help from govern-
ment departments, upon suffering further encroachments on their rights and 
interests, often opt to “make trouble,” rather than going through legal or admin-
istrative channels. They adopt more radical collective action. In capitalist soci-
eties, legal and administrative channels are used as institutionalized measures 
to mediate labor disputes and avoid class struggle. When a post-socialist China 
emphasizes the rule of law, this actually implies similar considerations. What 
is paradoxical is that the position and behavior of local government as a close 
ally of capital means that legal and administrative channels are practically 
closed off to workers, and the result is actually contrary to the original aim: 
the workers are pushed towards turning to class struggle. The complexity of 
the nature of a post-socialist state, and the role of the state, which contradicts 
itself, inadvertently leads to workers’ class action. 
9 Moving towards Unity in Resistance
As capitalism has developed, capital has always been excessively powerful, 
and workers have always been in a relatively weak position. Where then is the 
power of workers’ collective resistance? Wright has provided us with a detailed 
account delineating the different sources of workers’ power. He posits two 
main sources: the first is “associational power,” and the second is “structural 
power.” Associational power refers to the various types of power resulting from 
a formation of collective organizations of workers. Structural power refers to 
the location of workers within the economic system and reflects the workers’ 
this is still a far-fetched, unattainable standard, unobserved by their employees. Actually, 
it is already quite something if they are able to get just a living allowance by the month. 
The related government departments are not proactive about implementing the law. 
Instead, they tacitly accept the status quo. 
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ability to bargain.24 This theoretical framework of associational and structural 
power provides us with a viable framework to use at the mid-level perspec-
tive in our exploration of the power of working class struggle and control over 
workers. Just as Elizabeth J. Perry has pointed out, different types of workers 
have different types of politics,25 so in order to study workers’ resistance we 
must come into close contact with specific workers and investigate the specific 
power for resistance borne by them. 
In today’s China, the class formation and class action of construction work-
ers is faced up with a series of unfavorable conditions. In terms of associa-
tional power, workers lack the institutionalized channels commonly used in 
Western capitalist societies, such as the strike, and they do not have the sup-
port of unions or other organizations that exist in modern society.26 They even 
lack traditional organizations like trade associations, or secret organizations. 
Turning to structural power, this can be separated into two levels. First, the 
semi-proletarianization of construction workers means that they are unable to 
achieve a complete identity as workers, and instead their identity hovers back 
and forth between peasant and worker. This affects their class-consciousness 
and their ability to take action. Second, the subcontracting labor system dis-
sects workers into individual teams of contracted workers, making it extremely 
tough for them to draw on large-scale collective action to influence the produc-
tion project. The obscuring nature of the contracting system often succeeds in 
delaying resistance until after the completion of the labor, powerfully curtail-
ing the bargaining power of the workers at their workplace. 
24   Wright, E. O., “Working-Class Power, Capitalist-Class Interests, and Class Compromise” in 
American Journal of Sociology, 2000, Vol. 105, No. 4. 
25   Perry, E. J. Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor, tr. Liu Ping 2001, Nanjing, 
Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, 328 (Ch).
26   As early as 1992, the government had already adopted the Trade Union Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (中华人民共和国工会法). This stipulated that any enterprise 
or public institution with over 25 people must, in accordance with the law, establish a 
union. However, migrant workers in the construction industry have never had any luck 
with unions. The All China Federation of Trade Unions’ “Notice on Properly Protecting 
the Legal Rights and Interests of Persons Entering Urban Areas to Work” demands that 
trade union organizations at every level incorporate migrant workers into their unions, 
and taking into consideration the transient nature of migrant workers, it even conceives 
of the idea of establishing trade union organizations at the labor exporting area. However, 
in reality, the proportion of construction workers who become involved in a Labor Union 
is tiny; the vast majority of workers are left out in the cold by the unions. In the labor mar-
ket left to its own devices, for lack of support from labor organizations, there is a serious 
imbalance between the power of the workers and that of capital. 
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However, none of these unfavorable conditions is able to put a stop to the 
resistance of the workers, because the capitalist relations of production on the 
construction site are constantly creating difficulties and antagonism between 
labor and capital. As the workers’ bottom line is frequently crossed, they are 
forced into a position which is such that they reach the end of their tether. 
In August 2008, on a construction site in Beichen (北辰) in the northwestern 
suburbs of Beijing, seven workers from Hebei and another eight from Henan 
were living together in the same dormitory, doing work for their boss, who 
was from Jiangsu. They were all engaged in carpentry on the project, and they 
began their work on the site following Chinese New Year. By August, they had 
been working together for over six months. Although they had different local 
accents and different living habits, in their interactions with one another day 
in day out, they established a relationship of trust. In their own words, “We’ve 
all come away from home to work, and we’re all working for the same boss. We 
usually look out for each other, for we do not care who comes from where.” 
At the end of August, work finished up on the construction project, and 
the workers from Hebei decided against continuing to work there, so they 
approached the boss to settle their wages. In the same way as at countless other 
construction sites, the boss used every conceivable means to put them off, say-
ing that he could only settle their wages at the end of the year. The workers 
decided to take action, but they were concerned that they didn’t have enough 
members and had no chance against their boss. This led them to mobilize the 
workers from Henan to join them, and they went together to the complaints 
department of the Bureau of Labor to file a complaint. 
After two days, personnel from the Labor Supervision Team (劳动监察大队) 
arrived at the Beichen construction site and tracked down the head contrac-
tor and the project managers of the labor agency and the construction com-
pany to demand that they solve this problem over the workers’ wages as soon 
as possible. The bosses from the lower ranks up all carped on with their own 
grievances, evading the demands saying they had no money and needed the 
workers to wait a while. The workers were not willing to accept this, and one of 
them threatened that he would climb the tower crane, but was obstructed by 
the Labor Supervision Team. Both the workers and the bosses refused to budge. 
In the end, the people from the Labor Supervision Team acted as guarantor, 
suggesting that each of the workers first receive 1,000 yuan, the head contrac-
tor issue them with an IOU for the remainder of the money, and that the issue 
be settled on the spot on the last day of the month. 
With the word of the Bureau of Labor, the workers agreed to the boss’s con-
ditions. In order to prevent against their power being dissipated, the workers 
from Hebei and Henan (河南) decided to continue to stick together until they 
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had actually received their wages. The workers from Henan found a new con-
struction project, this time in the suburbs to the south of Beijing, and they 
asked the Hebei workers to come along and work with them. 
On the morning of August 31st, fifteen of the workers from Hebei and 
Henan headed from the suburbs in the south, to the Beichen construction site. 
To bolster their strength, the workers from Hebei got another five workers 
to come over from Dingxing (定兴), back home in Hebei, to join them. The 
five workers had previously worked for the same boss, and yet left without 
having received their wages before the end of the project. This way, their 
members were increased to twenty, and everyone was of the same mind, 
giving off the message that they would not rest until they got their hands on 
their wages. 
Just as they were about to arrive at the construction site, they received a 
text message from the head contractor, saying that he didn’t have enough 
money just then and would have to give them it the next day. The workers were 
infuriated. 
We just have to have it out with them, and we can’t be too soft with them. 
We’re going to have to go and get some answers from the Bureau of Labor. 
If they really aren’t going to do anything about it, then we’ll get them to 
write a note, saying they’re not going to deal with it.
We’re going there to get our money, we’re not breaking the law for that, 
and it’s perfectly reasonable, so the government’s not going to do any-
thing to us. If the Bureau of Labor doesn’t help us sort it out, then we 
should just go and do a sit-in. 
In their anger at the boss, the workers became even more united. At 2 o’clock 
that afternoon, the people from the Bureau of Labor rushed over, but the com-
pany had no way of coming up with the money. In the midst of the workers’ 
angry protestations, the company had completely lost the air of authority it 
usually had, and all the people from the Bureau of Labor could do was demand 
that the company make good on its word. The stalemate had been going on for 
a long time, and the company agreed to give each worker 150 yuan as money 
for transport and accommodation. The workers responded only to give them 
an extra day, but demanded that the company give their word in public that 
if the next day they were still unable to come up with the money, they would 
add an extra 1,000 yuan per worker. The next day, the workers successfully went 
away with their wages. 
This constant accumulation of experience in struggle gradually changed the 
workers themselves. They were learning and growing: learning how to survive 
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in the crevices and how to deal with and resist against capital and power. The 
most basic experience drawn by the workers was as follows: “Just as long as 
there’re a lot of people, anything’s possible. If there’re a lot of people, the min-
ute you make a noise, the boss will just give you the money. What you don’t 
want is too few people. If there aren’t enough of you, then the boss just won’t 
take you seriously, just find any old reason to put you off, and even if he’s got 
the money, he won’t give you it.” 
The contracting system is built on the basis of place-of-origin ties. In the 
daily life and labor of the workers, to a certain extent, native-place conscious-
ness holds together the unity within the team of contracted workers. Their 
native-place bonds with the head contractor are an even more important 
condition that leads to the possibility of wages in the construction industry 
going unpaid. Native-place consciousness also creates dislocation between 
the workers of different teams on site. Even in the process of their day-to-
day lives and work, disputes will often occur between workers from differ-
ent areas. However, once things get to the point when the workers want their 
unpaid wages, it is difficult for the head contractor to satisfy their demands, 
capital steps out from behind the scenes, and the real boss appears. Now 
when capital and labor come face to face, the feelings and mentality that 
accompany native-place ties can no longer be used by capital in the contract-
ing system as fetters to constrain working class consciousness. Instead, this 
native place consciousness becomes the social basis upon which workers rap-
idly unite. As Perry has pointed out, native-place, skill, gender and so on can 
be factors that create divisions between workers, but in the same way, can 
also prompt the formation of working class power.27 Our own investigation 
found that during resistance to get back unpaid wages, workers often called 
on workmates from the same bit of the countryside as they themselves, get-
ting them to come from construction sites nearby or even from back home to 
strengthen their voice. In a situation wherein they were lacking the support 
of organizations like unions, native-place ties became the most important 
organizational support for the workers’ collective action. In this case, workers 
from Hebei and Henan, who faced the same problem of wages being unpaid, 
united on the basis of their respective place-of-origin ties. But they also went 
on to surpass this place-of-origin consciousness to achieve an even greater 
alliance. Capital’s cruel exploitation and common interests, combined with 
the dissatisfaction and resentment that was built up during their daily lives 
and work, made this alliance become possible. 
27   Perry, E. J. Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor, tr. Liu Ping 2001, Nanjing, 
Jiangsu People’s Publishing House, (Ch).
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Due to the spatial separation between the migrant workers’ production and 
family life, there is no way for a workers’ community to be formed in order 
to sustain and accumulate power for the struggle. Then, the workers lack an 
institutionalized organizational basis. So, during the current phase, it is dif-
ficult for construction workers to carry out large-scale, organized resistance 
over a long period of time with the city as their base. Their collective action 
reveals certain characteristics: it is a spontaneous, scattered, and wildcat style. 
When the direct objective has been achieved, the action is immediately called 
to an end. A typical instance of resistance by workers trying to get their unpaid 
wages often goes on for no longer than a few days, and the number of work-
ers who participate often does not exceed one hundred. As efforts to obtain 
unpaid wages usually occur when the construction project is about to end or 
has already drawn to an end, the workers have either already left the field of 
production, or they find it very hard to have a strong impact on the production 
process. It is due to this that the workers usually do not adopt striking as a 
method of collective action, but instead they choose a variety of ways to make 
a noise. Although the scale of these instances of collective action is small, 
often things are taken to extremes, and even methods riddled with violence 
are adopted. The project department might be charged on, and specific mem-
bers of the management staff might be besieged inside. The workers may move 
on to besiege the sales department. They may climb a tower crane or block up 
the streets. All these reveal characteristics very different to those of collective 
action by workers in the manufacturing industry. 
10 Construction Workers’ Class Formation 
When they first left their homes in the countryside to step onto the building 
sites of the city, Old Zhang, Little Bo, Shi Dongdong, and Liu Xiaobing—these 
ordinary people from rural Hebei, Henan, and Jiangsu (江苏)—were simply 
trying to change their way of life and make a living away from the land. They 
were already prepared for hardships and even unjust treatments. However, 
what remained unforeseen to them was that the political economy of China 
in the current era was destined to drive them into the midst of the process of 
forging a class subject. 
Before construction workers arrive in the city, the historical legacy of the 
separation between urban and rural China, combined with the developmental 
strategy of the state, has already shaped them into a disfigured labor subject. 
This severely weakens their awareness of rights, their life expectations, and 
the resources at their disposal. On the other hand, it also provides favorable 
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conditions for capital in real estate and construction to control and exploit 
them. Encountering powerful and rapacious capital, even place-of-origin 
ties—the only thing that construction workers can rely on—is reduced to be a 
sharp tool, manipulated by capital to chase profit in the subcontracting labor 
system. When all of these factors combine, they create the serious and yet 
common phenomena of wages going unpaid, and that of cruel exploitation, 
which was most rare even during the initial stage of capitalism in the West. 
On the construction sites, in the dormitories, in the tiny details of life and 
work, workers are constantly, deeply experiencing exploitation and oppres-
sion. They are also experiencing repression, helplessness, feelings of dejec-
tion, and hatred. In reality, these first-hand experiences and emotions of 
construction workers are determined by the relations of production within 
which they find themselves and are caused by their class status. The very 
nature of their emotions is one of class. However, in today’s China, the lan-
guage of class has, for some time now, been labeled as something belonging to 
the extreme left and it has become a taboo in the whole society. Thus the class 
subject itself has also been afflicted with a case of discursive dyslexia. The 
voice of the people on the bottom rung has been submerged in the clamor 
of modern discourse, and construction workers have no way of finding legiti-
mate language or concepts in the mainstream discourse to understand and 
explain the plight. Nor do they have any way to express their demands related 
to interests or emotional experiences. Thus, these things more commonly 
emerge in the form of dissatisfaction with and resentment at their head con-
tractors and the management staff. At most, these are the initial hints of a 
budding class-consciousness, but they are blurred and fragmentary. Often, 
due to the dilemmas of place-of-origin consciousness, they become more 
complex and changeable. The journey from class in-itself to class for-itself 
remains one paved with difficulty. 
“Working for a boss, we can take sweltering heat and bitter cold, but we can’t 
take no wages.” Just as the lyric that appears at the beginning of this article 
reveals, endless oppression by capital has bit by bit drawn close to the work-
ers’ bottom line. As capital maximizes its exaction of the value of labor, the 
workers are forced to suffer terrible working and living conditions day in day 
out, which constantly destroys their notion of equality and morality, as well as 
sparks their dissatisfaction and resentment. Ordinarily, this feeling of dissatis-
faction and resentment is suppressed, but it does not just disappear. Instead, 
it builds up gradually in the deep hearts of the workers. In the end, it comes to 
a head and explodes when the workers follow up on getting back their unpaid 
wages. It forms a potent force. When workers have been working long and hard 
but cannot get their hands on their wages, and when they have been injured at 
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work but no one wants to do anything about it, the veil of tenderness between 
the head contractor and the workers, who come from the same place, slips 
away in a moment. When this happens, capital, which has hidden behind the 
scenes, is forced into the foreground, and then it becomes no longer possible 
for place-of-origin ties to obscure the antagonism between capital and labor. 
It is during this kind of resistance—especially collective resistance—that the 
blurred, fragmented dissatisfaction and resentment gradually finds clear direc-
tion and is focused into antagonism between labor and capitalism. This then 
shakes free from the entanglement with place-of-origin consciousness and 
grows into relatively clear class consciousness. 
Construction workers tend to have a lower level of education than other 
groups of migrant workers in China. Many have never even set foot in a 
middle-school classroom, let alone read the magna opera of Marx or Lenin. 
Nor do they have a proletarian vanguard to come along and inculcate in them 
a kind of advanced class-consciousness. Yet day in day out, year after year, the 
hardship of life as a migrant worker and particularly the continuous resistance 
against capital, which serve as a smelting furnace, shape their blurred, loosely 
scattered dissatisfaction and resentment into an awareness of the class antago-
nisms. It is the conflicts of interest, which are inherent in the capitalist rela-
tions of production, and capital’s cruel exploitation, that makes construction 
workers without any outside help break through the multitude of structural 
barriers and oppression. They come to shake off the unfavorable influences of 
the socio-economic organization (the subcontracting labor system), the main-
stream discourse, and their identity as nongmingong. Through entirely spon-
taneous resistance (mainly in the form of collective action to demand their 
unpaid wages), they forge a clear class-consciousness. Here, we see no trace of 
the question over which Marxists are racking their brains: “why not”. The logic 
of the relationship between the relations of production, class structure, and 
class-consciousness could not be clearer. 
The formation of class is a dynamic historical process, and it is difficult to 
determine a rigid set of criteria by which to judge it. Compared with the course 
of the formation of the English working class described by Thompson, the col-
lective action we have seen from China’s construction workers has mostly been 
fragmented and wildcat in style. Although it occurs frequently, the instances of 
action have not echoed one another or formed a wider alliance, and even less 
so formed a solid organizational basis. There remain many limits to the unity 
of workers. In this respect, it could be argued that the collective resistance of 
China’s construction workers is stuck at a relatively low level of development, 
and the formation of class remains in its nascent stage. 
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Each spring, as the lunar year begins, signaled by the rumble of heavy 
machinery, work starts at construction sites across China. A surge of dust fills 
the air, and the earth is torn open, creating gaping wounds in its surface. By the 
time the end of the year comes around, the same construction sites all become 
a lonely stretch as the work draws to an end. The wounds in the earth have 
been closed in, and left behind is building after building, vast and imposing, 
or elegant and majestic. The construction sites become still and then vanish 
without a trace. 
These vast construction sites are the product of both reform in the relations 
of production and systemic reform in Chinese society. They are also a micro-
cosm, revealing all of the social conflicts and contradictions that have been cre-
ated in 30 years of reform. On these vast construction sites, we have witnessed 
the arrival and rapid expansion of a bourgeoisie, represented by real estate 
and construction capital. The moment they appeared, they instantly became 
the centre and main guiding force in the social relations of a new era. We have 
also seen the hardships of the construction workers, in their struggles on these 
great construction sites just to find their footing and eke out an existence. We 
have seen the tough process of a newly emerging working class in its nascent 
stage. Before this working class has even emerged from the womb, it had been 
forced into a tiny crevice jointly created by the state and capital. Today, though 
the discourse of class has disappeared, there is still no way to obscure them to 
the extent that they are completely invisible. And so, as we speak, the spectre 
of class lingers hesitantly around the construction sites of China. Again and 
again, it drifts away. Then time and again, it returns, tenaciously resisting a fate 
suppressed and abandoned by society and calling for an opportunity for the 
rebirth of its class subject. 
Chapter 6
Internet Mobilizing and Workers’ Collective 
Resistance at OEM Factories*
Wang Jianhua**
1 Introduction
The Nanhai Honda (南海本田) strikes in May 2010 launched a prolonged wave 
of strikes by new workers at OEM factories all over China. A report from the 
Hong Kong Liaison Office of the International Labor Organization (IHLO) 
revealed that following this, in Guangdong Province (广东省) alone, strikes for 
higher wages broke out at over a hundred other enterprises.1 The momentum 
of the resistance by the new workers in northern OEM factories did not show 
any signs of abating. In Dalian (大连) alone, within only three months, a wave 
of strikes had spread through seventy-three enterprises, during which 70,000 
workers participated. They all had the same main demand—a rise in pay.2
It was far from simply the scale of this wave of strikes, its scope or the ini-
tiative taken by the workers that was surprising. Some of the striking work-
ers, faced with repression from the government and intimidation and sly 
 maneuvers from the owners to break them up, expressed a strong fighting 
*   This study received funding from the China Youth Development Foundation’s “Research 
on the New Generation of Migrant Workers” project. I would like to extend many thanks to 
my supervisors Professor Guo Yuhua and Professor Shen Yuan for their guidance and sup-
port for this article. Some of the ideas in this article benefitted from my discussions with 
Professor Ching Kwan Lee, Zheng Guanghuai, Chen Peng and others. Professor Chang Kai, 
Liang Guowei and Chang Cheng were amongst those to provide me with enormous assis-
tance in carrying the fieldwork upon which this article draws. Finally, I would especially like 
to express my gratitude and pay tribute to all of those workers, who selflessly provided first-
hand material. I take full responsibility for the content of this article. (This article was first 
published in Chinese in Open Times, 2011, No. 11).
** Wang Jianhua, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
1  IHLO 2010.
2  “Dalian tinggong chao 7 wan ren canyu boji 73 jia qiye, yi gongzi zhang 34.5% gaozhong”, 
(“Dalian’s wave of strikes spreads to 73 enterprises with 70,000 people participating, culmi-
nating in 34.5% pay increases”), Fenghuang wang, (ifeng.com), http://finance.ifeng.com/
news/special/cxcmzk/20100919/2636845.shtml.
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spirit and sense of unity. They were unwilling to draw the strikes to an end 
before they had achieved their objective. Strikes at some factories went on for 
upwards of a week, even during the brutal summer heat. Many of the strikes 
were also extremely orderly and rational, with the workers often agreeing right 
at the beginning that they would strike in a civilized manner: they would not 
damage any of the factory equipment; they would not touch even the tiniest 
blade of grass belonging to the company; during clashes with the owners or the 
government’s Labor Union (工会), they would maintain restraint.
The opportune timing and choice of tactics for the workers’ strikes were also 
a breath of fresh air. A significant number of the workers were clearly aware 
of their own market and workplace bargaining power, so they chose to launch 
the strikes at just the moment there was the most serious shortage of workers. 
Also, the strikes were often begun by the factory’s key departments or by work-
ers who were not easily replaceable. After the strikes began, usually at the first 
opportunity, the workers alerted media groups to the news through different 
channels and also did their best to maintain effective interaction with them at 
all times, seeking outside attention and support. What deserves a special men-
tioning is the emergence of this wholly new consciousness of the workers and 
their demands. These workers were not only demanding significant increases 
to their wages, they were also making strong demands for the establishment of 
normalized channels for them to voice their interests. Two of the most typical 
suggestions were the reformation of the Labor Union and the establishment of 
a system for wage negotiations. These characteristics also meant that for some 
of the strikes, it was possible to arrive at a solution that was to the advantage 
of both sides. The workers nominated their own representatives and entered 
into talks on an equal footing with the owners.3 For some of the factories, these 
talks continued throughout the whole process of the strikes. Through these 
negotiations, the workers achieved substantial wage increases;4 the owners 
gave their word not to follow up on the strikes and investigate those workers;5 
3    Of course, there were instances where the management of the company would concede to 
the demands of the workers without entering into talks. There were even some factories that 
did not wait for the workers to strike, but instead they took the initiative to increase wages. 
4    The highest wages were increased by 800 yuan; a great many enterprises made wage increases 
between 400–600 yuan, see Luo Wensheng “Xunzhao pinghengdian, weiquan yu weiwen 
bingzhong”, (“Searching for a Balance: Placing Equal Importance upon Protecting Rights 
and Maintaining Stability”) in 21 shiji jingji baodao (21st Century Business Herald), 28/7/2010; 
IHLO, 2010. 
5   Of course this kind of promise was not at all reliable. During the process of and following the 
strikes, some factories, used all kinds of excuses to cause problems for or dismiss the strikes’ 
activists. 
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at a small number of enterprises, democratic elections were held for the Labor 
Union, and a system was established for annual wage discussions.6 
The wave of strikes that began at Nanhai Honda has presented those schol-
ars who research China’s labor issues and social movements with an enor-
mous challenge. Although some scholars have come to realize that there were 
entirely different characteristics of this wave of strikes from those of the past 
(Cai He 2010; Chen 2011), research that could provide satisfactory analysis of 
the mechanisms behind this change is still yet to materialize. How can col-
lective action, which is lacking in systematic organization and the strength of 
leadership, be carried out with such orderliness and such great attention to 
strategy? Why is it that even with the risk of being suppressed and the intimi-
dation tactics of the owners was it so difficult to crush the fighting spirit of 
the workers? How can strike action transcend the single enterprise to form 
momentum over a whole area or even a whole nation? How do workers come 
to be conscious of their own strength and begin to take the initiative to put 
forward their own economic demands? How do they then come to conceive of 
seeking methods at a systemic level to solve their issues? From where does this 
entirely new consciousness arise? 
2 Workers’ Resistance at OEM Factories
Beverly Silver argued that “where capital goes, conflict goes” (Silver, 2003, 41). 
The resistance action of workers within the factory of the world has naturally 
attracted the widespread attention of scholars both within and outside China. 
They have each adopted their own perspectives to explain the resistance of 
workers at OEM factories. 
The first type of perspective adopted by scholars focuses on the structural 
reasons behind the resistance of the workers at OEM factories. Silver believes 
that the global flow of capital will cause an increase in the power of the work-
ers at the destination receiving an inflow of capital, and this will bring about 
a corresponding rise in resistance action (Silver, 2003). This perspective is also 
sometimes referred to as “economic determinism.” On the other hand, Pun Ngai 
and others have concentrated on the conflict between the traditional system 
of production by migrant workers and the substitution of one generation of 
workers for the next: on the one hand workers have been semi- proletarianized, 
6   This year through wage negotiations the workers at Nanhai Honda received a pay-rise of 
611 yuan. Huang Yinglai “Nanhai bentian gongren jiaxin 611 yuan”, (“Nanhai Honda Workers 
get a 611 yuan Pay-rise”) in Nanfang Ribao (Southern Daily) 13/3/2011.
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experiencing industrialization but not urbanization, whilst on the other hand 
the new generation of migrant workers have an entirely different sense of self, 
set of values and life expectations compared with those of the previous genera-
tion. These differences cause a complete change in their relationship to the vil-
lage, the city, the country and to capital. The emergence of this large number of 
instances of migrant workers’ direct resistance, originates in the fundamental 
misalignment of the system with generational change (Pun Ngai et al., 2009; 
Guo et al., 2011). 
Gallagher’s analysis is more overarching. She argues that behind the recent 
resistance of migrant workers, are shifts in the demographic, social and politi-
cal context. China’s one-child policy, the broken-up labor market, and the con-
stant expansion of industrialization have brought with them a shortage in the 
supply of labor and an increase in the strength of labor. The difference in char-
acteristics and lived experience between new workers and the older genera-
tion has caused the former to develop a new sense of self, new life expectations 
and a potentially stronger capacity for collective action. When it comes to the 
political environment, state legislation, and the establishment of both labor 
arbitration and a collective wage negotiation system, would work to reduce the 
possibility of spontaneous labor action (Gallagher, 2011). 
The second type of perspective directs its attention upwards, towards how, 
on a macro-level, the state system shapes the behavior we see in the resis-
tance. Through a comparative study of veteran workers in state-owned enter-
prises and these new workers, Ching Kwan Lee (李静君) finds that the state’s 
“Decentralized Legal Authoritarianism” leads to the cellular resistance of the 
two types of workers. Their resistance is limited to single factories, the local 
government is their target, and they use the law as their weapon; the legisla-
tive intervention by the state on OEM factories and the use of rural land to 
supplement the reproduction of labor have led to the mild, law-abiding resis-
tance of the new workers (Lee, 2007). This model of resistance by the new 
workers is also inexplicably linked to the tactics of the state in constructing 
labor rights. At the same time as actively legislating on labor rights, the state, 
through the limitations it places upon the civil rights and liberties of workers 
and their political rights, as well as the infiltration and control of the official 
Labor Union, obstructs the emergence of collective action by workers and the 
construction of collective interests (Chen, 2011). 
Developing an understanding of the macro-level structural factors and the 
state system is indeed an important prerequisite to explaining the resistance 
action of OEM factory workers. However, there are several important questions 
to which these perspectives are unable to provide answers. The first impor-
tant question is how we explain the concurrent existence of different types of 
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direct action at OEM factories. The state system perspective can only explain 
the frequency of workers’ individual actions to protect their legal rights. It can-
not explain the type of collective action which mainly draws on the strike and 
which has been going on for many years. It is even less able to help us under-
stand the appearance of this particular wave of strikes. Guo (郭于华) et al. have 
attempted to adopt a perspective that falls between the micro and the macro, 
looking at the factory regime in order to explain the division of labor resistance 
into different types of action. Taking Foxconn (富士康) as representative of the 
“military despotic regime” and Nanhai Honda as representative of the “conven-
tional despotic regime”, Guo argues that the former led to the appearance of 
individual worker action, whilst the latter led to collective action (Guo et al., 
2011). However, in the same way as the perspectives above, this is still unable to 
answer the second important question. This question pertains to how, within 
the type of labor resistance represented by Nanhai Honda, the following new 
characteristics were formed: worker demands that exceeded their legal rights 
and interests, the level to which the action was organized yet without an orga-
nization, the tactics, unity and militancy of the workers, and the fact that the 
action spread beyond single industrial zones and even city boundaries. The 
process of forming this new style of collective resistance remains a mystery. We 
must look to the micro-level in order to unearth its mechanisms for organizing 
and mobilizing. 
For a long time now, the resistance of China’s new workers at OEM facto-
ries has been faced with a shortage of organizational and discursive resources 
(Pun, Chen, 2008; Pun, Lu, and Zhang, 2010; Huang, 2010). In South Korea, 
where an authoritarian system also prevails, mass-movements, the Church and 
students have provided rich organizational resources in cultivating working 
class consciousness and mobilizing labor resistance (Koo Hagen, 2004). During 
the Republican Period (民国时期, 1912–1949) in China, time and time again, 
the mobilization of labor participation was organized into waves of large-scale 
strikes by the governing party and secret societies (Pei, 2001). Even when we 
look at the workers of contemporary China, if they are the old workers from 
state-owned enterprises, they have still at least retained the discourse of 
socialist cultural tradition, their memories of collective life, and the discourse 
of class, which can all be drawn upon as organizational resources (Chen, 2004; 
2006; Lee, 2007; Tong, 2006). When it comes to new workers, even if their action 
constitutes fierce resistance in response to threats to their very survival, in the 
end they would often be split up and silenced owing to the dissention sown 
by the owner and the local government. This is due to the lack of unified cul-
tural tradition, available organizational resources and the support of outside 
forces. The collective action of laborers at OEM factories often demonstrates 
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itself to be spontaneous, diffuse and wildcat-style (Pun, Lu and Zhang, 2010; 
Huang, 2010). 
The dormitory regime and networks created by place-of-origin ties may be 
precious resources for the mobilization of labor resistance. The loyalty and 
trust that accompanies connection by place-of-origin means that workers 
are more likely to share the risk of collective action (Chan, 2009; Cai He et al., 
2009). The dormitory regime can also strengthen and expand the workers’ 
original networks formed on the basis of gender, kinship and shared place-of-
origin. It can build a common understanding amongst the workers, providing 
the conditions for developing strategies and adopting collective action, and 
thus become both the social and spatial basis for mobilizing labor resistance 
(Ren and Pun, 2006b; Chan and Pun, 2009; Cai et al., 2009). However, the limi-
tations of both the dormitory regime and place-of-origin networks are very 
clear. It is also easy for the dormitory regime and place-of-origin networks to 
become forces used by the owner to divide, control and tame the strength of 
the workers (Lee, 1995; Ren and Pun, 2006a; 2006b). The scope for organizing, 
mobilizing and disseminating information are also extremely limited. It is dif-
ficult to imagine that these workers might be able to form new interests and 
demands purely within their dormitories and their relationships with people 
from the same place, that they would develop ordered and tactical resistance, 
and that they would form a model of resistance that spread over a broader area 
and through which there was interaction with others involved in instances of 
resistance. 
However, for the new workers at OEM factories, the networks formed by 
their dormitory experience, relatives, friends, classmates and hometown fel-
lows are not central to their lives any more. Increasingly, their work, lives, 
and even their consciousness are being permeated by information and com-
munication technologies (ICTs) and in particular by the Internet. Along with 
the increasing popularization of the Internet,7 these new workers commonly 
encounter and are familiar with the world of the Internet (Qiu, 2008; Zheng, 
2010). In particular, using mobile phones to surf the Internet has become the 
best option for new workers, for this is cheap and convenient. They will use 
their phones to surf the Internet for leisure in their spare time, as a way to 
obtain information, a way to chat and communicate with people, and even 
7    By December 2012, China’s Internet users had already numbered 457 million, of whom those 
who would use their mobile phones to surf the Internet had reached 303 million. See Zhongguo 
hulianwang xinxi zhongxin (China Internet Network Information Center) “Zhongguo hulian-
wang fazhan zhuangkuang tongji baogao” (“Statistical Report on Internet Development in 
China”) http://www.cnnic.net.cn/dtygg/dtgg/201101/P020110119328960192287.pdf.
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as a way of simply passing the time (Cheng, 2008; Qiu, 2008). A phenomenon 
that some Chinese and international media and scholars have begun to pay 
attention to is that during this wave of strikes, workers had started using the 
Internet and text messaging to organize and coordinate the strike action, and 
even to interact with the outside world (Guo, 2011; Barboza and Bradsher, 2010; 
Qiu, 2010). The purpose of this article is to explore how this entirely new way 
of life for the workers at OEM factories, with mobile phone Internet-surfing at 
its centre, is linked to their collective resistance, and whether the Internet can 
become a useful tool for future organizing and mobilizing, to be used by the 
new workers in their collective action. 
3 The Case Studies 
For the most part, the material analyzed in this article comes from my inter-
views on the strikes at three factories in two cities within the Pearl River Delta 
(珠三角). These interviews were carried out between January and February 
2011. During this period, altogether twenty interviews were carried out with 
over thirty workers. The interviewees were mostly activists in the strikes, ordi-
nary participants in the strikes, workers who were following along with the 
trend, and even those who had a kind of wait-and-see attitude. In addition to 
this, I obtained permission to enter the QQ Groups (QQ 群) and QQ Spaces 
(QQ 空间) of some of the workers, which could be accessed to find the workers’ 
information from the time of the strikes and details of their everyday interac-
tions. News reports from both inside and outside of China are also drawn upon 
as supplementary material for analysis within this study. Due to the lapse of 
time, it may be difficult to avoid the recollections of the workers in some places 
becoming hazy or contradictory. The immediate reporting of news agencies 
can be employed to compare with the material gleaned from interviews and 
correct errors within this material. 
During the interviewing and Internet data collecting process, I realized that 
in the course of the strikes the use of the Internet and different types of ICTs by 
workers was extremely diverse. Whilst there were many similarities between 
the three striking factories, there were also differences in Internet use, with dif-
ferent emphases at the respective factories. This means that to draw upon just 
one of these factories as a case study would make it difficult to demonstrate 
the potential strength of the Internet as a way to mobilize collective labor 
resistance. Through comprehensive analysis of data from strikes at the three 
factories, this study aims to fully demonstrate the different possibilities for 
ICTs and in particular the Internet to function as mechanisms to mobilize the 
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collective action of new workers. This article will also analyze the responses 
of government and capital to this kind of resistance, and the interaction via 
the Internet between workers and these two parties. So, this article attempts 
to locate the significance of the Internet for the mobilization of new workers’ 
resistance within the specific contexts of the Chinese system and the creative 
usage of ICTs. 
Factories A, B and C are the China-based affiliated enterprises of the 
Japanese Honda car company.8 Factory A is a China-based Honda parts com-
pany, responsible for the production of the transmission, gear boxes, drive 
shafts and component engine parts for Honda. The factory is situated in 
S Township in F City, and it employs in excess of 2,000 workers. The factory’s 
ordinary workers are almost entirely young people with a vocational second-
ary school education. Factory B is a joint-venture between Honda and an enter-
prise belonging to X Township in Z City. It mainly produces accessories such 
as the parts for the ignition, the lock for the car boot, and the locks for car 
doors for Honda. This factory has over 1,500 employees. A significant num-
ber of these workers have a middle school education, and their average age is 
thirty. Factory C is also a supplier of parts for Honda. It is situated in the same 
industrial park as Factory A. It is not a large-scale factory, and it has only 200 
or so employees, all of whom are young graduates with a vocational secondary 
school education. In the same way as other subcontracted factories in the Pearl 
River Delta, these three enterprises had, for a long time, been facing a shortage 
of workers due to the low wages it pays its staff. The strikes began at Factory A, 
then Factories B and C one by one responded with their own action. However, 
the strikes did not coincide with one another. The strikes at each of the three 
factories lasted for at least 6 days.
3.1 Factory A: Strikes Woven through the Internet
The workers at Factory A had already been dissatisfied with their low wages for 
quite some time,9 and there had already been rumors of strike at the factory. 
Prior to this round of strikes, there had been several instances of small-scale 
8    In line with academic standards, this article uses pseudonyms to replace the names of towns, 
cities, enterprises and people.
9    Before the strikes, level one general workers/rank-and-file workers received over a basic wage 
of 700 yuan per month. If we account for additional wages for their specific role within the 
factory, wages for overtime and then deductions made for various types of insurance, what 
they would actually receive was still only around 1,200 yuan. In three years, the company had 
made only minor adjustments to workers’ wages, adding around 10 yuan or so. Many of the 
workers even had to borrow money just to scrape by. 
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strikes aimed at the low and mid-level management. However, the previous 
strikes had not attracted the attention of high-level management. When the 
lowest wage rate in F City was adjusted to 920 yuan, the company simply began 
to calculate wages received by workers for their specific roles in the factory as 
part of their basic wage. This undoubtedly intensified the dissatisfaction of the 
workers and for a small number of them, strengthened their resolve to strike. 
At the very beginning, the strikes started with Xiao Lü and Xiao Xiao, who 
had already handed in their notices. They used the drone of the safety alarm to 
make the call on the shop floor, appealing to fellow workers from their respec-
tive production lines to strike. In some of the other departments there were 
also workers who were persuaded to join in the strike, but a significant number 
of workers were being blocked in the recreational room by management and 
were not allowed to join in. In the end, only around a hundred or so work-
ers collected together at the basketball court, where they began a quiet sit-in. 
However, this very quickly caused the whole factory to stop production. The 
news of the strike also fed through to the interns and those workers on the 
middle and late shift who were resting. This was achieved via text, phone and 
QQ Groups. On hearing the news of the strike, many of the employees imme-
diately started making calls to local television stations to make them aware of 
the news, and made posts about it on various forums. All that the company’s 
management could do was agree to hold talks with the employees, and prom-
ise to give them a response in one week’s time.10 Before the strikes, the workers 
had already set up internal QQ Groups, respectively based on work groups and 
the networks of the strike activists and those with whom they were close. To 
keep in touch with the outside world, they used a local web forum called TTX 
(Tian Tian Xin Wangzhan 天天新网站) to disseminate photos, filmed footage 
and written information on the strike. Through this forum, the workers also 
gleaned information and received announcements to coordinate their action 
in the strikes. 
On the third day, the workers went back to production, but the slump in 
their enthusiasm was obvious. It was also after three days that the company 
began to undertake talks with the representatives elected by the workers, but 
the workers clearly felt that the owners lacked sincerity. Out of a list of over a 
hundred suggestions put forward by the workers, the owners had conceded 
to only a few and had agreed to increase wages by only 55 yuan, which, as far 
as the workers were concerned, was just insulting. The workers immediately 
turned to the Internet to start another round of strikes that Friday evening. 
10    When the management first received news of the workers’ strike, their reaction was to 
express their contempt for the action. This only served to further infuriate the striking 
workers. 
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This time, the number of striking workers quickly reached three hundred. 
The company responded by firing two of the workers who were leading the 
strikes. However, this move only prompted more workers who had, up until 
that point, not left the production line, to join the ranks of striking workers. As 
they marched, the workers were shouting demands for a pay rise at the top of 
their voices and singing patriotic songs, whilst from time to time this would be 
followed by banter about the company’s management. To prevent the owners 
from taking photographs in order to act in retaliation against the strikers, the 
workers all wore facemasks. 
The ranks of striking workers were constantly expanding, and there were 
more and more news reports on the strike. The workers enthusiastically 
accepted interviews by the reporters outside the factory gates, and they 
actively communicated with the outside world using the Internet. This strike 
caused a halt to production at Company H’s four China-based assembly 
plants as well as at the company’s other parts factories. However, the owners 
subsequently began to split up their interns, and some, under pressure from 
their school and under coercion and concessions to pay-raises from the com-
pany, signed a document pledging not to strike. At the same time, the factory 
decided to raise the increase in workers’ pay to one of 355 yuan. Meanwhile, 
the government began to ban reporting by Chinese media on the strike at 
Factory A and attempted to shut down the QQ Groups and the TTX forums 
being used by the workers. 
Presented with a wage increase of 355 yuan, the workers still decided to 
hold firm and stand their ground, continuing the strike. By the third Monday 
of the strike, with the assistance of S Township’s Labor Union and govern-
ment employees, the factory managed to divide up the workers from differ-
ent sections of production and begin separate communications. Following 
this, only the workers from the ZZ section who had been the first to strike in 
the beginning, pressed on and came into conflict with the S township Labor 
Union. Several workers were beaten, causing a further escalation of the situ-
ation. The next day, only through the mediation of a certain delegate to the 
National People’s Congress (NPC, 全国人民代表大会) and with the promise of 
the company’s manager not to sack the striking workers, the workers agreed to 
go back into talks and gradually resume work. Three days later, a seven-hour 
negotiation was held between the workers and the owners. At one point the 
talks reached an impasse, but the stepping in of an expert on labor-capital 
relations helped the workers to straighten out their demands and bring more 
clarity to their strategy. In the end, the company conceded to a pay-rise of 
500 yuan and the establishment of a normalized mechanism for  coordinating 
wage increases. Subsequently, the workers reformed the Labor Union, for 
which, aside from the chairman, they elect all of the leaders. 
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3.2 Following Suit: Factory B and Factory C Begin Strikes  
of Their Own
The news of the strikes at Factory A mainly spread to other enterprises through 
media channels such as the Internet. This incident triggered a reaction in the 
workers at other Japanese car parts factories, including Factories B and C, gal-
vanizing them to action, so that the strikes at many other factories picked up 
speed. It is particularly worth noting that the workers at these factories began 
to copy the style of strike and negotiation tactics used at Factory A, as well as 
adopting the same standards when making their demands. 
Overall, the wages of workers at Factory B were lower than those at fac-
tory A.11 On previous occasions, the workers had instigated several small-scale 
strikes, but they had all ended in failure. This time, the news of the strikes at 
Factory A and wage increases at other companies in the surrounding area con-
stantly gnawed at the nerves of the workers. Added to this was the complete 
indifference of the company to the workers’ demands for a pay-raise,12 so some 
of the workers began to plan to instigate a strike after they had collected their 
annual mid-year bonus. The strike activists set up a QQ Group for the strike, 
and these key workers used this Group to share information, discuss strategy 
and coordinate the action. 
However, the sentiments amongst the workers were such that they were 
unable to wait it out until then. The evening before the strike was to formally 
begin, some of the workers from one of the production lines drew their work 
to a standstill, instigating a clash between the workers, the security guards 
and the management, in which some workers were beaten. The next morn-
ing, upon hearing the news, several of the strike activists, including a worker 
named Liu Kai, immediately led their production line workers to support the 
strike.13 They swept through all of the production lines in the factory, mobiliz-
ing the workers, and the wave of the strike quickly engulfed the whole factory. 
At the same time as marching within and outside of the factory, the workers 
made great efforts to post information, pictures and even video footage of the 
11    The wages of ordinary workers on the first rung are around 900 yuan. If we count their 
wages for overtime, subsidy for housing and then detract the various costs for insurance, 
the amount they actually get hold of is only 1,100 yuan.
12    Almost all of those workers who allowed us to interview them said that if the company 
had previously acted of its own accord to add 100–200 yuan to their wages, they would 
have given up striking. In the days leading up to the strike, several of the strike’s activists 
actually went via the management to express the demand for a pay-rise to the company. 
13    These shop-floor workers need to undergo a long period of training and are difficult to 
replace. 
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strike on various websites and forums, and they also made phone calls to tele-
vision stations to report the news. However, the government and the company 
also responded rapidly. The surrounding roads were immediately blocked 
off by the police, and even the river in front of the factory was patrolled by 
police vessels, whilst the droves of reporters coming to interview the work-
ers were turned away. In the days following, painstaking efforts were made to 
clamp down on reports of the strikes. With the support of the government, the 
company altered its previously moderate attitude,14 instead strongly threaten-
ing and trying to split up the workers. On the day of the strike, the company 
shut all of the workers inside the factory, and the ranks of marching workers 
were permeated with plainclothes informants so that the moment the striking 
workers made any move, they could capture it on camera. Several of the strike 
activists were followed at their every turn, their phones were bugged and their 
QQ Groups were infiltrated by the management. Outwardly, the factory began 
negotiations with the strike activists, but behind closed doors they were using 
the same tactics as the township government, both luring Liu Kai and the oth-
ers with the promise of gains and threatening them, to make them persuade 
the workers to go back to work.15
Early morning on the third day, the factory stuck up a notice announcing 
that they were willing to increase wages by 100 yuan. At the same time, they 
also promised additional incentives to those workers that would go back to 
work and prepared a document for them to sign. Aside for a small number 
of old employees, locals and management staff, the majority of the workers 
expressed anger at the company’s way of handling things. Without those lead-
ing the strikes at the present, they still persevered with their strike, directly 
prompting a march outside the factory gates. When faced with warnings from 
the higher-level management, the workers responded by hissing and booing. 
The strike continued for several days after this. Aside from continuing to 
divide and demoralize the striking workers, the company devised different 
channels to recruit new workers. At the same time, the company continued 
to hold talks with the representatives newly elected by the workers. Yet, those 
workers who were interviewed for this study maintained that a significant 
number of these representatives were appointed by the management. Since 
the subsequent plan to offer an increase of 200 yuan included the money for 
14    To begin with, the company had decided to add 500 yuan to the workers’ wages, but they 
were stopped by the local township government, which held 35% of the shares to the 
company. 
15    Several of the strike’s activists did not agree to the requests of the factory, but considering 
their families’ safety they hid out, and later they were let go by the company. 
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meals and high temperature allowance and so on, it was viewed by many of the 
workers as hollow and without even a modicum of sincerity. The majority of 
the workers continued to press ahead with their resistance. 
The stalemate between labor and capital was again broken by the same del-
egate to the NPC who had participated in the negotiations at Factory A. With 
the promise of a pay-raise of at least 200 yuan, at least two days of overtime 
per month, and that the striking workers would not be held accountable, 
many of the workers, fearing that they would be replaced by the company’s 
new recruits, agreed to go back to work for three days and hold further talks 
three days later. At the final negotiations, the factory and the government took 
a tough stance, conceding only to giving the workers an additional 200 yuan 
on their basic rate and subsidies totaling 80 yuan. The Labor Union was also 
reorganized, but the workers argued that this was simply a formality. Following 
this, the company went on to cancel the contracts of some of the workers who 
had proven active during the strikes and also began to more heavily monitor 
and control the behavior of other workers. The company also increased the 
volume that its workers were required to produce. 
In the same way as at the other factories, what prompted strikes at Factory C 
was the low wages that could not match the constantly increasing commod-
ity prices. A good number of discrepancies had also been building up for a 
long time, between the workers and the factory, over the calculation of their 
overtime, the docking of wages, privacy on the production lines, agency fees, 
work uniforms and so on. The Japanese management, for its part, had never 
concerned itself with the requests of the workers. A whole series of recent 
strikes and wage increases elsewhere also undoubtedly intensified the mood 
amongst the workers. In the end, it was a disagreement between several work-
ers and the management about the arrangement of shifts that gave rise to a 
strike throughout the whole factory of over a hundred ordinary workers. At 
the beginning, the company did not pay any attention to the action of the 
workers. Out in the scorching sun, not only did the workers fail to receive 
the reply they had been waiting for from the manager, but the company held 
them back when it was time for them to finish work, not allowing them to go 
home. The next day, the owners announced that they would increase wages 
by 200 yuan, but in reality, they had calculated the money for meals within 
this. This game with numbers that the owners were playing served only to 
further infuriate the workers. 
On the third day, two moves by the factory would force the discrepancy 
between the two sides towards boiling point. The first was the refusal to 
provide the workers with food and water; the second was to stick up an 
announcement stating that all those workers who had been participating in 
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the strike would be dismissed. The Chinese management was then forced 
to enforce the company’s decision. On the same day, police began to be 
deployed outside the company gates. As the mood of the group was aroused 
to indignation, almost all of the management staff, including two section 
leaders and the clerical staff, also joined the ranks of the strike. The man-
agers’ move to join in the strike not only caused the morale of the striking 
workers to skyrocket, but they also became a powerful leading force in the 
workers’ action thereafter. 
Faced with this momentum, the company had to make multiple moves of 
their own. The first was to urgently recruit new workers; the second was to split 
up the workers, particularly those who were locals; the third was to import 
finished products from overseas to guarantee that their supply line remained 
unbroken; the fourth was to continue talks with the worker representatives 
and keep going with their games with numbers, and finally, they asked the gov-
ernment Labor Union to come and mediate. Meanwhile, the workers were dis-
cussing tactics everyday with their superiors and exerting systematic pressure 
on those workers who were not participating in the strike.16 In the same way as 
at the first two factories, the workers discussed matters pertaining to the strike 
with the help of a QQ Group; they posted on various forums and on their own 
spaces, uploaded photos and video footage; they maintained close communi-
cation with different media groups. 
By the final stages, the workers virtually held no hope of success in the 
strike, and yet almost all of them kept battling on for the sake of dignity. The 
owners were also racking their brains each day to come up with counter-
moves. The Japanese director and the NPC delegate mentioned above stepped 
in and broke the impasse, and in the end the two sides reached a consensus. 
The company conceded to adding 250 yuan to both the basic wage and sub-
sidies for the workers. However, the employees reported that in reality, the 
increase to their wages was far lower than 500 yuan, because they began to 
receive less overtime, the volume they were required to produce in a given 
time was increased, and even the water and electricity costs increased signif-
icantly. For reasons unknown to the workers, some of the activists from the 
strikes left their positions at the factory, and the two section managers were 
demoted. The newly organized Labor Union basically existed in name only. 
16    Much of this was lambasting them for going against national interests. To differing 
degrees, the workers at all three factories used anti-Japanese sentiments and discourse to 
mobilize people to strike.
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4 Breaking through Adversity: Four Types of Mechanism for 
Mobilization
The Internet has drawn the attention of many scholars of social movements 
due to its inherent qualities, typically its ability to go beyond spatial limits 
and make interaction and communication fast and convenient, the diversity 
of the sources of information, and its relative comprehensiveness in compar-
ison with traditional media (Castells, 2003; Zhao, 2006). Between the 1990s 
and the present, a substantial amount of literature has already appeared, 
exploring the connection between the Internet and social movements. In 
terms of the content, the study on the Western countries has mostly focused 
on the use of the Internet in environmental protection, feminism, anti- 
globalization, transnational movements and other new social movements 
(Van De Donk et al., 2004; Garrett, 2006). Meanwhile, the study on China 
has cast its sights across Internet dissent, Internet nationalism, Internet 
incidents, Internet appeals for help (Yang, 2009), and online resistance by 
homeowners (Huang and Gui, 2009). In terms of the Internet’s functions 
and mechanisms, the study has mainly explored the role of the Internet in 
organizing and mobilizing, in changing opportunity structures and in cogni-
tive framing processes. In terms of methodology, these studies have mostly 
drawn upon case studies, questionnaire surveys, content analysis, network 
analysis and so on (Garret, 2006). 
In Western societies, because traditional labor movements have their 
own central hierarchy of organizations, powerful organizational strength 
and close-knit networks of interpersonal relationships, they do not attract 
the attention of scholars who look at the Internet as a medium for collec-
tive action (Van De Donk et al., 2004). In China, workers at OEM factories, as 
the stratum of the “information have-less” (Qiu, 2008), are not paid a great 
deal of attention in terms of their potential to use information technologies 
in mobilizing social movements. Indeed, in terms of their sources of infor-
mation, China’s new workers lack the multifarious channels for information 
acquisition that come with the heterogeneous interpersonal networks and a 
relatively high level of education of middle-class business owners. In terms 
of organizational resources, they lack the mature organizations like those 
in foreign labor resistance, which could articulate striking workers’ interests 
and demands, and lead and mobilize collective action. This is also in contrast 
to Chinese homeowners who are allowed to establish their own homeowner 
committees. In terms of political opportunity structures, the situation for 
China’s new workers is unlike that of some other new social movements, like 
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the environmental protection movement, which receives the tacit acceptance 
of the government. Instead, because the issues of these workers are connected 
to maintaining stability in the bigger picture and also to the interests of capi-
tal and local government, they are faced with the risk of suppression. Finally, 
in terms of scale, often due to a lack of communication links to pass on infor-
mation, it is difficult for the resistance to reach beyond the single enterprise 
to form a more powerful wave of resistance. Following the high connectivity 
of the “information have-less” stratum with low-end information technology 
services, particularly using a mobile phone to connect to the Internet (Qiu, 
2008), there is now the possibility of fully making use of these new types of 
technology, whereas in the past, there was a scarcity of resources upon which 
China’s new workers could depend for collective resistance. This article, by 
drawing on materials on the strikes at the three factories, will demonstrate 
the enormous potential for ICTs, particularly the Internet, to solve the dilem-
mas faced by new workers during their resistance, including channels for 
information acquisition, organizational resources, and communication with 
the outside world. 
4.1 Mobilizing Cognizance and Sentiments 
4.1.1 Mobilising Cognizance
When new workers lack organization and class discourse, the Internet offers 
potential resources, which are important for affecting the cognition and senti-
ments of workers. Many topics trending on the Internet were also often men-
tioned by the workers during our interviews, for example, the too rapid rise 
in commodity price and even housing price. The price increases naturally 
prompted the workers to make a connection between the steep price and 
the meager rate of increases in their low wages, leading them to question the 
mechanisms controlling wage increases. Another example is that reports on 
various instances of injustice, particularly those relating to corruption and 
the unscrupulous behavior of those belonging to a class of influential officials, 
intensified the anger of workers as members at the bottom of the heap. When 
this kind of incidents was closely related to their own fate, for instance the 
Foxconn incidents involving a spate of suicides as workers jumped from its 
buildings, it would inspire even more discussions and expressions of sympa-
thy. The majority of the workers who used their mobile phones to access the 
Internet used QQ, and they would find out more about news reports via QQ’s 
popup windows. Some of the workers also frequently logged onto forums such 
as Tianya (天涯论坛) and Tiexue (铁血论坛) to keep track of and get involved 
in discussions on various issues. Although for much of the time, workers will 
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be drawn to sports news, entertainments and gossips, military news and so on, 
the moment news appears on something that is closely related to their own 
lives, many workers will not only carefully read up on the news, but also imme-
diately share it with their workmates. 
As well as being able to strengthen workers’ cognition of their own troubles, 
as a rich source of information, the Internet prompts them to reflect on the 
knowledge they have acquired from education and propaganda in the past. 
Not only is the legitimacy of the government’s Labor Union being dispelled 
through different day-to-day reports of misconducts, but even more so it is 
completely losing the trust of ordinary employees as a result of its perfor-
mance in certain major incidents. 
At the moment, elected Labor Unions are basically just working for the 
capitalists. The Labor Union at Factory A even cracked down on the 
strikes by the workers! Not speaking up for the workers, that’s nothing, 
but it even cracked down on them striking! You saw the news about it too. 
They even beat up the employees, right? There were people in uniform 
from the S Township government, plainclothes people and people from 
the S Township Labor Union.
Factory B, 21 January 2011
The strengthening of their perception of their own difficulties and their 
questioning of the role played by the Labor Union have prompted a sig-
nificant number of workers to begin seeing the issue in structural terms. As 
such, it is not difficult to understand why, during this wave of strikes, the 
workers from many factories extended demands for the reconfiguration of 
the Labor Union and the establishment of a normalized system for wage 
negotiations. 
Of course the low-cost, easily accessed information from the Internet 
does not only change or strengthen people’s identification in daily life, 
even more so, it can be deployed at key moments to supply movements 
with participants (Garrett, 2006). When workers are faced with sudden 
problems during the process of a strike, they will often search for corre-
sponding information and look for support on the Internet. For example, 
when the workers at Factory A were accused by the owners’ lawyer of ille-
gally striking, they were able to quickly search on the Internet for infor-
mation on the legally acceptable behavior of workers, which stabilized 
the fighting spirit of the troops and gave a great boost to morale. 
Factory A, 12 January 2011
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In much the same way, in our interviews, the workers from factories B and C 
also frequently mentioned searching on the Internet for past instances of the 
law being in support of strikes. The contents of other searches included the 
business models of a company (from which the workers were able to come 
to understand their own strategic position within the production chain), 
the impacts of different strikes and so on. This is how one male worker from 
Factory C described what was going on at the time: 
Interviewer: “Were you specifically setting out to look up business 
models?”
Interviewee: “Yes we were, as well as the Labor Law and that kind of thing, 
erm, it was really crazy at that time, right?”
Interviewer: “How was it crazy?”
Interviewee: “Well, basically, as long as it meant we’d be successful, we’d 
search anything, Labor Law and all that. We all surfed the Internet, and 
we could find anything we needed there. . . .”
Factory C, 24 January 2011
4.1.2 Mobilizing Sentiments
The Internet provides a rich source of information for the participants of a 
movement, and what is equally important is that it is also a platform for inter-
action. The striking workers made full use of platforms like their QQ Groups 
and various forums. They shared their feelings with one another: they spoke out 
about the alienation of working on the production line, their inhuman lives and 
the unfair treatment they received. They spoke of the unsavory practices of their 
management, like their corruption, pushing around and bullying the people 
beneath them, and excluding outsiders. They also expressed their indignation 
at being fleeced and exploited. For example, a worker from Factory A posted 
his own “angry shout” on one of the widely spread posts on a TTX forum: the 
company is making a huge profit but it still squeezes the workers in every way 
possible; the Japanese top-level management is showing not even the slightest 
whiff of sincerity, not keeping their word on raising pay, conning everyone time 
after time, and using every conceivable threat to intimidate the workers. Finally, 
he expressed strong skepticism over the development model of the nation as a 
whole, which was based on low-cost human resources and the sacrifice of work-
ers. Workers also used different ways to express their dissatisfaction with their 
current situations, such as exposing their pay-slips on the Internet and writ-
ing comic verses. In the atmosphere of mutual communication of opinions and 
feelings, some workers may have not been entirely truthful or may have gone 
to extremes in what they were writing, but overall the exchange online really 
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deepened workers’ hostility to the owners, eliciting greater unity, boosting 
morale and heightening their desire to continue the resistance. 
The deepening of the structural plight of these new workers is happening 
at precisely the time when the Internet is popularized as a kind of way of life, 
which implies that there is the possibility for workers to fully absorb and utilize 
this abundance of information. Just as we can see from the above, they have 
begun to reexamine their own difficulties and learned to think about the plight 
of the worker group from a structural perspective, in terms of national institu-
tions, the model adopted for development and so on. They are skeptical about 
the current system of wages, the role of the Labor Union and even the model 
of economic growth, and they have become conscious of the necessity for and 
legitimacy of collective resistance. They are, on a conscious level, absorbing, 
contemplating and questioning, and at the same time, they are trying to draw 
on Internet platforms to express themselves and to communicate. Thus the 
significance of the Internet for workers is not merely that it will spark their 
desire for resistance in a specific collective action. A more likely impact is that 
a new set of subjects is being forged. They are learning to contemplate things 
on a structural level, attempting to articulate their demands at a systemic level, 
and they dare to undertake resistance on a collective level. 
4.2 Organization and Mobilization
In Western social movements, the role of the Internet in organizing and mobi-
lizing is for the most part manifested as a complement to formal organizations, 
making it convenient for internal communication and coordination when 
mobilizing a movement (Van De Donk et al., 2004). However, when there is 
a lack of formal organizations, the Internet is not simply a complementary or 
an additional tool. The Internet itself has to produce a kind of decentralized, 
non-hierarchical, make-do organization. This article attempts to summarize 
the organizing and mobilizing mechanisms of the Internet in labor collective 
resistance as establishing connections, discussing strategy, sharing experiences 
and quickly mobilizing. In the cases illustrated above, at all three factories, the 
strikes were organized mainly through QQ Groups, but QQ Groups were used 
most exhaustively and in the most sophisticated way at Factory A. As such, 
Factory A will be drawn upon as an example to show the potential role of the 
Internet in organizing and mobilizing.
4.2.1 Establishing Connections
As the living arrangements of the workers were quite spread-out, communica-
tion covering a greater scope was mainly achieved by using QQ Groups. Many 
of the different production teams created their own QQ Group. The workers 
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were not particularly familiar with one another, but during the duration of the 
strikes, workers living in different areas and working on different shifts com-
municated their feelings with one another, encouraged each other, and shared 
their experiences through these QQ Groups. In this way, the weak relationship 
that existed between the workers became strengthened. 
One of the leaders of the strike from the ZZ production section got some 
of the people he was familiar with and activists from other sections to join 
the QQ Group. In this way, a network was built up between the different sec-
tions to coordinate things. Not everyone joined the QQ Group, nor everyone 
actively participated. After the strike activists from the different sections got 
word from the “headquarters,” they then used the QQ Group of their own pro-
duction team to spread the word, or did so by word of mouth. Through this 
network, it was possible for the latest news or decisions to be received and 
passed about at any time between the different production sections, between 
the strike activists and the followers, and between those workers who had and 
those who did not have QQ Groups. In this way, they were able to act in concert 
with each other in their actions. 
4.2.2 Discussing Tactics
There was no clear leader of the workers’ strike at Factory A. This was all the 
more the case following the dismissal of two of the people who had been lead-
ing the strike. Many employees would participate in democratic discussions, 
and those who were quite insightful and well reputed played a certain role in 
guiding things. Although there were differences in opinion and the discussions 
were quite chaotic, they were still able to reach a consensus in the end. The 
contents of the discussions were mostly related to each of the steps to be taken 
in the run-up to and during the strike, the plan for increasing wages and so on: 
There’s a guy, that guy over there, he listed out all of the different steps, 
and he asked our team and those other teams to just follow his steps the 
next day. It was as if all we were doing was walking up to the national flag 
and singing the national anthem. . . . For instance we, erm, after we went 
there by bus in the morning, we’d go to wait to begin work. We would 
go there, and on the lawn of the company we would quietly, quietly sit, 
and wait for our own team to arrive. When our team arrived, we would 
then walk along the road used by company cars. We would walk along 
that road until we got to the national flag, and then we would sing the 
national anthem. After that, we would go to the basketball court, and 
there, there we’d sit. . . .
Factory A, 12 January 2011
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Of course, the face-to-face discussions between the strike activists and the rep-
resentatives were also very important. However, not only did the discussions 
about strike tactics on the Internet benefit from the pooling of different opin-
ions, but they also deepened the workers’ sense of responsibility and desire to 
participate within this horizontal democratic network. It could be argued that 
they both surpassed and complemented the face-to-face discussions.
4.2.3 Sharing Experiences
Workers from different departments and different shifts would come across 
various issues in the different phases of the strikes. They may also have a posi-
tive experience and good strategies to deal with those issues. These workers 
would share all of them within the QQ Group.
All of the people that participated in the strikes did, they all joined a QQ 
Group.17 Then when something happened or whatever, we’d tell people 
about it in the QQ Group. Then, all the people that weren’t working would 
be constantly checking what exactly was going on in that Group. Then, 
erm, sometimes it would be time for one Group to finish work, and they 
would come online too. Then the people from this Group would pass stuff 
on, telling them what they could do, and what they could do would work 
better. They’d sum up their experiences, that kind of thing.
Factory A, 12 January 2011 
4.2.4 Instant Mobilization
The situation at the scene of the action was constantly changing. The workers 
would use their mobile phones to report through a QQ Group about what was 
going on, including their own situation, what was going on with the factory, 
where support was needed, where there were reporters and so on. Also, the 
instant a decision was made, the QQ Groups would be used to draw together 
unified action. As mentioned above, the workers returned to work for some 
days, but later, when some workers heard that the company was not sincere 
about increasing wages, they immediately made a call on the Internet to all 
the workers: 
Originally we were meant to start work on Monday, but in the end we 
started striking on Thursday evening, because we were worried that if we 
waited until Monday, the company would have already come up with a 
17   Not all of the workers had joined QQ Groups; at least some of those interviewed said that 
they had not joined the Groups.
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counterstrategy. Then, on the Internet—at that time we had a Group—
we sent messages to say that we couldn’t wait until then to strike, for if we 
waited until then it would be too late!
Factory A, 16th January 2011
The workers also gave each other encouragement in their QQ Groups, since 
it was unavoidable that the combination of striking over long periods and 
the oppressive heat of the weather at that time would cause a slump in 
their morale. This kind of mutual encouragement was also very useful when 
they faced sudden difficulties, for example, when a lawyer brought in by the 
company accused the workers who were gathered together in one of the 
rooms of unlawfully striking, the workers were faced with huge psychologi-
cal pressure, but everyone encouraged each other to keep going and not to 
be tricked. 
Thus, when organizational strength is lacking, the Internet has the poten-
tial to enable new workers to effectively organize, and to undertake efficient 
and effective resistance. When a network for disseminating information has 
been woven amongst the workers who are spread about, and they use this to 
discuss strategy and share their experiences, in the event that they are faced 
with sudden difficulties, they are able to immediately unify their actions to 
avoid chaos. 
5 Mobilization of Social Forces
Social movements must also consider the political opportunity structures with 
which they are faced (Tarrow, 1996). The greatest fear of the workers at the sub-
contracted factory was that their collective strike would be silently suppressed. 
The Internet breaks through the government’s regulation of information and 
reduces a state’s capacity for repression (Scott and Street, 2000), because both 
the Internet’s rapid, automated path for disseminating information and its 
high interconnection with multiple routes between nodes make it very diffi-
cult for the government to regulate (Garrett, 2006). 
Deeply aware of the importance of communicating with the outside world, 
what workers did at every factory, as soon as they began to strike, was make 
contact with the media and surf the Internet to post the news. The high enthu-
siasm of the workers left the phone-lines of many media groups constantly 
engaged. Some of the workers tracked down and gathered together the con-
tact details of all kinds of media houses, including online media and television 
channels, to seek the greatest possible coverage of the strikes. While some were 
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doing this, a greater proportion of the workers were spreading the latest news 
from the scene of the strikes via various forums, typically with written descrip-
tions, and pictures and filmed footage they had taken themselves. The first-
hand materials used in many journalists’ reports were taken from amongst 
those materials. Many of the workers viewed the support and attention of the 
outside world as the most integral factor in the success of the strikes, because 
this would enable them to avoid being fated to succumb to suppression: 
If it was like that, we might have been quieter, and that way we might 
have been put under pressure. Maybe after two or three days, after a few 
days, we would have been, we would have been hushed up by the police, 
and no one would have known anything about it . . . If society wasn’t pay-
ing any attention to us, without society’s attention, no one would see 
what was going on, we. . . . No, there are strikes in lots of places but the 
news on them is banned, right? If that was the case, we could even be 
there with our heads smashed in and bloody but no one would see, and 
then we’d be even more terrified. 
Factory A, 12 January 2011
The workers also derived strength from this attention. During the strikes, many 
of the workers were constantly checking the media reports on their own strike, 
keeping an eye on the various comments and reactions from different quar-
ters. Of course, there were some who were concerned with whether or not the 
reports coming out were true, because they were worried that the media would 
be bribed by the owners. 
Another reason that the workers sought Internet support was that they 
felt that they already had nobody around them that they could rely on: the 
government and the Labor Union were standing on the opposite side to the 
workers. Under such circumstances, the Internet was representative of jus-
tice; it was the law; it could discern whether something was right or wrong. 
Thus, by attracting the attention of the world outside, this confrontation 
between the workers, capital, and the government was to be placed upon 
an open stage, to ensure that the confrontation avoided becoming seriously 
imbalanced. The political opportunity structure that had been in place pre-
viously was broken; the workers had found themselves a widespread alli-
ance, and the greatest assistance this alliance could provide for the workers 
was attention. This attention forced the owners to respond to the reasonable 
demands of the workers, and even more so, it restricted the use of violence 
by the state. 
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6 Showing Them How It’s Done
The reports on the strikes that appeared on the Internet and in other forms 
of media not only lent strength to the striking workers themselves, but also 
had a powerful galvanizing impact upon other workers. The pay-rise at Factory 
A achieved through the strikes not only amplified the dissatisfaction of the 
workers at enterprises that had not offered pay-raises, such as Factory B and C, 
but also made them see the possibility of fighting for their interests by way of 
collective resistance. 
The most pressing problems faced by workers are that they have little expe-
rience of collective action and then lack institutionalized organizations and 
the help of outside forces. The cases of strikes that received widespread report-
ing on the Internet precisely provided workers a model to copy. Many of the 
lessons drawn from the strikes at Factory A were picked up on and used in the 
process of the strikes underway at Factories B and C, including the principles, 
forms and methods of civilized and rational striking: 
Actually, we weren’t the first factory to strike, and we could already see 
how other people had been striking. So we knew what we were doing. 
We wouldn’t use violence, including hitting people and whatever, and we 
wouldn’t go damaging anything either. All we were going to do was sit 
quietly and negotiate, you know.
Factory C, 24th January 2011
The substance of what they were learning from and copying also included the 
methods for negotiating and for securing an increase in pay. One of the female 
workers from Factory B added herself to the QQ Group of Factory A and also 
contacted one of Factory A’s strike activists, learning from this person about 
their successful experiences in striking and negotiating (Factory B, 20 January 
2011). In addition, in the same way as at other factories, the representatives 
from Factory B looked to the precedent of Factory A in demanding the refor-
mation of the Labor Union. 
With the Internet as an intermediary medium, batch after batch of new 
worker subjects, sensitive to their own plight and to the structural roots behind 
it, with a strong sense of the need for resistance, are gradually being forged, 
which, without doubt, provides a solid basis for collective labor resistance. The 
mobilization and organization undertaken via the Internet can enable loosely 
scattered workers who are lacking organization to be organically linked up and 
can coordinate the unity of their action. The mobilization of external strength 
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boosted the morale of the workers and even more so, altered the original politi-
cal opportunity structure, thus avoiding suppression by the state. Exemplary 
models of mobilization prompted collective labor resistance on a wider scale 
and provided it with a successful frame of reference. 
7 Limitations of Using the Internet
As a tool for internal mobilization and external communication in workers’ 
collective resistance, the Internet has the possibility of molding the cogni-
tion and feelings of new workers, but the significance of the Internet and 
the effect it may have on the social movements of new workers and other 
groups in the future remains difficult to accurately judge. The above analy-
sis has merely pointed to the possible mobilization mechanisms for labor 
resistance, yet the form that these mechanisms will take in the future and 
the role they will play is still colored with huge uncertainty. Studies of the 
Internet must avoid simple predilection towards “political determinism” or 
“technological determinism” (Huang, 2010), but instead we should specifi-
cally examine the complicated relationship between the characteristics of 
the Internet as such, the reality of the institutional environment, and the 
creativity of Internet users (Garrett and Edwards, 2007). During the strikes 
at all three factories, government and capital struck back at the workers’ 
action online and in other media, yet the workers immediately responded 
by altering their own action. The exploration of the complicated interaction 
between the state, capital and workers on the Internet should be helpful in 
deepening our understanding of the complex significance of the attributes 
of Internet technologies for labor resistance within a given “state-society” 
relationship. 
Throughout the process of the three factory strikes, the first half of the 
strike at Factory A received widespread coverage by television stations, 
newspapers and Internet media. It was even reported by some of the main-
stream government media groups. However, after about a week, the govern-
ment placed a ban on reports of the strike in domestic traditional media 
and some of the main web portals. Also, the TTX forum through which the 
workers had been connecting with the outside world was closed down. With 
the strikes at factories B and C, the government banned media coverage by 
major media agencies right from the beginning. Of course, the workers were 
still posting information on the strike via various forums and their own QQ 
spaces, and news or forwarded posts could also be seen on websites other 
than the main portals. 
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The resistance of the workers with the government and capital over QQ 
Groups was full of even more drama. When the workers at Factory A realized 
that there were staff on the side of the owners who had joined their Group, 
they immediately switched to using a new Group. Following this, the workers’ 
QQ Group was shut down by the government. The workers took lessons from 
this and once again set a new Group. 
At Factory B, monitoring by the owners was more severe. Not only did the 
owners monitor and track the strike activists, they also secretly joined their 
Groups and noted what the activists were saying, and were using this as a basis 
to intimidate and berate them: 
Our QQ Group wasn’t actually closed down, but we heard that the 
Japanese accessed it and read the chat history. One of my workmates 
knew about it and she knew all about it. She sent us messages telling 
us not to go to work, she sent a load of them, and she sent messages on 
QQ. Then, she was called in to the company, and they said she was tak-
ing a leading role. She said that it might have been that the messages she 
was sending us were being monitored and controlled, and that’s how the 
company knew so much.
Factory B, 21 January 2011
A group of the main strike activists at Factory B switched their communication 
platform to YY Voice (a network similar to Skype) and used code words to dis-
cuss arrangements for secret gatherings (Barboza and Bradsher, 2010). 
8 Conclusion
The emergence and popularization of a new way of life may bring with it the 
re-configuration of people’s lifestyles, personal networks and values, and may 
even lead to even larger transformation on a systemic level. Rather than sim-
ply using the Internet, people are living within it. In this sense, many research 
topics within the social sciences in the future will be inextricably linked to 
analysis of the Internet. China’s new workers are caught up amongst structural 
difficulties, yet at the same time they are also lacking in institutionalized, orga-
nizational resources and discourse resources. This study, through case studies 
of the three strikes, has demonstrated the possible roles and mechanisms of 
ICTs, in particular the Internet, for molding the cognition of these new work-
ers, and in both internal and external mobilization for stimulating collective 
resistance (see Table 6.1). 
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This is evinced specifically in the following: heightening the desire to par-
ticipate and strengthening collective unity through cognitive and emotional 
mobilization; exploiting the Internet for organization and mobilization to 
ensure that the movement is orderly, rational and efficient; mobilizing exter-
nal forces in order to alter the political opportunity structures and avoid sup-
pression; and providing a precedent or frame of reference to be learned from 
and imitated. However, these are just possible paths, and the final effect that 
the Internet will have upon collective labor resistance is inseparable from 
how it is used innovatively by the workers within the context of the current 
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“state-society” relationship. Every move of workers to use the Internet in their 
 collective resistance is followed by the control and counter-moves of the state 
and of capital. However, research shows that whilst the state finds it easy to 
control traditional media, taming the Internet is an entirely different matter. 
The publication of news on the major web portals can be controlled, but it is 
practically impossible to control the spread of information and interaction by 
the hundreds of thousands of news carriers. News can be screened for the most 
sensitive information, but there is no way to obstruct workers who are faced 
with the struggle of existence from using, paying attention to, and contem-
plating the various types of everyday information that is related to their own 
fate. There is no stopping the emergence of batch after batch of new worker 
subjects who are sensitive to their own plight and the structural roots behind 
it and have a strong sense of the need for resistance. The unique traits of the 
Internet provide an enormous and flexible space that can be utilized by differ-
ent groups. Within the context of the “state-society” relationship, how workers 
utilize this space to protect their own rights and interests, how they change 
the configuration of the current system on a macro level, and how they even 
reconfigure “state-society” relationship—all these remain significant subjects 
for future research on labor. 
Of course, the emphasis on the mobilizing role of the Internet does not 
necessarily mean that the role of the traditional dormitory, place-of-origin, 
classmate networks and that of traditional media and technologies in launch-
ing and organizing workers’ collective action at OEM factories should be 
overlooked. In mobilizing workers to resist, the Internet goes beyond tradi-
tional methods of mobilizing, whilst both complementing them and being 
complemented by them. The Internet has broken through the spatial limita-
tions of dormitory, place-of-origin, production line and classmate networks, 
and as thus it presents the possibility of breaking through the current politi-
cal opportunity structures. In addition, it provides a stimulating source of 
information and supplies a frame of reference and access to the experience 
gleaned through other strikes. The interactive nature of the Internet and 
its nature as a source of diverse information mean that in comparison with 
other forms of media like television and newspapers, it has greater poten-
tial to break through censorship and closure by the state. The coordination of 
action using QQ Groups is also faster and more convenient than in the past, 
when workers would only use their mobile phones. The above case studies 
have shown that in strikes, the workers would use the Internet to weave class-
mates, workmates, people from the same place-of-origin and all other kinds 
of contacts into a more organic network that was larger in both scale and 
scope. Moreover, when organizing and coordinating collective action, they 
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would use both mobile phone text messaging and face-to-face interaction to 
complement their use of the Internet. The rich information on the Internet is 
constantly shaping the cognition of the workers and in doing so inducing the 
new demands of the workers as well as heightening their desire to participate. 
The organic combination of the Internet and traditional methods of mobili-
zation is strengthening the strategic, unified and organized nature of work-
ers’ resistance. Then, the spread of the news about the resistance outside of 
the site of resistance itself is further inciting and affecting more widespread 
resistance action. 
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Chapter 7




From the very outset, the internal migration of China’s rural population has 
been linked to the issue of poverty. Early studies made in the 1990s show that 
one of the main reasons, or even the main reason, that people leave rural 
China is to help their families to escape poverty. There are of course many 
other reasons, for instance, to get out of the countryside, to seek development 
opportunities, to escape problems and so on. But in terms of the number one 
reason, different types of study have all revealed a direct connection to escap-
ing poverty.1 
It was in the 1980s that the issues of poverty and anti-poverty work in China 
came to the fore. Whilst there have been different understandings about what 
constitutes poverty, when it comes to the successes achieved over the years 
* The main research materials for this article originate from a joint project by a research team 
from the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the World Bank 
named “Xin shiqi zhongguo pinkun pinggu: dingxing yanjiu” (An Assessment of Poverty in 
China in a New Era: A Qualitative Study). The director of the research team was Wang Xiaoyi. 
I was one of the core members of the research team, and I led the follow-up study on J Village, 
Sichuan and the village’s outgoing migrant population. The results produced by the team 
upon concluding this study form the basis for this article. These include interview materials 
and specific reports at the village level. The final results of this study are to be published by 
the Social Sciences Academic Press (China). (This article was first published in Chinese in 
Open Times, 2009, No. 10).
** Tan Shen, Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.
1 See “Migrant Workers” Research Team, “Zhujiangsanjiaozhou wailai nongmingong zhuang-
kuan” (Migrant Workers in the Pearl River Delta), in Social Sciences in China, 1995 Vol. 4 (Ch); 
Du Ying, Bai Nansheng (eds.), Zouchu xiangcun: zhongguo nongcun laodongli liudong shizheng 
yanjiu (Leaving the Countryside: An Empirical Study on China’s Labor Migration), 1997, p. 34, 
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in anti-poverty work, the following two points are generally accepted, be it by 
official sources, researchers or the public:
First, if we look at the overall situation of poverty in China, we can see that 
there have been huge reductions in absolute poverty over the last twenty or so 
years. According to publicly available official data, in 1985 there were 1.25 hun-
dred million people living in absolute poverty. By 2006 this figure had dropped 
by over 80% to 21.48 million.2 In 2008, the poverty line was raised, and the 
threshold for absolute poverty was combined with that for low-income to form 
one unified standard. As such, the target population for poverty relief increased 
to 40.07 million people.3 Nonetheless, when compared with the early poverty 
alleviation in 1985, which also coincided with the beginning of rural migration, 
the reduction in poverty is still striking. 
Second, as members of the rural labor force left home to find work, the 
effect this had on increasing family income and improving living standards 
played a positive role in local economic development. For example, in 1985, 
18% of the net income of people in rural China was made up of income from 
wages, whereas by 2007 this had increased to 38.6%.4
However, there were other related problems that came sharply to the fore. 
Each new wave of people leaving rural China to find work was greater than the 
last. In recent years, these people have already come to constitute over a quar-
ter of the rural labor force.5 Yet we failed to see a reduction of the disparities 
2 “Zhongguo gaigekaifang yilai nongcun pinkun renkou jianshao 2.28 yi” (Since the Beginning 
of China’s Reforms and Opening, the Population of Rural People Living in Poverty has been 
Reduced by 2.28 hundred million) [online] Xinhua net, available at http://news.xinhuanet 
.com/fortune/2007-05/26/content_6156047.htm, [visited 8 September 2009] (Ch).
3    Gu Zhongyang “Wo guo xin pinkun biaozhun shangtiao fugai fupin duixiang 4007 wan ren”, 
(China’s New Poverty Line Raised to Cover 40.07 Million People) People’s Daily, 17 March 
2009, First Edition (Ch).
4 Gaigekaifang 30 nian: chengxiang jumin shenghuo cong pinkun xiang quanmian xiaokang 
maijin (30 Years of Reforms and Opening: The Lives of People in Urban and Rural China 
are Moving from being spent in Poverty towards Overall Moderate Prosperity) [online] 
zhongyang zhengfu menhu wangzhan (The Central Government of the People’s Republic of 
China Portal), available at http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2008-10/31/content_1136730.htm, [visited 
8 September 2009] (Ch).
5 The second general census on the agricultural labor force determined that this was a labor 
force of 5.31 hundred million people. See The Leaders Office Working Group on The Second 
National Agricultural General Census of the State Council, National Bureau of Statistics, Di er 
ci quanguo nongye pucha zhuyao shuju gongbao (di wu hao) (Public Report on Main Data from 
the Second National Agricultural General Census, No. 5) 27 February 2008, [online] National 
Bureau of Statistics Website, available at http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/nypcgb/qgnypcgb/
t20080227_402464718.htm, [visited 8 September 2009] (Ch); at the end of 2008 the migrant 
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between rural and urban China, and of wealth inequality within rural com-
munities. On the contrary, these problems have gradually become more pro-
nounced. For instance, in 1984, the gap between rural and urban income had 
shrunk to 1.71:1, but after the 1990s, rural-urban income disparity continued 
to grow, so that by 2006, it had risen to 3.28:1.6 Research by the Institute of 
Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(中国社科院人口与劳动经济研究所) posits that in the last seventeen years, 
the disparity in absolute terms between income in rural and urban China has 
increased almost twelvefold.7 This has resulted in the emergence of the Three 
Rural Issues (sannong, 三农问题) (rural areas, rural people, and agriculture), as 
well as the issue of migrant workers, and has become a focal point for serious 
government and social concern. 
What this apparently contradictory phenomenon demonstrates is that 
under circumstances where there have been enormous reductions in rural 
absolute poverty and widespread improvements in living standards, the rela-
tive poverty that arises through inequality gradually emerges as the main 
problem. So, how does this relative poverty occur? What are the effects of this 
migration of rural labor and the rural population upon inequality? 
This article is written on the basis of existing research. My prior poverty-
related research is for the most part limited to economic and social dimensions.8 
worker population was 1.4 hundred million people, see “Tongjiju:jiezhi 2008 nian mo quanguo 
nongmingong zongliang wei 22542 wan ren” (Bureau of Statistics: the Total Migrant Worker 
Population at the end of 2008 is 225,420,000) [online] (Authors note: this includes the figure 
for those going to work in a town within their own local rural area), Zhongyang zhengfu menhu 
wangzhan (The Central Government of the People’s Republic of China Portal), available at 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-03/25/content_1268173.htm, [visited 8 September 2009] (Ch).
6 “Chengxiang jumin shouru chaju reng zai kuoda 2006 nian da 3.28:1” (Disparity between 
Urban and Rural Income Continues to Grow, Reaching 3.28:1 in 2006) [online] Zhongguo 
wang, available at http://www.china.com.cn/news/2007-09/13/content_8870200.htm, [vis-
ited 8 September 2009] (Ch). 
7 Shekeyuan: zhongguo chengxiang jumin shouru chaju 17 nian zengjia 12 bei (Academy of 
Social Science: Income Disparity between Urban and Rural Chinese Increases Twelvefold in 
Seventeen Years) [online] Zhongguo Xinwen Wang (ChinaNews.com), available at http://www 
.chinanews.com.cn/cj/gncj/news/2008/10-15/1412625.shtml, [visited 8 September 2009] (Ch).
8 See Tan, S. and Zheng, G. “Wailaigong Xuqiu Diaocha Baogao” (Report on the Needs of Migrant 
Workers) in Contemporary Chinese Studies Center, Tsinghua University and Guangdong 
Provincial Women Cadre’s School, 2003 (Ch); Tan, S. (ed.) “Sichuan sheng T xian ‘gongshang 
fanxiang dagongzhe tanfang’ xiangmu ziliao huiji” (Collection of Materials from the “Visits to 
Workers who have Returned Home due to Work-related Injuries” Project, T County, Sichuan 
Province) Printed by T County’s Female Migrant Worker Service Center and T County’s 
Women’s Federation (internally circulated), 2004 (Ch); Tan, S. “Wailai nügong de anquan 
yu jiankang” (The Health and Safety of Female Migrant Workers) in Shehui zhuanxingqi de 
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Economic poverty encompasses both absolute and relative poverty. The notion 
of absolute poverty basically continues to use the traditional connotations of 
poverty, in other words, material living standards that are lower than current 
average living standards. Relative poverty, on the other hand, mainly refers to 
disparity in income. The social elements linked to poverty are inequalities in 
social status and social resources. In addition to this, culture has a deep impact 
upon rural poverty. Zhang Xiaojun (张小军) has interpreted the production of 
cultural poverty from the perspective of cultural deprivation. His discussion of 
migrant workers mainly focuses on the culturally inferior position of migrant 
workers in urban China.9 Yan Hairong (严海蓉) has argued that rural China 
has been counter-posed against the “modernity” of urban China, and thus con-
structed as a cultural wasteland, forcing young people to leave the countryside, 
altogether creating a process of “increasing vacuity in rural China.”10 Those 
studies on New Generation Migrant Workers (新生代农民工) or Second-
Generation Migrant Workers (二代农民工) all raise the issue of the difficult 
choice currently facing young people who move away from rural China to find 
work and the psychological dilemma it puts them in, as they are “unable to stay 
(in the city), but unable to go back (to the countryside).”11
Between 2006 and 2008, I participated in a qualitative study on rural poverty.12 
The perspective adopted differed from that of those studies conducted at a 
national level, which draw upon quantitative data. Its main research objectives 
were to discover the mechanisms of poverty and to analyze how at different 
levels, poverty and poverty alleviation come about. That is to say, what are the 
effects of the migration of labor and the rural population on a person’s family, 
on his or her place of origin and on that person himself or herself? What is the 
  zhongguo funü in (Chinese Women in a Period of Social Transition), Meng, X. (ed.) Beijing, 
China Social Sciences Press, 2004 edition, (Ch). 
9   Zhang Xiaojun and Pei Xiaomei (eds.) Nengli yu pinkun: zhongguo chengshi pinkun renkou 
de ge’an yanjiu (Capabilities and Poverty: Case Studies of Urban Poverty in China), Hong 
Kong Social Science Publishing House, 2007, 201–204 (Ch).
10   Yan Hairong, “Xukong de nongcun he kongxu de zhuti” (Depleted Countryside and 
Distressed Subjects), 2005, Vol. 7 Dushu (Reading), (Ch). 
11   See for example Wang Chunguang’s work on “New Generation Migrant Workers,” and the 
research of Pun Ngai and Lu Huilin on the “second generation of peasant-workers.” 
12   Working Group from the Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “An 
Assessment of Poverty in China in a New Era: A Qualitative Study,” twelve villages were 
selected from across six provinces in the western and central regions, and the eastern 
region, to undertake in-depth, detailed qualitative research into both the mechanisms 
that cause rural poverty to occur, and anti-poverty strategies. This study will be abbrevi-
ated to “Qualitative Study on Poverty.” 
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relationship between these effects and inequality? These research objectives 
determine that our research should mainly be of a qualitative nature, and that 
we should strive to adopt a bottom-up perspective. This article undertakes anal-
ysis at different levels: the rural family, the community, and the migrant worker. 
2 Migration and Poverty at the Family Level
The rationale behind selecting the rural family as the first level for observation 
is that the family is at the very heart of life for people in rural China. It is the 
link between the individual and the community. The status of an individual 
within community life is decided by his or her family. This is uniquely char-
acteristic of China. For those who are already married, the main objectives of 
their leaving home to find work arise from what the family needs. For those 
who are not yet married, the needs of their family are also one of their most 
important motivations.13
This research shows that for those villages from which there is a large out-
going migrant population, the main source of a household’s cash income 
is migrant work. Migrant work is, for the majority of families, an important 
channel through which to escape poverty. It has become generally accepted 
amongst many rural people that “if you don’t leave to find work then you’ll 
have no money.” In ten of the villages that we visited to undertake the research, 
it was very much commonplace for the villagers to emphatically confirm the 
significance of migrant work. 
Some people had managed to achieve a relatively high income by way of 
leaving home to find work or going into business, creating their own career or 
taking with them their whole family, leaving the countryside for the cities and 
altering their household registration. However, amongst those who leave the 
countryside, this kind of situation is extremely rare. 
To the majority of migrant workers and their families, their work had 
enabled a certain improvement to the way family members live, how they are 
clothed and fed, and so on. For the things that they could not afford in the past, 
they were now able to go ahead and buy them, and for the things they could 
13   Of course, the individual aims of migrants are also extremely important; this is even more 
the case for those who are young and unmarried. See Tan Shen “Jiating celüe haishi geren 
zizhu? Nongcun Laodongli waichu juece moshi de xingbie fenxi” (Family strategy or indi-
vidual autonomy? A gendered analysis of the models for decision making over the out-
migration of rural labor) in Zhejiang Xuekan (Zhejiang Academic Journal), 2004, Vol. 5 
(Ch). A discussion of these issues is included in the latter part of this paper. 
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not afford to eat in the past, they could now eat. Many families had built new 
houses. In the rural areas where we undertook our research, those households 
that had built two or even three new houses, each replacing the last, were all 
able to do so, because they had family members that had left home to work. 
Those families that still lived in the same old houses where they had been there 
for decades were usually poor households that had no income from migrant 
work. As such, in terms of its significance related to absolute poverty, migrant 
work has a positive role to play in improving the living standards of rural fami-
lies. A villager from Q Village in Inner Mongolia explained:
Twenty years ago we never had enough to eat. Ten years ago although there 
was enough to eat, we didn’t have a lot of money. We used to eat corn, now 
we eat flour and rice. We used to just eat whatever was in our yard rather 
than go and buy food, but now people go and buy their vegetables. Ten 
years ago we would only slaughter a pig to eat at New Year. There’d be some 
households that couldn’t even manage that. When you had guests, you’d 
go and buy a bit in. But now if you want to eat something, you just go out 
and buy it. Now, at New Year, every family slaughters a pig. The leftovers 
are stored, and some people cure the meat. Ten years ago, the pigs that we 
killed were scrawny and didn’t have much meat or fat on them. Now the 
pigs we have are big; you can make oil out of them. These days, people rear 
pigs to sell off, whilst ten years ago you didn’t even have enough pork to eat 
yourself. We used to wear homemade cotton overcoats, but nowadays we 
buy protective winter clothing and coats made with down. 
Q Village, Inner Mongolia (内蒙古), informal discussion with 
villagers14
Nonetheless, our analysis leads us towards the argument that for the majority 
of rural families, income from migrant work mainly plays a kind of equaliz-
ing role; it helps them to maintain a standard of living that is around aver-
age locally. In recent years, along with improvements in living standards, the 
outgoings of a rural family have also been increasing. For instance, the cost of 
everyday living, of agricultural goods and of socializing is rising. It is very dif-
ficult for a household depending purely on income accrued from agriculture 
to handle these costs. The locations for the Qualitative Study on Poverty were 
mainly impoverished or relatively poor villages. These areas really didn’t have 
14   “Q Village, Inner Mongolia, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on 
Poverty”, the leader of the sub-team was Zhan Shaohua, and the main team members 
included Wang Yan and Zhang Wei.
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great living standards, but even just to maintain things as they were they had to 
rely on migrant work. Take for example S Village in Jiangxi Province (江西省), 
where the typical model of the division of labor amongst family involves the 
young, fit and healthy going away to find work, whilst the elderly or some of the 
women stay at home and take care of agricultural production. The grains and 
vegetables the household produced were enough to sustain the whole family, 
but the costs of this production depended on income from those working away 
from home. If there was no income from migrant work, even if they were to take 
out a loan, they would be unable to then clear it.15 X Village, in Jiangxi Province 
is a village with a particularly high concentration of out-going migrants due to 
the building of a dam. The villagers there explained that they had moved here 
for fifteen or sixteen years, yet there had been no change in terms of other pro-
duction. They felt that if it wasn’t for the rising trend for doing migrant work, 
then the lives of the villagers would be even tougher. We conducted interviews 
at seventeen households here. These interviews reflected that for twelve of 
those households, income from migrant work accounted for over 70% of the 
total family income.16
In the meantime, the costs of maintaining family reproduction—building 
homes, marriage, education and medical care—were growing even more rap-
idly. Participants in some villages reflected that the cost of building just an 
ordinary new house was almost tenfold that of ten years ago. When they met 
with this kind of bulky family expenditure, rural families would often opt to 
borrow the money, and then return it by income earned through migrant work. 
For many people, returning money became the direct goal of going away to do 
migrant work. LRF’s story is a typical case: 
I left home to find work in 1991. It was because my family built a new 
house and spent over 4,000 yuan; 2,000 yuan of that was borrowed from 
my maternal uncle. I went away again to find work at a brickyard to make 
the money we owed for building the house. 
Life for him doing migrant work was really tough, and he still barely made any 
money:
15   “S Village, Jiangxi, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty,” 
the leader of the sub-team was Wang Xiaoyi, and the main team members included Ma 
Chunhua, Hua Chuanguo and Liu Chunchun.
16   “X Village, Jiangxi, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty,” 
the leader of the sub-team was Xiao Tangbiao, and main team members included Huang 
Xuesong, Liu Shiqing and Liu Xiaoqing.
Tan180
After getting married I stayed back home to grow mu’er (木耳, a type of 
edible fungus commonly used in Chinese cooking), but I ended up losing 
money. At that point I was thinking, “I’m going to have to go away again 
and do migrant work, for I need to return these loans!”
LRF’s Life History, J Village, Sichuan Province17
For the majority of rural households, the income from migrant work only 
props up a basic equilibrium. It is very rare that money can be saved up. Just 
as a villager from D Village in Gansu Province (甘肃) explained, “the money 
from doing migrant work is just spent, there’s no saving up or improvement in 
how well-off we are.”18 Those households who were better off and for whom it 
was possible for the whole family to live in the city were also unable to amass 
savings due to the high cost of urban living. As a result, when they grew older, 
the majority of migrant workers would return to their place of origin in the 
countryside and go back to their old way of life. 
However, this kind of equilibrium is often a fragile one. First, leaving home to 
find migrant work meant reliance on the outside labor market. Economic fluc-
tuations, lack of market standardization and social discrimination all directly 
affect the employment opportunities and income of migrant workers, yet these 
factors are all things that migrant workers from the countryside have no con-
trol over. Through a study conducted in 1998 in J County, Sichuan Province (四
川省), I found that due to the impact of the 1997 financial crisis a great number 
of people that had left home to work in Guangzhou (广州) had no choice but 
to return to the countryside because they were unable to find work. At the end 
of 2008, according to data from the county’s Bureau of Labor (劳动局), out 
of more than 5,000 migrant workers that had gone back to the countryside 
at that time, almost half had found themselves with no choice but to return 
home given the impact of tough financial conditions causing enterprises to 
fold or make staff cuts.19 Under normal circumstances, it is also common 
17   “J Village, Sichuan, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty,” 
the leader of the sub-team was Tan Shen, and the main team members included Xu Ping, 
Zhuang Ming and Cheng Yao.
18   “D Village, Gansu, Sub-Team Research Material”, from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty,” 
the leader of the sub-team was Zhang Xiaojun, and the main team members included Ma 
Yaping and Zhu Yujing. 
19   Institute of Sociology, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences project: “Nongcun waichu 
wugong nüxing yanjiu” (A Study of Female Rural Migrant Workers), (Ch), sponsored by 
the Ford Foundation, I was the director of this project; Li Xiang “Baiwan nongmingong 
mianlin caiyuan weiji fanxiang chao zai ci ‘zhen’ sichuan” (The Wave of Vast Numbers of 
Migrant Workers Returning to the Countryside in the face of the Crisis of Staff Cuts once 
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for migrant workers to meet with unemployment. Studies undertaken in 
2002 by me in Guangzhou, and Li Qiang (李强) in Beijing (北京), showed that 
of those migrant workers participating in the research, one third and 100% 
respectively had experienced over a month of unemployment.20 When faced 
with this kind of situation, migrant workers may even need to rely upon their 
families in the countryside to send them money, or borrow money to keep 
them going. 
For those migrant workers who came across unanticipated difficulties or 
failed in finding work, their families in the countryside directly suffered the 
effects. In recent years, much attention has been paid to incidents involving 
wages arrears, occupational safety failures, and people being ripped off whilst 
away from home working. At the same time as infringing upon the rights and 
interests of the migrant workers themselves, these incidents bring all kinds 
of difficulties for the families of migrant workers. Some become completely 
impoverished as a result, whilst others experience troubles in family relation-
ships. Take for instance, a study planned by me on sixteen rural townships 
in J County, Sichuan Province in 2004. There were 346 recorded instances of 
people becoming ill, disabled, or even dying whilst working away from their 
homes. Amongst them were 242 people from Town Z, or 2.4% of that town’s 
total population of over 10,000, who left there to find work. One of the damag-
ing effects that these incidents befalling migrant workers had on their families 
was the change in their economic situation. Three out of every four families 
saw their living standards drop beneath the average for their local area. There 
were thirty-six families that became “very poor” households.21
CKS: Male, Group One, Village S. In December 1999, he went away to work 
through the introduction of a relative. His monthly wage was around 800 yuan 
again ‘shakes’ Sichuan), [online] CCTV.com, quoted on Sohu.com, available at http://
news.sohu.com/20090111/n261689952.shtml, [visited 8 September 2009], (Ch).
20   Tan Shen and Zheng Guanghuai “Wailaigong xuqiu diaocha baogao” (Research Report on 
the Demand for Migrant Workers) (Ch); Li Qiang and Tang Zhuang “Chengshi nongmin-
gong yu chengshi zhong de fei zhenggui jiuye” (Migrant Workers and Informal Employment 
in the City) in Sociological Studies, 2002, No. 6 (Ch).
21   This was an action research project by the T County branch of the All-China Women’s 
Federation, Sichuan, the project leader was Wang Feng, and Tan Shen and Xu Ping acted 
as consultants and participated in the project design. The project was sponsored by the 
Asia Foundation. See Tan Shen (ed.) “Sichuan sheng J xian ‘Gongshang fanxiang dagong-
zhe tanfang’ xiangmu ziliao huiji” (Collection of Materials from the Project: “Visiting 
Migrant Workers who have Returned Home due to Injury at Work,” J County, Sichuan 
Province), here there were 223 recorded cases amongst 346 households; for 123 house-
holds we did not have the relevant information.
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and he worked ten hours a day. In 1999, whilst working in a coal mine in 
Guiyang (贵阳), he was injured during a collapse in the mine. He was hospital-
ized for over two months and the cost for his treatment was tens of thousands 
of yuan. The mine covered all of these costs, and after going through the vari-
ous levels of appraisal to identify the injury as work-related and to certify that 
he was, in fact, disabled, he received 4,000 yuan in compensation and made an 
application for arbitration. In 2000, he returned to his home in the countryside 
unable to work. To date, he remains unmarried, and there is his mother of over 
seventy at home who needs to be looked after. Life is very tough. 
PY, from Village Z, thirty-five years old, in 2003 went to work away at the 
Zipingpu (紫坪铺) water conservation project in Dujiangyan (都江堰) through 
an acquaintance. He was working as part of a privately contracted geologi-
cal surveying team. At 9 o’clock one evening whilst he was doing overtime, 
his lower back was injured when a drill went out of control, and the lower 
half of his body was crippled. He received no compensation, and after having 
been hospitalized for some time to receive treatment, he was sent back home, 
unable to live independently. His wife left, and he heard nothing more from 
her, whilst at home there were his eighty-year-old mother, his father, who was 
approaching ninety, and his two children, a son and a daughter. At present 
they depend on the meager pension of his old father, Rural Minimum Income 
Support (nongcun dibao, 农村低保), the financial assistance of his three elder 
sisters and social donations, both to live on and for the children’s schooling. 
After carrying out their interviews, the researchers happened to come across 
the P family’s plot of allocated land. It was thick with weeds since there was no 
one to work the land.22
There were also a great many cases of this nature that came up during the 
“Qualitative Study on Poverty”:
In 1989, MSZ was doing road construction work in Yushu County (玉树县), 
Qinghai Province (青海省). At that time, before he had received his wages, 
the boss had made a run for it, the accountant also disappeared, and 
the workers went to report it to the Bureau of Public Security (公安局). 
Chinese New Year came and went, and following the festival, the matter 
fizzled out without resolution. Since at that time not only had he failed 
22   The research was conducted by Tan Shen, Xu Ping, Cheng Yao and Liu Huiping in 
J County, Sichuan Province Work Injury Project in 2004. See also Tan Shen (ed.) “Sichuan 
sheng J xian ‘Gongshang fanxiang dagongzhe tanfang’ xiangmu ziliao huiji” (Collection of 
Materials from the Project: “Visiting Migrant Workers who have Returned Home due to 
Injury at Work,” J County, Sichuan Province”).
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to receive the money he had earned, but had also borrowed money from 
someone else for his travel costs, he now actually owed money. For the 
next six or seven years, he remained in the countryside because he had 
a young child at home, and he also had to take care of the agricultural 
work. In 1998, when he did leave to find work, this time to do road con-
struction work in Tibet (西藏), again he ended up being swindled by his 
boss, who left him with no wages. This meant that there was no money 
for his eldest son to go to middle school. 
H Village, Gansu Province, Life History23
In 1990, Yang XX went to Liaoning Province (辽宁省) to find work. He 
found work at a brickyard, and subsequently had his leg crushed by the 
machinery there. Following this, he returned to the countryside. To date, 
he is still yet to marry, and he lives in poverty. 
Q Village, Inner Mongolia, Life History24
In 1990, Wang XX also went to work at a brickyard in Liaoning. As a 
result of an accident at work, he returned to his home in the country-
side to recover. After falling ill, the need to eke out an existence forced 
him to go away once again to find work. In the end, overwork caused him 
to become partially paralyzed, and he basically lost the ability to work 
altogether. His household became one of the few in his village to receive 
Rural Minimal Income Support.
Q Village, Inner Mongolia, Life History25
In those poorer regions where there is no other industry, a further direct fac-
tor affecting whether or not a family suffers from poverty is the composition 
of the family in terms of ability to participate in work, which is influenced 
by the life-cycle of the family. This is because these rural families rely on out-
going migrant work for the majority of their income. During the stage when 
a family’s children are still young and have not reached working age, and the 
grandparents are becoming elderly and need to be cared for by the younger 
generation, there are not enough people to work, and the family is likely to 
be relatively poor. When the children enter employment age, and have come 
23   “Section of Material on H Village, Gansu Province,” from the “Qualitative Study on 
Poverty,” the leader of the sub-team was Zhang Xiaojun, and the main members of the 
team included Ma Yaping and Zhu Yujing.
24   “Section of Material on Q Village, Inner Mongolia” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
25   Ibid.
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to the stage where they can go out and find work to make money, the family 
may break free from poverty. However, when these offspring come to an age 
when they themselves marry and start their own families, the family will again 
become affected by poverty. If the family lacks sufficient laborers and is also 
faced with the costs of some unforeseen incident, the equilibrium arrived at by 
the family will be shattered and they will slip into poverty.26
3 Migration and Poverty at the Community Level
While increasing the family’s income, labor migration also has a variety of 
impacts on the rural communities from which the workers leave. Also, the 
experiences of different groups vary. 
3.1 Positive Effects of Out-migration on the Community
The local governments of migrant labor export areas usually fully recognize 
the impetus to economic development prompted by outgoing labor. It was pre-
cisely for this reason that during the early period of internal labor migration in 
China, when on the whole the state adopted a controlling attitude towards the 
Wave of Migrant Workers (民工潮), the local governments of many out-going 
areas (for example county, town and township governments) directly partici-
pated in and promoted initiatives for the out-going migration of their local 
labor force. For example, they established corresponding agencies in out-going 
and destination areas, entered into direct contact with employers, and orga-
nized labor migration. Z Town in Sichuan Province, which participated in the 
“Qualitative Study on Poverty,” had begun this kind of activity as early as 1987. 
T County, to which this town belongs, is an agricultural county. It is the least 
economically developed amongst all of the counties that fall under the juris-
diction of CH Municipality. Through their research, the leaders at that time 
came to believe that the out-going migration of labor was a path towards eco-
nomic development. They established specialist agencies, and meticulously 
arranged for the early migrant workforce that went to work in Guangdong. This 
gradually prompted Z Town and even the surrounding townships and counties 
to experience a wave of out-going migrant workers. Z Town has been referred 
to in the media as “the first migrant-worker town.”27
26   See “Section of Material on S Village, Jiangxi Province” from the “Qualitative Study on 
Poverty.”
27  From a study I conducted.
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In those areas where the migration of labor was mostly spontaneous, 
the costs associated with out-migration, including the spending in human 
resources, travel, job-seeking and living in the initial job-search period, were 
all paid for by migrant workers’ families or by themselves. Basically, the gov-
ernment did not need to make any financial investment. However, the ben-
efits of migrant work were instantaneous. The local economy was boosted by 
consumption based on the income from this work. In the 1990s, the media 
commonly made reports of “the amount of funds remitted to X X area from 
local outgoing migrant workers is equivalent to X times the local fiscal rev-
enue.” Moreover, some migrant workers would return to small towns and cities 
in their local area and establish their own enterprises as private traders (geti, 
个体户), which again increased the local tax revenue. This made the major-
ity of local governments to become aware of the advantages of out-migration. 
As the export of migrant labor became part of a local government’s strat-
egy for market participation, for those regions that were largely agricultural, 
“the migrant-work economy” often became an important or even core local 
industry. One after another, different areas asserted that they would make 
the industry in out-migration “great and strong,” and create a brand for their 
local migrant workers. 
In recent years, with the use of rural land for development, the exchange of 
rural land has taken on a new model. Whilst originally, land was transferred 
between rural households, this model was transformed into one operated 
together by government and business. One method operated by government is 
to re-gather land that has been allocated to rural households, sort out the land 
and then bring in business parties to undertake scaled profit-making ventures. 
There are two problems that emerge from this: where does the money come 
from, and where do the people go? The essence of the second question is one 
of employment for the rural people who lose their land. In accordance with 
the plans in some places, the rural households to which the land had originally 
been allocated would receive rent from the new business operator. Labor from 
that family would either work for the new operator, thus gaining an additional 
wage income, or they would become migrant workers. This would appear to 
be a model through which everyone (the rural household, business operator 
and government) was a winner. As such, many local governments actively pro-
moted the model, and since the export of migrant labor was helpful to the 
process of re-gathering the land, it was all the more promoted. 
In some areas, following implementation of this policy, rural households did 
in fact benefit. However, in this model, the legal relationship between the three 
parties is unclear. Moreover, it is quite apparent that the rural household has 
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only a passive position within the relationship. How to protect their right to 
benefit from the land? How to secure the employment of older migrant return-
ees to the countryside? It was most likely that both the issues were waiting to 
happen.28 Then, as one of the Three Concentrates (三个集中), the accompany-
ing policy, the concentration of the residency of rural people is somewhat bur-
densome for villagers. Three Concentrates is defined as the following: industry 
is concentrated within development areas, land is concentrated in scaled com-
mercial activity, and rural people are concentrated within residential areas. 
As such, a large number of people from the rural areas were to be relocated. 
Although they were to be provided with a certain amount of subsidies from the 
public finances, the main sum for building new houses had to be shouldered 
by these rural people themselves. Then, the standard for new housing was 
obviously higher than that in the past. For example, a villager from J Village in 
Sichuan Province told us that they would need to invest around 70,000 yuan 
themselves for a 120m2 house, not including the cost for decoration. Thus, with 
the increase in housing cost, these rural people had no choice but to spend 
more money.29
Out-migration also plays a positive role in giving impetus to the expansion 
of local social resources and the improvement of human capital. Local govern-
ments believe that these rural people, by going away and gaining experience, 
would improve their skills and update their way of thinking. They “switch mind-
sets, make cash, and have new ways of accomplishing things.” Amongst those 
who were more successful, some would establish organizations such as com-
mercial clubs whilst away, becoming a potential social resource for the local 
area. Local governments would often hanker after establishing communication 
with those successful migrant workers, who expand their influence in the labor 
destination areas, attract business and capital, establish contact with the local 
government at the labor destination, organize out-migration, mediate in dis-
putes, and even assist in handling the administrative tasks of the local govern-
ment at the labor destination. For instance, during our research, we became 
acquainted with some friends who belonged to a commercial club in another 
area. They told us that when it came to switching to the new type of Identity 
28   In the latter half of 2008, following the deepening of the impact of the economic crisis on 
the real economy, great numbers of migrant workers returned to the countryside after fall-
ing unemployed. However, some of them had already had their land re-allocated or had 
already lost their land, increasing rural land disputes and conflicts. See “Nongmingong 
shiye diaocha” (Study on the unemployment of migrant workers) in Caijing 2009, Issue 1.
29   “Section of Material on J Village, Sichuan” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
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Card (身份证), it was they who had assisted in the handling of these identity 
cards for over 10,000 migrants from their local area who were working here. 
For many migrant workers, “seeing the world” is not just one of their objec-
tives in going away (different studies have shown that this is second only to 
“making money” as a motivation for becoming a migrant worker), but when 
summing up their lives as migrant workers, they commonly assert that it is 
an important reward of this way of life. During this specific study, some of 
these workers said of themselves that they were “someone who has seen and 
learned things.” On returning to the countryside, these people become a local 
organizational resource. Some of them become cadres in the local village 
organizations. For example, amongst the village cadres in F Town, J County, 
Sichuan, 20% had formerly been migrant workers. The leader of the town’s 
organization department gave his take on this: “Generally, the people who have 
been migrant workers are relatively strong in ability. Since they have seen and 
learned, their attitude is a bit more proactive, and when they have something 
to say, they make a good point.” However, he continued to say that 20% was 
actually still quite a low proportion, because “those migrant workers that have 
done reasonably well whilst away aren’t willing to come and be a village cadre.” 
(Interview with Town Government, F Town, T County, Sichuan Province, 
25 February 2006) Also, through the experience they acquire while going away, 
these migrant workers gain a strong consciousness of rights-safeguarding. 
This has played a role in certain public affairs in their rural hometowns. For 
instance, when conducting research in J Village, Sichuan, we came upon two 
instances of collective action aimed at protecting the interests of the villagers. 
The main organizers were those who had experience away from home.30
3.2 Negative Effects of Out-migration on the Community
In recent years, rural issues have become an important focus of concern. In 
its discussion on community poverty, the Qualitative Research on Poverty 
sums this up as the problem of a lack of both material and non-material public 
resources. It posits that all of the following are both manifestations of com-
munity poverty and part of the cause of poverty: insufficient natural resources, 
a dearth of labor resources, the lack of effective maintenance of basic infra-
structures, sparse collective income, inadequate organizational resources, the 
disappearance of identification with the community, the weakening of unity, 
the erosion of common interests, a paucity of mutual trust, and the loss of the 
30   Ibid.
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ability to undertake collective action.31 There are also cases demonstrating that 
specific policies, major projects and so on have the potential to cause or relieve 
poverty in certain areas. As an example of this, take the policy of Swapping 
Farming for Forestry (退耕还林) in J County, Sichuan. This policy enabled the 
villagers to achieve a stable income for a certain length of time.32 X Village 
in Jiangxi Province, on the other hand, is a village of migrants, relocated for 
the construction of the Three Gorges Dam (三峡大坝). The simultaneous exis-
tence of an Excellent Quality Project (优质工程), “backwards reservoir area” 
and “struggling migrants” caused the local community to sink into poverty.33 
However, regardless of which type of region we were looking at, the mobility of 
labor had a significant impact on that area. 
First, the outflow of labor creates change in the composition of the popula-
tion. Because the population that leaves is made up of the young and able, the 
population that remains in the village, in terms of age, develops in the shape of 
a dumbbell (its two ends are large whilst the middle is small). For those villages 
where the workforce does not go far afield to find work, this kind of change 
is not particularly obvious. However, those villages, where there is a greater 
concentration of outgoing workers and where those who leave for the most 
part do so in a longer term, demonstrate a classic dumbbell-shaped structure 
to their population. In these villages, the majority of the young and fit have left, 
primary and middle school students attend schools in the centralized schools 
or in the rural townships. Only the elderly people, a small number of adults, 
and children not yet of an age to attend school remain in the village. Whilst 
the outward labor migration enables the springing up of new housing within 
the village, a great many of these new houses remain empty or unlived in, 
becoming aged whilst still unoccupied. The phenomenon of increasing vacu-
ity is clearly evident in this kind of rural area. In some areas, the proportion 
of young women leaving to find work outweighs that of the men, creating the 
dilemma of an imbalance of marriage partners for villagers. Take for example, 
Y Village in Yunnan Province. Here, although the proportion of the population 
that leaves to find work is not great, over twenty young men have not yet found 
wives in spite of now being thought to be reaching an older age. This situation 
is blamed upon the fact that the young women are going away from the village 
31   Section on “New Characteristics of Poverty” in the “Qualitative Study on Poverty” overall 
report, authored by Wang Xiaoyi.
32   “Section of Material on D Village, Sichuan” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty,” the 
leader of the sub-team was Guo Hong, and the main team members included Gao Guizi, 
Fu Ying, Jiang Chunming and Zhang Weifeng.
33   “Section of Material on S Village, Jiangxi” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
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to find work or are marrying outside of the area.34 In Z Town, Sichuan, the 
people for whom the government made arrangements to leave for work dur-
ing the earlier period were female. However, it was quickly realized that those 
men left in the rural area might find it difficult to find a spouse. In response, the 
government adopted a method of matching males and females when arrang-
ing for labor migration so as to avoid this kind of imbalance.35
The dearth of labor resources, insufficient organizational resources, the 
weakening of unity and other problems, as summarized by the “Qualitative 
Study on Poverty,” are directly connected to the large number of people going 
away from the countryside to find work. In discussing the positive effects of out-
going labor migration on the community, this article has pointed to the roles 
it can play in expanding local social resources and improving human capital. 
This can be understood as a double-edged sword. Whilst the experience gained 
by outgoing labor migration may improve the resources of the local popula-
tion, these human resources do not play a role in the local community itself. 
So, in terms of the needs of their hometowns in the countryside, the overall 
standards are actually dropping. A simple example of this is that when build-
ing basic infrastructure like roads and tunnels, there are now fewer people that 
can take on the work. When doing research in J Village, Sichuan, we observed 
a road being built. It was very different to the times of the People’s Commune 
(人民公社) when there were always people around to get the work done at the 
drop of a hat. Now, amongst the sparse group of workers, there were only a few 
young women, and the rest were all elderly people. Due to this lack of labor, 
the reciprocal help between rural households is also not what it used to be. 
In the past, it was possible to achieve certain things by neighbors helping one 
another out. Now, they had to go through the market. For some rural house-
holds, when it came to building houses or the peak season for farming, it was 
difficult to find the right workers to do the labor even if it was paid for. With 
the loss of its young, fit people, the village lost its character and vitality, and 
at the same time the sense of unity in the community was weakened, which 
became a direct reason for young people to leave. They explained that “there’s 
no one to hang out with in the village,” and “there’s not even anyone to talk to.” 
As to other problems, the causes are complex, and yet one of those causes 
is the large population of outgoing migrant workers. For instance, the level of 
participation in rural public affairs has fallen. Some villagers believe that, with 
34   “Section of Material on Y Village, Yunnan” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty,” the 
leaders of the sub-team were Chen Xin and Huang Xiaojun, and the main team members 
included Pan Jie and Yang Jing.
35   From a study conducted by the author.
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the leaving of the young and fit, there are fewer people that dare to speak out, 
and the behavior of the party cadres is not effectively curbed. On the other 
hand, village cadres believe that since the elderly people who are left behind 
are unable to make decisions, it is difficult for many of the public affairs to 
be undertaken. Participation in public events within the community has 
decreased, and connections within the community have become much looser. 
In some regions, for events and village meetings held by the Party and the 
Youth League, people have to be given money in order to participate. Since 
there are already very few young people here, the Youth League organizations 
exist in name only. There are also few people participating in traditional cul-
tural activities, and even occasions like Chinese New Year and Lantern Festival 
(元宵节, falling at the end of Chinese New Year, when the family is meant to 
be together) have become cold and bleak. “Compared with in the past, it’s like 
two different worlds,” and now it is only associations for the elderly that still 
host events. A village cadre from J Village in Sichuan shared with us his idea:
The effects of this outward labor migration are both good and bad. In my 
opinion there are more negative effects, because after the young people 
have left and are working away from home, all they are concerned with is 
making money out there. They aren’t concerned about their homes back 
in the countryside. . . . It’s really difficult to develop public business, and 
you have to spend money to get people to come and get things done. 
It’s really different to how things were before 1995 (when outward labor 
migration really began here). The difference is like heaven and earth. 
Also, the commitment to public affairs is impaired. They hardly have any 
public awareness, and all they’ve got on their minds is money.
Village Cadre, J Village, Sichuan Province, interview conducted 
on 25 February 200636
3.3 The Impact of Outgoing Labor Migration on Wealth Disparity in the 
Community
Based on the importance of migrant labor in increasing the income of rural 
families, we can infer that within a community, outward labor migration wid-
ens the gap between the better-off and the poorer families. This is a conclu-
sion drawn to as early as the 1990s,37 and has been since confirmed by many 
36   “J Village, Sichuan, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
37   Du Ying and Bai Nansheng (eds.) “Zouchu xiangcun: zhongguo nongcun laodongli liudong 
shizheng yanjiu” (Leaving the countryside: empirical study on China’s labor migration), 
144–146, (Ch).
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researchers. The “Qualitative Study on Poverty” also found examples that give 
further weight to this argument. In D Village, Gansu Province, “in 1986 and 1987 
people from the village began to go away to make money, and at the peak of this 
trend three or four people would leave from one family. The people began to be 
stratified into two classes, and an income imbalance started to emerge in the 
village.”38 In S Village, Jiangxi, compared to ten years ago “the social composi-
tion has already seen great changes. Ten years ago, 80% of the rural households 
belonged to the lower stratum. Now over 80% belong to the middle stratum. 
The reason that the majority of rural families were able to move upwards from 
the low to middle stratum is mainly that they rely on income from migrant 
work.”39 In X Village, Jiangxi Province, “The main reasons why twenty-five 
households out of almost three hundred are well-off include: they have family 
members that have gone away to work, some families have multiple members 
that have done this, and they are all in good health. Out of the twenty-five well-
off families, the nine that have people working away make up 36%.”40
However, if we compare the circumstances of the families with members 
who have become migrant workers to those without any migrant workers, we 
realize that more often than not, those who leave a community to become 
migrant workers are from families somewhere around the middle stratum. In 
other words, they are not from poor households and nor are they from well-off 
households. There are two reasons for this. First, it takes a certain amount of 
capital for someone to go away from home to work, to cover the costs of trans-
port, job-seeking and leave them with a living allowance. To poor households, 
this is not an insignificant amount, and they are unable to foot the costs. For 
those households that are relatively well-off, if they can make a reasonable 
income locally, it is not necessary for them to go away to work. Second, poor 
households are often those families that lack laborers, and they cannot send 
people away. In this sense, if we are to split rural households into upper, middle 
and lower stratum households, the change witnessed by the real upper and 
lower stratums is minimal, whilst those that do see relatively big changes as a 
result of family members going away to find work are at those middle income 
families. Their income from migrant work may improve the living standards 
of the whole family and their position within the community, and as a result 
widens the gap between themselves and the poorer households in the area. 
38   “D Village, Gansu, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty”, 
the leader of the sub-team was Zhang Xiaojun, and the main team members included Ma 
Yaping and Zhu Yujing. 
39   “S Village, Jiangxi, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
40   “X Village, Jiangxi, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
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However, just as this article argues in its analysis of migration and poverty 
at the household level, as soon as the migrant worker meets with unantici-
pated difficulties, or they are unsuccessful, particularly when faced with injury 
at work, a car accident or serious illness causing them to lose the capacity to 
work, they immediately bring their family to the brink of poverty. Currently, 
part of the poor population within rural communities is formed of those who 
have encountered those difficulties whilst working away. Just as a report from 
S Village in Jiangxi Province points out, “Illness is the most important cause 
of rural poverty, and becoming a migrant worker may be an important cause 
of people from S Village becoming sick.”41 Because the migrant worker is usu-
ally the main labor propping up the family income, and they have both their 
elderly and their young family members to take care of, as soon as they lose the 
ability to work, the loss to their families becomes “a shortage in the most real 
sense of the word” and they lose the “potential for improving things.”42 It then 
becomes difficult for them to recover for quite some time. 
Recently, following continued anti-poverty efforts, the population of those 
living in poverty has been dramatically reduced. As this article touches upon 
above, the population living in absolute poverty constitutes only a small pro-
portion of a community. However, over a decade or two decades ago, though 
poverty was common, the community functioned relatively well, and those 
living in poverty were not that marginalized in the community. Today, the 
widening wealth gap within rural communities causes poor families and their 
members to become more conspicuous, suffering a worse status and marginal-
ization in their communities. Although rural social security and economic aid 
systems are currently being built, they remain far from able to satisfy the needs 
of these poor families, whether in terms of the amount of money provided 
or the scope covered. These families are unable to share the fruits of migrant 
labor. As the character of the village is sapped away, and community is no lon-
ger functioning efficiently, the negative effects of labor migration are felt most 
deeply by poor families. 
41   “S Village, Jiangxi, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
42   “H Village, Gansu, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
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4 Impacts of Migration on Different Groups 
4.1 Migration and Gender
4.1.1 Labor Migration Models
According to the most recent statistics, in 2006 31.3% of China’s overall male 
workforce was made up of migrant workers, whilst 18.2% of the overall female 
workforce was made up of migrant workers.43 In general, the situation over the 
years prior to this told much the same story, with the number of males leaving 
their homes to find work far outdoing that of females. This displays a certain 
element of continuity to the migration model. There is an element of gendered 
selection involved in the migration of the rural workforce. This is the collective 
effect of individuals, families and the market.
Let us take first the individual. In the 30 years before the reforms, as China 
was putting socialism into practice, “gender equality” became part of offi-
cial discourse, and most people in rural areas were used to hearing about it. 
Although the paternal system was not fundamentally changed, gender equal-
ity became a dialectical resource for women to use in striving for their rights 
and interests. Following the Reform and Opening (改革开放), the trends of 
the West gradually made their way to China. The discourses of individual self-
reliance, independence, development and success little by little also became 
ideas that young people in the countryside felt strongly about, wanting to try 
them out for themselves. The outgoing labor migration that arose within this 
context became an opportunity for development for both the individual, and 
for the family. This article has already noted that many studies have shown 
“making money” to be first amongst the objectives of rural people going away 
to work, whilst the secondary objective is “to seek development opportuni-
ties” or to “see the world.” Especially when it comes to young people who are 
unmarried, there is a significant proportion of them who leave to find work 
mainly out of their own volition, rather than being prompted by the needs 
of their families. Also, to a great extent they will receive the support of their 
families. In this type of instance, there is not a pronounced difference between 
genders.44 However, this kind of situation mostly occurs within those families 
that are not so poor. This is not the same for those families that are faced up 
43   Di er ci quanguo nongye pucha zhuyao shuju gongbao (Public report on the main statistics 
from the second national rural consensus, No. 5), 27 February 2008, (Ch).
44   See Tan Shen “Jiating celüe haishi geren zizhu? Nongcun Laodongli waichu juece moshi 
de xingbie fenxi” (Family strategy or individual autonomy? A gendered analysis of the 
models for decision making over the out-migration of rural labor) in Zhejiang Xuekan 
(Zhejiang Academic Journal), 2004, Vol. 5 (Ch).
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with poverty or have an urgent need for money. For instance, if there is a limit 
to how many children a family can continue to send to school, as long as the 
boy keeps moving up to the next grade, this opportunity will always be given 
to him. The opportunity will only be given to the girl if there is no way for 
the boy to continue on at school. Another example is that unmarried young 
women who send money back home commonly do so in order to provide for 
their brother/s to go to school or to marry, but it is very rare that young men 
will send money to support their sisters. As such, it might be argued that when 
there is a relative scarcity of resources, it is likely that females may be more 
deprived of opportunities.
As soon as the individual gets married and begins family life, marriage 
presses husband and wife to make necessary adjustments to their individual 
aims, and shift the center of life to their small new family. These days, in rural 
China, the result of the business operations in rural households is that power 
is transferred from the older generation to the younger generation, and family 
relationships are shifting, so that instead of revolving around father and son, 
the family is beginning to revolve around husband and wife. As such, the wife 
has more of a say in the family. In spite of this, the majority of married couples 
continue to adopt a gendered division of labor by which “the man takes care of 
things on the outside whilst the woman takes care of the home.” 
Our study also reveals this division of labor. In terms of the different mod-
els for outgoing labor migration, the following types emerged. The first is the 
“Migrant Working Partners” model, in which before getting married both 
members of the couple has already been working as migrant workers, and after 
getting married the wife tends to continue to work away. The second is the 
“Husband Leads and Wife Follows” model, in which both husband and wife 
become migrant workers only after they are married. The husband leaves first 
to get a foot in the door and his wife then follows on afterwards. They may 
take their children or may not. The third is the “One Partner Stays and One 
Goes” model. In this model, it is usually the husband who goes away whilst 
the wife stays to look after things at home. The majority of couples conform-
ing to this type have children and it is not practical to take their children with 
them. All of these models apply mostly when we are looking at migrant work 
far away from home. However, there are also some exceptions to these models. 
For example, after getting married, first the wife may go away, and after she has 
helped the husband to find work, he will follow on behind, or the wife goes 
away to work while the husband remains back at home. In J Village, Sichuan, 
the trend for leaving the village to find work began with people going to the 
factories in Guangdong Province. At that time, it was all women who were 
going away. In this way, we see other kinds of exceptions emerging. During the 
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course of this study, amongst two groups of forty-six married couples, twenty-
three couples had gone away together. There were four cases where the wife 
had gone away to work while the husband remained back at home. This kind 
of instance often arises when the couple has no other choice. When it comes 
to seasonal migrant work, the proportion of married women is notably smaller 
than that of men (this occurs, for example, in Q Village, Inner Mongolia). The 
researchers believe that maybe because of the seasonal nature of the farming 
work done by men, they can go away to work, whilst the activities of women, 
including housework, the rearing of pigs and bringing up children, are not of a 
seasonal nature.45 Although there are certain differences between the models 
outlined above, if we see migrant work as a resource for development, then 
what all of the models have in common is that the division of labor gives mar-
ried women a more constricted amount of freedom. 
4.1.2 The Different Impacts of Marriage on Male and Female Migrant 
Workers
Connected to the gendered division of labor and roles in the family, young 
unmarried girls who are doing migrant work are constantly troubled by a kind 
of marriage dread. The stronger the self-awareness and the development-
mindedness of the young woman are, the deeper the feelings of dread may be. 
On asking migrant workers in Guangdong (广东) about the problems they faced 
with dating and marriage, we found that whilst both males and females alike 
were troubled with the “difficulty of finding someone who understands them,” 
the proportion of female respondents who selected this response (40.9%) was 
notably higher than that of male respondents (31.3%).46 When a young person 
leaves home to find work, whether male or female, his or her ideas about and 
expectations for marriage are heightened. They hope that by leaving home they 
will have more options and find a partner with whom they are really satisfied. 
However, within the model of marriage wherein the man is meant to be in a 
better position than the woman, the impact of becoming a migrant worker on 
finding a spouse is very different for the two sexes. A man’s self-development 
and his options for finding a spouse develop in the same direction. The higher 
he rises, the greater his freedom in finding a spouse. For a woman, this is the 
opposite. The better her personal development is, the narrower her scope for 
seeking a partner becomes. This brings the woman inner conflicts. At the time 
45   “Q Village, Inner Mongolia, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on 
Poverty.”
46   Tan Shen and Zheng Guanghuai “Wailaigong xuqiu diaocha baogao” (Research Report on 
the Demand for Migrant Workers) (Ch).
Tan196
of conducting these studies in 2002, of those women of twenty-five years of 
age or older, 10% remained unmarried or had no boyfriends.47 They found it 
difficult to find a suitable partner. They didn’t have their own family, but they 
were unwilling to return to their parents’ home in the countryside. At the same 
time, they were unable to settle in the city. Thus, they became a group of lonely 
floaters. 
4.1.3 The Use and Change of Gendered Labor Division by the Market
There have always been two opposing theories about the impact of industri-
alization, or as we have seen emphasized in recent years, the market, on gen-
der disparity. One theory holds that the market reduces the effect of various 
ascribed factors, helping to reduce the disparity between men and women in 
terms of division of labor and allocation. The other theory holds that the dif-
ferentiation caused by the market division of labor results in the lack of techni-
cally skilled work for women and the lowering of the level at which they can 
find work. The outcome of this is that women in the labor market are further 
marginalized.48
Ma Chunhua (马春华)’s research on labor-exporting areas supports the 
theory of disparity reduction. She argues that the theoretical core of rural 
household gender relations is “patriarchy.” If we view labor migration as a 
development resource, then this resource is more often provided by the mar-
ket, rather than being decided by the household allocation of resources. A 
further study of a village in the town of Zhu in Sichuan, which has a heavy 
concentration of outgoing migrant workers, finds that when a great number 
of rural women leave to find work, this creates a more flexible model of labor 
division, like the model mentioned above in which the wife goes away to work 
while the husband remains at home. The wife’s income strengthens her right 
to allocate resources from the family income and assets, creating a new self-
assured self-image and social status, and weakening gender bias. In the family 
and cultural spheres, this is helpful in weakening the production and repro-
duction of the system of patriarchy, thus becoming instrumental in making 
family gender relations become more equal.49
47   Tan Shen and Zheng Guanghuai “Wailaigong xuqiu diaocha baogao” (Research Report on 
the Demand for Migrant Workers) (Ch).
48   Jin Yihong, Fuquan de shiwei: Jiangxi nongcun xiandaihua jincheng zhong de xingbie yan-
jiu (Decline of patriarchal authority: a study of gender in the process of modernization in 
rural Jiangsu), Chengdu, Sichuan People’s Publishing House, 2000, 92–93, (Ch).
49   Ma Chunhua, “Shichanghua he zhongguo nongcun jiating de xingbie guanxi” 
(Marketization and gender relations in Chinese rural households) in Jiang Yongping (ed.) 
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Hundreds of thousands of young female workers from the countryside 
congregate in the labor destination areas, particularly those newly burgeon-
ing industrial areas. In the 1980s and 1990s during the period of the Wave of 
Migrant Workers, it was easier for females to find work than it was for males. 
In this sense, the market provided women with alternative opportunities and 
resources. But the reality of this alternative was that in the destination areas 
for rural labor not only did a dual labor market begin to emerge between the 
“formal” and the “secondary” or the local and non-local people, but a gendered 
labor market also began to emerge, with specific professions for men and for 
women. Our research finds that in the labor markets of towns and cities, gen-
der segregation within the labor market for non-locals was more serious than 
that in the labor market for locals.50 Non-local females were gathered within 
labor-intensive jobs that do not require skill, for which the working hours are 
long and the pay is low. The segregation of local and non-local has already 
received much criticism as “local interest determinism.” Gender segregation is 
often explained by people in business as “biologically specific determinism,” or 
is believed by some researchers to be human capital determinism. This has not 
particularly been questioned. It is presumed that a female’s physiology makes 
her more patient and more suited to tedious work over longer periods of time. 
However, research carried out in the south of China has found that psycho-
logical problems, death through overwork and suicide amongst females on the 
assembly lines due to stress, depression and overwork are no less than those 
amongst males: it is just that these things are usually blamed upon their own 
personal issues and forgotten about. The market aim is the maximization of 
profit, and the real reason behind favoring females for some occupations is 
that being marginalized in the family economy and in terms of social power, 
females are more likely than males to accept low pay, they are the cheapest of 
cheap labor, and it is more difficult for them to undertake organized resistance. 
Certain weaknesses of females are utilized by capital in order to achieve the 
maximization of profit. 
Shiji zhijiao de zhongguo funü shehui diwei (The social status of Chinese women at the 
turn of the century), Beijing, Contemporary China Publishing House, (Ch).
50   Tan Shen and Ma Chunhua, Waichu wugong yu nongcun xingbie guanxi de bianhua (Out-
going migrant workers and changes in rural gender relations), in All-China Women’s 
Federation Research Team, Jiang Yongping (ed.) Shehui zhuanxing zhong de zhongguo 
funü shehui diwei (The social status of Chinese women during a period of social transfor-
mation), chapter 12, Beijing, China Women’s Publishing House, 2006, (Ch). 
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4.1.4 The Wife that Remains Behind
A classic result of the gendered division of labor is that the husband goes away 
to work while the wife stays and looks after things at home in the countryside. 
How do women view this kind of division of labor? There were two conversa-
tions on this during the women’s focus group that formed part of this study: 
Host: Does everyone think that it’s a good thing for women to become 
migrant workers or not?
Speaker 1: Going away to work is only any good for the youngsters. For 
people that are as old as us, you can leave to find work but nobody wants 
you. I spent several years away; it’s not easy to make money out there 
away from home either. You’ve got to do overtime, and you might work 
until 2 am but it’ll only get you a few hundred yuan a month.
Speaker 4: When you’re away from home working you have fixed wages, 
which is pretty reassuring. . . .
Speaker 5: It’s still best if we can be taught some skills and we can do 
something at home. When you’re away working, your family doesn’t get 
looked after properly, and there’s no one to watch the baby. 
Host: In the production teams is there anything different about men and 
women, what does everyone think? 
Speaker 3: Women are more useful than men now.
Speaker 5: It’s all men that are responsible for things away from home and 
women that take care of things at home. It’s still the same these days too. 
It’s still equal.
Speaker 3: Our male comrades can stay home too, look after the kids and 
grow crops, or the female comrades can stay at home, look after the kids 
and grow crops. It’s all pretty much the same. Whoever does those things 
doesn’t really make a difference.
J Village, Sichuan Province Women’s Focus Group51
When a husband and wife are able to get on well, the wife receives respect. In 
those situations where family life was relatively stable, the women who partici-
pated in the focus group saw a gendered division of labor as a family strategy 
with which they agree. When this prerequisite did not exist, the feelings of the 
women were very different. In the same village we found the following case: 
Husband XSE: In the early years his family was really poor, but XSE was 
really bright. He learned some of the techniques involved in growing mu’er 
51   “J Village, Sichuan, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
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(a kind of edible fungus). Through incredibly hard work, he managed to 
build a house and save up a bit of money. But later on he was ripped 
off by his business partner, who ran off with 84,000 yuan, and he was 
“totally crushed.” He “spent 10,000 or 20,000 yuan looking everywhere for 
this guy but never managed to get the money back.” He ended up owing 
a large sum of money and “there were no tears left to be cried.” In order 
to survive and evade the debts, he ended up going all over the place, first 
working at a mine in Xinjiang (新疆). He also went to the Soviet Union. 
For a while he did not contact his family, and they thought that he was 
dead. This went on until he had made some money, and he finally sent 
money home. After that, “wherever there was work I could do, I’d go there 
and do it.” Now his child has grown up, and his family’s economic situa-
tion is such that they would be considered to be “moderately prosperous” 
within his village. 
Wife XXS: When carrying her first child, she was “over-tired, had nau-
sea, vomiting and edema.” The baby was born deformed, and not long 
afterwards it passed away. She was totally devastated. She lost her second 
child through miscarriage, which was also due to the tough situation she 
was in. Her eldest son was the third child that she had conceived. She 
recalled her hardship as a mother: “When I was doing the farming work, 
it was always a case of carrying the baby on my back and working until 
3 or 4 am.” When her second son was born there was no milk for him; all 
she could do was “grind up rice flour and add water for him to drink. My 
baby was in such a sorry state, going hungry for a long time. He didn’t 
have a decent intake of nutrition and suffered from severe anemia. We 
took him to hospital, and the doctor was going on about giving him a 
blood transfusion, but we didn’t have the money to use the hospital’s 
blood, and all we could do was take our own blood. My husband said we 
should use his, but my thinking was that he’s a man, he’s the only worker 
our family’s got, and he has to go out there every day to get on with his 
work. Taking blood is bound to have an impact on his body, and that 
might mean an end to this one way that we manage to get by. Although 
it’s tiring for me at home too, it’s much better for me, so I made them 
take my blood.” During the several years in which her husband had been 
away to avoid things without a trace, she went through a very hard life: 
“Over that period I didn’t hear a peep from my husband; that was the 
toughest time. We had debts all over the place, my baby was sick and I 
still had to get on with the farm work. I didn’t even have anyone there to 
give me a bit of comfort.” “I was even thinking that I wanted to divorce 
him,” said she. 
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During a chat between the interviewer and both husband and wife, 
when this period in their lives came up, XSE exclaimed: “My life has still 
been worth it though.” To his words, XXS immediately responded: “Mine 
hasn’t been worth it.” 
Village J, Sichuan Province, XSE and XXS Life History52
Both husband and wife experienced great difficulties during this period. Yet for 
the man, even though he may be presented with many risks out there, as long 
as the result of his working away is alright, he is able to foster a certain sense 
of achievement. However, where the woman is concerned, all that remains 
with her from the great hardships she has faced are scars. As the family’s situ-
ation improved, she was thought of as only having played a supporting role. 
Her greatest hope was placed in the child, with no status herself as a woman 
and an individual. 
4.2 The Impact of the Migration of Parents upon their Children
Labor migration has an enormous impact upon children who have not yet come 
of age. Those children who go with their parents are referred to as migrant chil-
dren (流动儿童), whilst those who stay behind in the countryside when one 
or both parent goes away to work are called left-behind children (留守儿童).
Social concern was first focused upon those migrant children who entered 
the cities. Amongst these concerns, those relating systemic issues highlight 
compulsory education and immunization, while other concerns involve the 
acclimatization of migrant children to urban living, discrimination by locals 
from destination areas and so on. A focal point of criticism is the social exclu-
sion of migrant children by the current institutions, as well as the policies and 
culture of the labor destination areas, which are shaped by the previous dual-
istic urban-rural system.
With almost ten years of hard work, the policy environment for migrant 
children has seen somewhat significant improvement. The 2001–2010 Chinese 
Children Development Program (2001–2010 中国儿童发展纲要) issued in 
2001 involved policies relevant to migrant children. In the field of children 
and health, it proposes the target of “gradual improvements in the coverage 
of child health protection and for children from the migrant population.” In 
the area of children and education, it proposes the target of “children from 
within the migrant population being able to receive nine years of compul-
sory education.” In 2003, the General Office of the State Council (国务院办公
厅) issued the Suggestions for the Improvement of Work on Employment for 
52   “J Village, Sichuan, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
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Migrant Workers and Compulsory Education for Rural Children (关于进一步
做好进城务工就业农民子女义务教育工作的意见), composed by a commit-
tee comprising six ministries including the Ministry of Education. This went 
further in emphasizing the policy of “two main priorities” (priority given to 
management by the local government in labor destination areas; priority given 
to a full-time public system of education for middle and primary school educa-
tion) proposed in 2001, and incorporated compulsory education for migrant 
children into the local planning and budgeting of the labor destination 
area. Through the revisions to the Compulsory Education Law (义务教育法) 
passed by the 2006 Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
(全国人大常委会) and the new Law on the Protection of Minors (未成年人保
护法), it is set out in law that the conditions for compulsory education are to 
be provided by the local government at a child’s place of residence, and that 
this will no longer be subject to fees. At the same time, both the education 
and health administrations, as well as the administrative authorities of some 
major labor destination areas, formulated specific measures for putting this 
into operation.53 
The improvement of legislation and policy in turn brought about improve-
ments in the conditions of compulsory education for migrant children. First, 
there were schools for them to go to, and second, it reduced the burden of costs 
for parents. However, in practice, there have remained many problems that 
await solution. An example of this is the current University Entrance Exam (高
考) system, according to which migrant children are able to study in the area 
they have moved to, but they must return to the place to which their household 
registration is attached in order to sit the entrance exam. As such, there are 
many discrepancies in this system, and unreasonable situations arise. Another 
example is that whilst public schools do not charge fees, in reality there are 
many instances of all sorts of different costs being leveraged under different 
guises. 
In terms of preventive vaccines and immunization, there is significant differ-
ence between different labor destinations. According to official data from Beijing, 
the proportion of migrant children that have received vaccinations is over 85%.54 
53   Wu Xiaoying, Liudong/liushou ertong xiangguan zhengce shuli (Policy related to migrant/
left-behind children) part of the output of the “Nongminggong liudong dui ertong 
de yingxiang” (The impact of migrant worker migration on children) research team, 
2008, (Ch). 
54   Zheng Lingqiao and Bai Ying, “Beijing tigong gao shuiping gonggong weisheng fuwu” 
(Beijing provides a high standard of public health services) in Zhongguo shequ yishi 
(zongheban) (Chinese community doctors [full edition]), 2007, No. 8, (Ch).
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Other areas currently remain at the stage of undertaking Care Drives (关爱活动), 
and are yet to form a structure for carrying out this immunization. 
In the last three or four years, the focal point of social concern has shifted 
to left-behind children. According to the latest census, it can be inferred that 
in 2005 there was a total of approximately 20 million migrant children who 
accompanied their parents as they went away to work. There is not a great 
difference between this figure and the figure five years earlier. However, the 
total number of those left-behind children in the countryside when one or 
both parents went away to work was 58 million, which was over double the 
figure five years earlier.55 The huge disparity between these two figures shows 
that even though in recent years the urban social environment has seen some 
improvement, migrant workers still choose to leave their children behind. This 
is consistent with our study. 
An informal discussion with village cadres and villagers of J Village in 
Sichuan revealed that of all those families in their village who leave to find 
work, only around 10% take their children with them. Combined with research 
from the corresponding destination area, H Town in Guangdong Province, 
we will divide migrant workers’ families into three categories. The first is the 
“type that is free to come and go.” As this type of family has a degree of eco-
nomic capacity, the current and future arrangements for their children are, 
for the most part, not subject to policy and structural limitations, but rather 
are determined by the parents or the child himself/herself. However, this type 
of family accounts for only a tiny proportion of migrant families. According 
to our study of rural communities at the destination town, this type does not 
even constitute 1% of migrant families. The second category is the “type that 
moves between two perches,” which does have a certain amount of economic 
capacity, but the roots of which are still in the countryside. The children of 
these families may, for a certain amount of the time, stay and study at the place 
where their parents are working and become “migrant children.” They are 
clearly constrained by or benefit from the education system at the area where 
their parents are working. The third category is the “left behind to work away 
55   Quanguo fulian zhaokai weichengnianren jiating jiaoyu he nongcun liushou ertong zhuang-
kuang diaocha fabuhui (All-China Federation of Women conference on a study of house-
hold education of children and adolescents and rural left-behind children) [online] 
china.com, available at http://www.china.com.cn/zhibo/2008-02/27/content_10180165.
htm?show=t [visited 8 September 2009] (Ch). I would question this figure, but its reflec-
tion on this trend is reliable. In other words, due to the excessively high cost of living in 
the city and the system of education, migrant workers are forced to leave their children in 
the countryside.
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type.” For them, working away has improved the lives of their family, enabling 
them to maintain an average standard of living for a rural family and the basic 
functions of a family. However, due to economic constraints, the parents are 
unable to take the children with them to the location where they are working 
to live for the longer term or to go to school, the majority choose to leave their 
children back at home in the countryside. The term left-behind children, more 
often than not refers to these children. As the numbers above shows, this type 
of family and its children form the vast majority. 
As such we believe that the children of migrant workers from poor areas, 
for the most part, belong to the group of left-behind children. This means that 
the policies of both the state and the destination cities on children could not 
benefit them, since their parents are unable to bring them to the cities to live 
with them and study there. 
Recent research on these left-behind children as well as the social concern 
have both focused on the various problems caused by the separation of the 
children from their parents, including for example, the loneliness suffered by 
children and a lack of family values. Some put all of the problems that befall 
this group down to separation from their parents. Some of the care measures 
and policies place strong emphasis on creating the conditions or proposing the 
creation of conditions for these left-behind children, so that they can go to the 
town or city to be reunited with their parents. Emphasis is also put on methods of 
intervention, such as substitute guardians (for instance, stand-in guardians and 
child-care centers). The study in which I participated took as its point of entry 
the fundamental rights and interests of children and prompts new thinking. 
First, the problems pointed out in some studies, such as safety, study-
weariness and misbehavior, are not specific to left-behind children. They are 
common for rural children. For example, the problem of transport safety is 
related to the recent merging and closure of primary schools in the country-
side, which implies that the children have no other choice but have to travel 
long distance to get to school. The problem of study-weariness has no direct 
relationship to whether or not their parents are at home. Obviously, the two 
problems are related to the policies on rural education. 
Then, there is the problem of guardianship for left-behind children. The best 
environment for them is still the family. Though the children are not living with 
both parents, they are still living amongst families and relatives. In this sense, 
there are defects in the different methods of substitute guardianship, for it is 
very difficult to substitute the parent-child relationship, and then the substi-
tute guardianship is not something that can be widely implemented. 
Third, whilst the intention behind creating the conditions necessary for 
children to move to towns and cities to live with their parents is absolutely 
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right, this is not something that can be achieved through a couple of policies. 
As we have seen above, many children are left behind because their parents 
are unable to shoulder the costs of living in the city for the whole family. This 
relates to urban residential systems and even urban planning, the latter involv-
ing whether migrant workers are to be incorporated into urban development 
strategies as essential members of that urban society. Further, this is also 
linked to migrant workers’ low pay or the unfair allocation of income. In sum, 
this is an issue that we must face: the responsibilities are heavy and the road to 
making real changes is long. 
4.3 The Impact of the Migration of Grown-up Offspring on their Elderly 
Parents
When younger family members go away to work, those back at home are 
able to share in the fruits of that labor. As this article has mentioned, this can 
improve their living standards. However, it can also give rise to tensions and 
problematic consequences.
When their grown-up children go away to work, not only do elderly parents 
have to help them with the cultivation of their land, but often they are also 
expected to take care of their grandchildren. Some elderly people have to look 
after the offspring of several adult children, and their burden is a heavy one. 
Also, since the number of children that a couple can have has been reduced 
by policies on family planning, these elderly people feel even greater pressure 
and responsibility in taking care of their grandchildren. One elderly person 
in X Village, Jiangxi Province told the researcher that one early evening in 
October 2005, their grandson suddenly became ill. The parents of the child 
were working away, and the elderly couple did not dare to wait around, so that 
night they piggybacked the child all the way to the hospital. Both of them were 
getting on in age and the journey to the hospital was all mountain paths, so it 
was not until the next morning that they managed to return home. They said, 
“We were as shattered as a pair of packhorses.”56
This article has already mentioned the phenomenon of vacuity in the vil-
lage when a large number of young people go away to find work. The older 
generation that remain in the village are the ones who are deeply affected by 
this. Aside from being lonely, they also entertain a deep-seated fear that their 
sons and daughters that have gone away to work will not come back. 
In Z Village, Sichuan, we made multiple visits to a family of elderly people 
who had been left behind. Both of the two sons belonging to this family had 
56   “X Village, Jiangxi, Sub-Team Research Material” from the “Qualitative Study on Poverty.”
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found wives not from the local area. The eldest son had moved to the place his 
wife was from, and the elderly couple were “so angry they were almost at the 
point of losing it.” Soon, their second son also found himself a wife who was 
not from their local area and let on that he was thinking about leaving. The 
elderly couple was broken-hearted. Seven years later when we paid another 
visit to this family, the second son had already brought his wife and child back 
with him and moved their household registration to their home in Sichuan. 
He had also just helped his parents to build a new house. This means that ulti-
mately the son was to return home. Now, though the elderly couple had four 
grandchildren to look after whereas seven years ago when we last met they had 
two, they appeared to be much healthier and in much better spirits than they 
did during our last visit. And now, they also complained very little about how 
tired out they were for taking care of their grandchildren. 
When it comes to the children that are left behind, although the elderly 
people have great pressure in looking after their grandchildren, still they are 
unwilling to let them leave their side. They also long for their own children to 
come back, but they know this is not realistic. The elderly are tangled in this 
conflicting state of mind, but practically they are left without any choice in 
the matter. At the same time, since the income from migrant work is becom-
ing more and more central as the main source of income in the countryside, 
those elderly people who are no longer able to go away to work are gradually 
becoming marginalized. Their power within the family clearly begins to slip 
away and they lose their authority. Many things are taken over by their chil-
dren’s generation. All that these elderly people are left able to do is help their 
children to look after certain specific tasks at home, such as working the land 
and caring for their grandchildren. The marginalization of elderly people is 
also manifested in their participation in community affairs. As we saw earlier 
in the case of the cadre from J Village in Sichuan, who said that “the elderly 
people that are left behind are unable to make decisions” in community affairs, 
the opinions of the elderly members of the community hold no weight, and 
actually the current system of community administration excludes the elderly 
from participating. Even when it comes to their role of guardians for their left-
behind grandchildren, there are also criticisms of the elderly generation, and 
their guardianship is considered unbeneficial for the children. 
In recent years, some areas have witnessed the springing up of Elderly 
Associations (老年协会), encouraged by local governments. Is this a way for 
elderly people to participate in society? Although I have not made specific 
investigations into this, according to the observations made in the research 
that forms the basis of this study, these organizations mainly function as 
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places for leisure and entertainment. No doubt, they are good for the physical 
and psychological well-being of elderly people, but they cannot change their 
marginalized position in the family and the community. 
However, marginalization and “being abandoned” are two very different 
issues. Our research shows that rural traditional ethics do still exist, largely 
owing to the conscience of individuals and the monitoring of the community 
through public opinion. In the above instance, when the second son of the 
elderly couple explained why it was important to build a new house (prior to 
this, the elderly couple had built houses for both of their two sons), he said that 
“it was mainly about what the old couple want.” However, this kind of tradition 
is gradually becoming diluted. What this change means for the rural commu-
nity and rural families remains to be observed. 
5 The Significance of Migration for Poverty and Poverty Alleviation 
By looking at two levels—the family and the community—as well as differ-
ent groups, specifically women, children and the elderly, this article has ana-
lyzed how migration has different effects at various levels and on particular 
groups, and also looked at its impact upon poverty and inequality. Through 
this analysis we can see that for all the five subjects, the migration of work-
ers from the countryside has both positive and negative effects. Its positive 
effects are mainly economic and developmental, for instance a huge reduction 
in absolute poverty, and the widespread improvement of living standards. Its 
negative effects are dispersed, mostly reflected in those aspects that are not 
directly related to economic or development issues. Examples of this are the 
weakening of unity in the community, an inundation of utilitarian values and 
so on. The extent of these positive or negative effects varies with areas, com-
munities, families and individuals. For example, the change in power relations 
within the family is a positive thing for young people, but it is a negative thing 
for elderly people. 
In general, during its early period, migration was useful in breaking down 
the barriers between the urban and the rural, and in getting rid of inequali-
ties in identity under the old system. However, as migration has continued, 
not only have inequalities failed to disappear, but they have actually grown. It 
should be noted that whilst this article analyses poverty and inequality from 
the perspective of migration, clearly migration is only one of the factors that 
cause growing inequality. It is even just an intermediary factor, through which 
other factors have aggravated inequality. The poverty of migrant workers in 
the city is a classic case in point. Another example would be the educational 
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gap between urban and rural children, which results from the latter’s study-
weariness and dropping-out-of-school. It is often thought that the cause of this 
study-weariness and dropping-out-of-school is related to migrant work, which 
tends to arouse an eagerness for seeking instant benefits. Actually, the influx of 
utilitarian values has already become a common social problem, and in cases 
where rural children are unable to see any other choice, going away to find 
work is simply a way out for them. 
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